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The implications of reliability based decisions are a vital component of the control and 
management of power systems. Network planners strive to achieve an optimum level of 
investments and reliability. Network operators on the other hand aim at mitigating the costs 
associated with low levels of reliability. Effective decision making requires the management of 
uncertainties in the process applied. Thus, the modelling of reliability inputs, methodology 
applied in assessing network reliability and the interpretation of the reliability outputs should 
be carefully considered in reliability analyses. 
 
This thesis applies probability density functions, as opposed to deterministic averages, to model 
component failures. The probabilistic models are derived from historical failure data that is 
usually confined to finite ranges. Thus, the Beta distribution which has the unique characteristic 
of being able to be rescaled to a different finite range is selected.  
 
The thesis presents a new reliability evaluation technique that is based on the sequential 
Monte Carlo simulation. The technique applies a time-dependent probabilistic modelling 
approach to network reliability parameters. The approach uses the Beta probability density 
functions to model stochastic network parameters while taking into account seasonal and time-
of-day influences. While the modelling approach can be applied to different aspects such as 
intermittent power supply and system loading, it is applied in this thesis to model the failure 
and repair rates of network components. Unlike the conventional sequential Monte Carlo 
methods, the new technique does not require the derivation of an inverse translation function 
for the probability distribution applied. The conventional Monte Carlo technique simulates the 
up and down component states when building their chronological cycles. The new technique 
applied here focuses instead on simulating the down states of component chronological cycles. 
The simulation determines the number of down states, when they will occur and how long they 
will last before developing the chronological cycle.  
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Tests performed on a published network show that focussing on the down states significantly 
improves the computation times of a sequential Monte Carlo simulation. Also, the reliability 
results of the new sequential Monte Carlo technique are more dependent on the input failure 
models than on the number of simulation runs or the stopping criterion applied to a simulation 
and in this respect gives results different from present standard approaches.  
 
The thesis also applies the new approach on a real bulk power network. The bulk network is 
part of the South African power grid. Thus, the network threats considered and the 
corresponding failure data collected are typical of the real South African conditions. The thesis 
shows that probability density functions are superior to deterministic average values when 
modelling reliability parameters. Probability density functions reflect the variability in reliability 
parameters through their dispersion and skewness. The time-dependent probabilistic approach 
is applied in both planning and operational reliability analyses. The component failure models 
developed show that variability in network parameters is different for planning and operational 
reliability analyses. The thesis shows how the modelling approach is used to translate long-term 
failure models into operational (short-term) failure models.  
 
DigSilent and MATLAB software packages are used to perform network stability and reliability 
simulations in this thesis. The reliability simulation results of the time-dependent probabilistic 
approach show that the perception on a network’s reliability is significantly impacted on when 
probability distribution functions that account for the full range of parameter values are applied 
as inputs. The results also show that the application of the probabilistic models to network 
components must be considered in the context of either network planning or operation. 
Furthermore, the risk-based approach applied to the interpretation of reliability indices 
significantly influences the perception on the network’s reliability performance. The risk-based 
approach allows the uncertainty allowed in a network planning or operation decision to be 
quantified. 
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The Swedish royal war-ship, the Vasa, is one of history’s great marvels [Borgenstam & 
Sandstroem, 1995]. Its capsizing in 1628 is however one of the great examples of poor design 
The Vasa capsized on its maiden voyage after travelling only 1300 m. Several reasons have been 
put forward to explain why the ship sank [HMS website]. One underlying aspect of the Vasa 
catastrophe, more than 3 centuries ago, still affects us today: Basing critical decisions on 
unreliable information and data. Such data is usually as a result of applying wrong or poor 
methodologies. The construction plan set out in the beginning was for a small ship but the 
builders of the Vasa were unsuccessful in changing the method appropriately when the Swedish 
King required the Vasa to be bigger and bigger.  
 
Reliability planning is based on the long-term state of a power network; a year, five years or 
longer. Planning is performed in the context of modifications required to the existing system so 
as to meet future power supply and demand contingencies. Network operation however looks 
to manage contingencies that affect the current state of the network. Operation involves power 
system security monitoring, fast simulation and implementation of emergency control and 
restoration protocols [Bebic, 2008; Schlabasch & Rofalski, 2008; Henderson et al, 2009]. 
Medium to short-term time windows lasting hours, days or months are usually applied in 
network operational studies.  
 
According to Li [2013], there are fundamental differences between reliability assessments for 
operation and long-term system planning. One expects the reliability requirements for network 
planning and operation to be different. Further, the influence of network conditions such as 
loading, generation and external factors should be modelled according to either a network’s 
planning or operational states. It may even be necessary in some cases to modify a 
component’s failure model from a planning state to an operational one [NERC report, 2012].  
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However, conventionally the same reliability methodology is applied to networks irrespective of 
whether the reliability results are required for a network planning or operation decision. Since 
network planning models do not cater for short-term changes in network parameters a 
situation similar to that faced by the builders of the Vasa is created; network operators not able 
to adjust the network models so as to cater for variable operating conditions. The operating 
decisions would thus be based on unrealistic and inaccurate reliability results which could lead 
to catastrophic results. 
 
Cost-risk analysis is a major component of reliability evaluation for network planning and 
operation. Planners aim to achieve a balance between network reliability and investment in the 
network, such that an increase in investments, targeting improved service reliability, has to be 
justified. Planners thus weigh the cost of investing to improve reliability with the losses that 
could occur (equipment damage, customer interruption costs and lost power sales) as a result 
of network unreliability. Network operators on the other hand are not only concerned with 
network risks that lead to network failure but also the cost attached to respective network 
failures. To ensure effective decision making at both planning and operation levels, the 
reliability models applied should not only represent network component parameters 
realistically but also ensure that the outputs are in a form that can be interpreted usefully by 
both planners and operators. 
 
This thesis explores the use of different reliability criteria for planning and operation purposes. 
A new reliability evaluation method will be applied. It will also be shown how the same 
approach can be consistently applied to either planning or operational reliability analyses and 
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1.2 NETWORK PLANNING AND OPERATION CHALLENGES 
 
It is widely accepted that the provision of continuous electricity-on-demand is neither 
technically nor economically feasible.  
Instead, the basic function of a power system is to supply power that satisfies the system load 
and energy requirements economically at acceptable levels of continuity and quality. However 
there exists a range of factors that directly and indirectly influence a network’s ability to 
perform its core function. 
 
Member countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
are called upon to ensure that their Green House Gas emissions do not exceed specified levels 
[UNFCCC website]. In the United Kingdom, so as to conform to a European Union directive to 
close the most polluting oil and coal fired power stations, 12 GW of generating capacity is 
expected to be lost. This, combined with the decommissioning of ageing nuclear reactors, 
means that prolonged power cuts in the United Kingdom are imminent [Fells Associates, 2008; 
Kinver, 2008]. The South African electricity consumption growth for the next 20 years is 
forecast at an average rate of 3%. To ensure adequate reserve margins, 20 GW of additional 
generation capacity is required by 2020 and 40 GW by 2030 [IRP, 2010]. Such expansions, 
requiring significant capital investment while maintaining adequate power delivery, should be 
carefully included in the long term planning of a network. Renewable energy sources are one of 
the ‘green’ solutions to meeting the ever increasing demand for electricity. The emergence of 
such power sources and their increasing penetration levels impact on network planning and 
operation. With such variable supply included, planners have to be careful before 
approximating base generation to constant levels while operators have to probabilistically 
assess the available supply before load scheduling. 
 
New concepts and practices have also led to operating conditions not previously observed, that 
significantly impact on network reliability and its evaluation [Borges et al, 2001]. Deregulation 
has increased competition so that bulk power sales have grown.  
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As a result the number and level of power transfers between systems have increased pushing 
network components closer to their maximum ratings. In addition, interconnection of national 
grids and the strong reliance of critical infrastructures on each other significantly influence 
planning and operation. The increased complexity of networks may turn a local disturbance in 
one system or sub-grid into a blackout via cascading events with catastrophic effects [Mili & 
Qiu, 2004]. According to Lee [2009], measures used to quantify the failure of current networks 
to supply power must be able to compute the probability and impact of different failure stages.  
 
A key limitation to the availability and quality of electricity supply is the unpredictability of 
network operating conditions. Energy markets, transmission open access and restructuring of 
the electric utility sector have introduced unprecedented uncertainty in transmission planning 
and operation practices [Marakov & Hardiman, 2003]. One of the major sources of uncertainty 
in operating conditions is the sporadic behaviour of a network’s environment. In particular, the 
risk posed by external network threats such as adverse weather. This has not only increased the 
significance of reliability analysis to the planning, design and operation of power systems, but 
also facilitated changes in the methodologies applied. New methods being developed for 
reliability analysis need to incorporate probabilistic multi-scenario assessment [Marakov & 
Hardiman, 2003]. 
 
The above issues indicate that networks face a problem with several dimensions. The network 
risks faced by planners and operators are similar. The models, decisions and approaches 
applied to network planning could manifest themselves as constraints to operation. A 
probabilistic approach ensures flexibility in reliability assessment (hazard and risk). Such an 
approach might be useful and replace conventional contingency approaches and even develop 
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1.3 REVIEW OF WORLD WIDE ENVIRONMENT INDUCED NETWORK OUTAGES 
 
Literature defining and analyzing network risks is available from many authors. A key aspect in 
the definition of network risks is the impact of their occurrence. According to Koonce et al 
[2008], the event that occurs, the likelihood of it occurring and the assessment of its 
consequences are what constitute a risk.  
Falcao and Bollen [2009] term network risks as ‘exceptional’ or ‘force majeure’ if they resulted 
from events that were not only sufficiently rare, but also with an effective cause beyond control 
of the network operator.  Lee [2009] also categorized failure events in terms of their likelihood 
of occurrence and the acceptability levels of their consequences. It is also stated that the 
different categories of events that constitute network risks vary greatly in terms of their nature 
and degree [Lee, 2009]. Network risks lead to power interruptions which have negative social, 
financial and environmental impacts. The many causes of power interruptions can be 
categorized into component degradation, environmental factors, utility maintenance, human 
error and unknown factors. However, component degradation and environmental factors 
contribute most to power interruptions.  
 
1.3.1 Component degradation 
Component failures are usually deemed a result of different types of deterioration. For 
mechanical components the different failure mechanisms can be grouped into four main 
categories: corrosion, erosion, overload and fatigue. Component failures can be further 
categorized as either chance or non-chance failures [Li, 2005]. Chance failures relate to sudden 
component failures while non-chance failures consider planned outages and component 
ageing. Component life-cycles take on different shapes. The bathtub curve shown in Figure 1.1 
is commonly used to represent the life-cycle of component/ equipment and system failures. 
Chance failures occur during the useful life portion while ageing failures occur during the end of 
life portion of the curve.  
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Figure 1.1: Variation of component failure rate with time [Wilkins, 2002] 
 
While the bathtub curve could be applied to electronic components, real transformer failure 
data does not follow the same trend [Jagers et al, 2007]. Chance failures are random fatal 
events independent of the age of a component. Such failures are usually modelled such that 
the component failure rate is deemed constant [Li, 2005]. The failure models presented in this 
research can be developed for any region of a component’s lifecycle. 
  
1.3.2 Environmental factors 
Power networks are exposed to a range of external threats that lead to outages. The 
occurrence and severity of external threats are quite variable. It is for this reason that the use 
of constant values to represent component failure parameters in the useful life-section of the 
bath-tub curve is questionable. Compared to other environmental factors such as animals, tree 
contact and motor vehicle accidents, adverse weather conditions contribute most to failures 
and faults in bulk networks [Chowdhury & Koval, 2008]. Adverse weather elements such as 
lightning, strong winds and conductor icing are the commonly known elements that cause 
power outages because their occurrence leads to immediate component failure, particularly to 
transmission lines. While it is clear how adverse weather affects transmission lines, power 
generation has also been significantly influenced by change in weather patterns. The gradual 
drop in hydropower generation in East Africa was linked back to dropping levels of liquid 
precipitation [Mason et al, 2006].  
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Wind and solar based power generation is also sensitive to wind speeds and irradiation levels 
respectively. Research on other adverse space conditions patterns such as geomagnetically 
induced currents (GICs) that do not lead to immediate component failure is ongoing.  
 
Some of the major world-wide power outages in recent years are summarized in Table 1.1. 
Some outages were catastrophic while others led to rolling black outs. It should be stated that 
Table 1.1 is not exhaustive. 
Table 1.1: Summary of some significant power outages around the world 
Location Date 
Scale 
(population or GW or duration) 
Brazil [Filho et al, 2000] 11/03/1999 >90M customers 25 GW,  5 hours 
East Africa [USGAO, 2005; Mason 
et al, 2006] 
2000-2005 1.5M customers, 0.12-0.3 GW 
North America [POSTS, 2004] 14/08/2003 50M customers, 62 GW, > 1 hour 
Italy [UCTE report, 2004] 28/09/2003 57M customers, 27.7 GW, 27 minutes 
Indonesia [Jakarta Post] 18/08/2005 >100M customers, >7hours 
Western Cape-South Africa 
[Eskom report, 2006] 
19/02/2006 9 GW, > 1 week 
Kosovo [KOST, 2007] 24/07/2007 
Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, >1 hour 30 minutes 
France, Spain [BBC news; RTE, 
2010] 
23/01/2009 >1.7M customers, >12 minutes 
Brazil, Paraguay [Fox news, 2009] 10/11/2009 60M customers, >20GW, 4 hours 
Texas-US [Reuters-US, 2011; 
Reuters-Africa, 2011] 
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Brazil, 11th March 1999 
A lightning bolt struck the Bauru 440 kV bus bar causing a phase-to-ground fault. All five 440 kV 
lines connected to the sub-station opened and the power system began to collapse starting 
with the disconnection of T.Irmãos-I.Soteira 440 kV. A sequence of tripping of a number of 
power plants in the São Paulo area and loss of both the HVDC and 750 kV AC links from Itiapu 
finally led to the separation of the whole system.  A loss of 24.7 GW load for up to 5 hours was 
caused by this disturbance [Filho et al, 2000; Chen, 2004] 
 
East Africa, 2000-2005 
Droughts in East Africa in 1999-2004 had a serious impact on the hydroelectric facilities in the 
East African region. Stager et al [2007] and Mason [2008] correlated drops in river flow rates to 
sun spots. In Uganda the hydro power generation of the Nalubaale power station dropped by 
more than 50% (300MW–120MW) between 2000 and 2005 leading to rolling blackouts. 
Neighbouring countries, Kenya particularly that imports electricity from Uganda also suffered 
severe power shortages [USGAO, 2005; Mason et al, 2006].  
 
Western Cape Province, South Africa, 18-19 February 2006 
High pollution levels and misty conditions caused several lines into the Western Cape (South 
Africa) to trip, resulting in a full blackout on the 18th and 19th February 2006 [Eskom, 2006]. 
 
Kosovo, 24th July 2007 
On 24 July 2007 at 15:59 hrs a power blackout of Kosovo power system occurred. The black out 
was attributed to the 2007 European heat wave. The blackout affected Albania and Macedonia, 
with a partial blackout in Monte Negro and Serbia [KOST, 2007]. 
 
France and Spain, 23rd January 2009 
Hurricane-force winds in south-western France and northern Spain left more than a million 
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Brazil and Paraguay, 10th November 2009 
Heavy rain, lightning and strong winds caused three transformers on a vital high-voltage 
transmission line to short circuit. Two other lines went down as part of the automatic safety 
mechanism. The massive Itaipu dam on the border with Paraguay, the world's second-largest 
hydroelectric power producer, was completely shut down during the blackout. The blackout cut 
electricity to 18 of Brazil's 26 states and left them without power for up to four hours. All of 
Paraguay briefly lost power [Fox News-11/11/2009]. 
Texas-US, 02nd February 2011 
More than 50 generating units, capable of producing 7 GW of power, shut down due to 
extreme cold, forcing the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the grid operator, to 
impose rolling blackouts [Reuters US-03/02/11; Reuters Africa-10/02/11]. 
 
Herman and Gaunt [2008; 2010] distinguish between power failures based on the frequency 
and likelihood of their occurrence. Three types of network interruptions were identified; 
momentary, sporadic and chronic interruptions. 
 
 Momentary Interruptions are characterized by flicker, dips and sags caused by switching 
actions such as auto-reclosers. Such operations mainly affect transmission and 
distribution networks. LaCommare and Eto [2004] state that momentary interruptions 
in some cases constitute over 60 % of a network’s total outages and consequently 
significantly affect power delivery systems. They are due to temporary faults, lasting for 
short durations dependent on the time-delay settings of the auto-recloser (less than 30 
seconds), and are thus usually ignored in broader reliability assessments.  
 Sporadic interruptions are common to networks with robust power delivery systems 
such as those in developed countries. In most cases such interruptions are caused by 
adverse weather conditions and mainly affect transmission and distribution systems. 
Sporadic interruptions usually occur when reclosing systems lock-out due to sustained 
faults [Yun et al, 2003]. According to several utilities, sporadic interruptions last more 
than 1 minute long [Bevers & Saint, 2006].  
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 Chronic interruptions occur regularly and affect the generation, transmission and 
transmission facilities of a network. Such interruptions are generally due to load 
shedding necessitated by a shortfall in generation, age induced equipment failure, a lack 
of maintenance and compromise of the capacity carrying ability of delivery systems. This 
type of interruption is typical of developing nations where the load growth outstrips the 
supply and network reinforcement requires substantial investment. In developed 
countries, loss of critical generation units could lead to chronic interruptions. 
 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The effects of external threats can be categorized based on the short- and long-term states of a 
network. As such, reliability methodologies should model, analyze and quantify network risks in 
the respective categories. The use of different reliability parameters for network planning and 
operating reliability studies is however uncommon.  
 
A reliability approach that has sufficient flexibility is required to take into account the influence 
of variable network risks on either network planning or operation. It appears that a probabilistic 
technique could be more useful than the present approaches of contingency analysis.  
Thus the hypothesis that this research is based on is that:  
Incorporation of continuous probability distributions in reliability analyses to account for 
network interruptions caused by adverse external conditions contributes to effective network 
planning and operation decisions. 
 
The research questions required to test the validity of the hypothesis include:  
Qn.1: How is network reliability evaluated and how are the results represented? 
The concept of network reliability is not new. The risks to which networks are exposed have 
however evolved. It is thus important to determine how the evaluation of bulk network 
reliability has changed and the techniques developed thus far. The different indices computed 
as reliability outputs and how they are presented in literature will also be investigated. 
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Qn.2: How applicable are continuous probability distributions in network reliability analyses? 
External threats such as adverse weather elements are stochastic such that the conventional 
use of average values to describe and model them may not be sufficient [Billinton & Allan, 
1992]. The use of an average value assumes that the parameter being described will not change 
throughout the analysis period. Network risks such as those posed by adverse weather 
elements change per climatic season and occur for short periods of time.  
It has been shown that the impact of variation in reliability parameters (due to intermittent 
operating conditions) on reliability indices can be clearly presented using probability 
distributions. This question aims at identifying the distributions commonly applied in reliability 
analyses. A reliability analysis that considers network risks whose intensity is dependent on the 
season and time-of-day, requires a probability distribution that can exhibit any level of 
skewness (right or left) and also represent data that falls within a finite range. Literature will be 
analyzed to determine which probability distributions are suitable for this purpose. 
 
Qn.3: What block of a power network is required for this analysis? 
It is important to identify in literature the section of the power network (generation, 
transmission or distribution) that is significantly affected by stochastic network threats.  
 
Qn.4: What is the effect of external threats on bulk networks and what contingency 
approaches have been developed for modelling vulnerability of network components to 
external threats? 
The causes of power interruptions include both internal degradation and external threats like 
inclement and even extreme weather, and these are necessary inputs to any model of 
reliability. External threats are however characterized by intermittency and therefore create 
uncertainty in the performance of bulk networks. It is thus important to analyze the effect of 
variable external threats on network components. Literature will be reviewed to analyze the 
approaches developed thus far and applicable modelling component reliability parameters 
(failure rate and restoration time) when exposed to external network threats.  
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This research posits that variability in network risks impact network planning and operation 
differently. The modelling approaches applied in the thesis should thus be able to take into 
account the different requirements of planning and operation reliability analyses. 
 
Qn.5: How significantly do seasonal and time-of-day variations impact on component 
reliability parameters? 
The stochasticity in network component parameters is both inherent and induced. The most 
significant source of variability in reliability parameters is the external environment of a 
network which changes with season and time-of-day. A review of how seasonal and time-of-day 
variations influence network parameters is required. Reliability analysis for planning purposes is 
on a long term basis and annual time lines are usually considered. For network operation, a 
more dynamic approach is required for the analysis. The potential of an approach that analyzes 
reliability parameters and the network risks that affect them according to the season and time 
of occurrence will be investigated. A season could represent any given period such as an hour, a 
week or months for operation and a year or longer for planning. A season could also be based 
on the climatic seasons in a year.  
 
Qn.6: How can continuous probability distributions be incorporated in either planning or 
operational reliability analyses? 
This question will help determine the reliability technique that is most suitable for the type of 
analysis proposed in the thesis. The technique should be able to incorporate the probability 
distribution(s) selected for use in the thesis. A number of software packages have been 
developed for reliability studies. Most of them however use single deterministic values as 
reliability inputs and outputs. The technique selected should be able to use reliability inputs 
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Qn.7: Does the use of probability distributions in either network planning or operation studies 
yield more useful results for each scenario? 
Realistic and accurate reliability analyses are critical to network planning and operation 
decision making. The outputs of the reliability model applied in this research must be in a form 
that can be interpreted usefully by both planners and operators. More information could be 
derived from a reliability analysis when probability distributions are used to describe its 
outcomes compared with using the average values.  
The level of skewness of the distribution of an index is quite important when interpreting the 
index. Instead of computing single deterministic values, reliability indices should also be 
represented as PDFs to allow for a range of values per index. This way the impact of risk-based 
decision making on planning and operation practices can be investigated. 
 
Qn.8: Can PDFs be applied in linking planning and operational failure models? 
Network planning and operation reliability studies require different inputs. Network planning 
studies are based on long-term periods while operation considers short-term periods. The 
threats investigated in each analysis are however the same. Variability and severity of network 
threats are also distinct in the network operation scenario. One could thus regard operational 
failure models as planning failure models modified so as to account for an increase or decrease 
in the probability of failure of the network components.  
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
 
Chapters two and three present the literature reviewed that relates to some of the research 
questions posed in Section 1.4. Chapter two discusses the concept of reliability. It highlights the 
need for reliability evaluation, the techniques applied and the factors that hinder effective 
reliability evaluation. Chapter two also discusses the probability distributions proposed in 
literature for use in reliability studies. Chapter three discusses the effect of a network’s external 
environment on its generation and transmission facilities.  
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The chapter then provides an in-depth discussion on the component vulnerability modelling 
approaches proposed in literature. The models highlighted relate component failure to 
intermittent failure causes. The shortcomings and limitations of the modelling approaches are 
presented. The chapter also assesses the correlation between network failures and seasonal 
and time-of-day variations. 
 
Chapter four analyzes the areas identified in literature that require improvement so as to 
validate the thesis hypothesis. The chapter considers the probability distribution, reliability 
simulation method and network failure modelling approach required. The suitability of the Beta 
PDF which thus far has had limited application in reliability studies is analyzed. A comparative 
study is performed with the commonly applied PDFs. The time-dependent probabilistic 
approach (TDPA) for reliability analysis that is applied in this research is also developed in 
Chapter four. The component vulnerability model applied that incorporates probability 
distributions is described. The chapter further discusses the methodology applied when 
deriving probabilistic models for both network planning and operation cases.  
The performance of the TDPA is tested on a published test network and compared with one of 
the conventional reliability evaluation methods. 
 
Chapter five applies the TDPA to a real power network. The South African power grid and local 
weather threats typical of the region are considered. The chapter presents the input failure 
models applied in the planning and operation case studies performed on the network. The case 
studies performed on the real network aim at investigating the impact the input failure models 
have on the perception of a network’s reliability. The planning case studies aim at showing the 
importance of using the right input failure models in a reliability analysis. The operational study 
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Chapter six presents and discusses the results of the planning and operational TDPA 
simulations. The chapter discusses the implications of representing reliability inputs as PDFs. 
The importance of the selecting the correct failure model and applying it appropriately is also 
discussed. The improvement PDFs make to index interpretation is discussed. The chapter 
emphasizes the impact of risk-based decision making i.e. the significance of attaching a risk or 
confidence level to index values is presented.  
 
Chapter seven uses the TDPA to analyze the effect of network threats whose occurrence has 
both immediate and deferred effects on the network. The chapter specifically analyses global 
space weather threats on the reliability of a network already predisposed to local weather 
threats. While the GIC threat can be considered a planning issue, it significantly affects the 
operation of a network. The chapter thus shows how planning PDF models can be modified to 
account for elevation in component risk of failure due to such threats. Thus, translating long-
term failure models for use in operational analyses. The implications of the results computed 
with the GIC threat considered are also discussed in the chapter.  
 
Chapter eight presents the conclusions drawn from the research. A review of the answers to 
the research questions is presented and the validity of the hypothesis assessed. Some 
implications of the thesis research are also presented. 
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 M. Edimu, K. Awodele, C. T. Gaunt, R. Herman, Appropriate protocol for applying 
Beta probability distribution functions to reliability data-sets, submitted to IEEE 
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reliability assessment process for decision-making in South Africa using CIC surveys, 
19th Southern African Universities Power Engineering Conference, Johannesburg, 
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Reliability of power networks is not a new concept. Engineers and network operators in the 
past used only experience to help determine and predict power system performance. The 
power industry has however evolved since the early 1890s and with this, the network risks to 
which power networks are exposed. Developments in the power industry such as energy 
markets, transmission open access, interconnection of national grids and, networking of 
electricity systems to other critical infrastructures have directly or indirectly changed the way 
utilities are planned and operated [Borges et al, 2001]. Utilities are less sufficient and more 
dependent on their neighbours for imported power. Financial and environmental constraints in 
the last decade or so have worsened the situation. The mode of operation of power networks 
around the world is now different from what was initially planned; with increased power 
interchanges occurring. The management of reliability is even more critical today to network 
planners and operators. Improvements, not only in the evaluation techniques used but also in 
the way analysis results are presented and interpreted, are required. 
 
2.2 RELIABILITY OF A POWER NETWORK 
 
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) defines reliability of a component or 
system as its ability to perform the functions required of it under given operational and 
environmental conditions, for a stated period of time [ISO, 1994]. Network reliability is also 
described in terms of two main aspects, network adequacy and network security [Billinton & 
Allan, 1992]. 
 
Network adequacy is the ability of a network to not only generate, but also supply the electrical 
demand and energy required by consumers.  
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‘Adequacy’ is concerned with continuity of supply i.e. the facilities necessary to generate 
sufficient energy and the associated transmitting facilities required to supply all load under 
performance requirements [Leite da Silva et al, 1993; CEER report, 2005]. Network security on 
the other hand relates to ability of the network to respond to dynamic or transient disturbances 
occurring in the network [Billinton & Li, 1994]. Security thus considers the quality of supply and 
the ability of the system to respond to the various perturbations to which it is subjected [Fong 
& Grigg, 1994]. Billinton and Li [1994] state that these perturbations include conditions 
associated with local and widespread disturbances and the abrupt loss of major generation 
and/or transmission facilities which can lead to transient, dynamic or voltage instability of the 
network. 
 
Reliability analyses on a power network are carried out separately in the functional zones of a 
power system; generation, transmission and distribution. Generation system reliability 
evaluation examines the total generation capacity to determine its adequacy to meet the total 
system load requirement [Billinton & Allan, 1996]. Distribution system reliability evaluation 
focuses on the impact of distribution element failures on individual consumer load points. 
Distribution systems are usually localized to one geographical location such that all the 
components are always exposed to the same weather elements.  
 
The work presented in this thesis was carried out on a composite or bulk power system. This is 
a system consisting of only the generation and transmission facilities of a power network 
[Billinton & Allan, 1988; Zhang & Billinton, 1998]. While reliability analysis of composite systems 
is a complex task, the impact of interruptions at this level makes the analysis a vital component 
of power system planning and operation. Not only are the number of electricity customers 
affected always high, but significant resources are usually required to restore power supply to 
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2.3 MEASURING NETWORK RELIABILITY 
 
This section aims at identifying and describing the main techniques developed in literature for 
reliability evaluation. The representation of reliability outputs is also discussed. 
 
Measurement of reliability performance has become and continues to be more established in 
the power industry. In fact, several guidelines and codes have been revised to ensure more 
realistic reliability specifications of engineering design. A Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) ruling in USA called for the development of new reliability standards to 
address power network risks previously disregarded [FERC, 2013]. Haldar and Mahadevan 
[2000] mention the American Institute of Steel Construction Load and Resistance Factor design 
specifications and the European and Canadian structural design specifications as having been 
reviewed to include the probabilistic nature of reliability. Reliability performance measurement 
provides feedback to utility planners on the results of executed plans and to operations 
personnel on the reliability effects of operating and maintenance practices [Fong & Grigg 1994]. 
Reliability evaluation however does not benefit planners and operators alone. According to 
Fong and Grigg *1994+, information on actual reliability “can be helpful to customers planning to 
locate in the utility’s service area. Through measurement, it is also possible to determine the 
difference in reliability performance between operating districts within a utility.” 
 
2.3.1 Reliability Indices 
While it helps to know what events lead to unreliability in a system, it is of added importance to 
know the probability of occurrence and severity of these events, hence the need for reliability 
or unreliability indices [Fong & Grigg, 1994]. Reliability indices are determined for a given 
system or component and it is the interpretation of these indices that sheds light on how 
reliable the system or component is.  
 
Network reliability indices can be regarded as either past performance indices or predictive 
indices.  
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This categorization depends on whether the indices computed are to provide information 
relating to future system performance or show actual performance of the system [Endrenyi, 
1978]. It is common for network planners to base their decisions on past performance indices. 
Predictive indices are however more applicable to operational purposes. 
Indices can be calculated so as to provide information on the reliability of either the overall 
system reliability or at individual load buses.  
 
Load point and overall system indices complement each other. Load point indices are very 
useful in system design and in comparing alternative network configurations, while system 
indices indicate the ability of a composite system to meet its total load demands [Billinton & 
Kumar, 1990]. Several reliability indices can be identified. According to Billinton & Kumar [1990] 
“it should be noted however, that the selection and definition of these indices are very 
dependent upon the intent behind the studies and the methodologies used.” The most 
appropriate indices are dependent on a given system and its requirements [Fong & Grigg, 
1994]. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) proposed indices for use in 
reliability studies. These are described in Appendix A. Most indices identified for use in power 
system evaluation can generally fit into four categories: Probabilities, Frequencies, Durations 
and Expectations [Billinton & Kumar, 1990]. After determining the probability, frequency and 
duration of failure of a given network outage, one can go on to evaluate most of the other 
indices required for an analysis [Endrenyi, 1978].   
 
Billinton and Wangdee [2006] state that system reliability performance based on average 
interruption information may not be sufficient. Such average values are valuable information 
but provide only a single customer risk dimension without underlying probability distributions. 
Random events affecting power networks like the occurrence of a fault or the time to restore 
the service after a fault are represented by using random variables. As such, reliability indices 
built on the basis of these random variables would also become random variables [Carpaneto & 
Chicco, 2004]. The performance indices of a power system should be considered as stochastic 
values with inherent variability.  
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Wangdee & Billinton [2005] state that indices vary from year to year and should therefore be 
regarded as random variables that are dependent on the system topology, operating 
philosophy and external conditions. More information could be derived from the outputs of a 
reliability analysis if probability distributions were used to describe them, compared to using 
average values [Billinton & Huang, 2005]. The level of skewness of the distribution of an index is 
important when interpreting the index [Billinton & Allan, 1996]. For example, the likelihood of 
occurrence of extreme events can be investigated using the tails of a distribution.  
Histograms have previously been used to determine the probability distribution that fits a given 
reliability index. Probability density functions (PDFs) are characterized by shape and range 
parameters [Walpole, 2007; Papoulis, 1991]. One could thus infer on the shape of an index 
probability distribution without having to plot a histogram of the index data set.  
 
2.3.2 Network reliability measurement techniques 
The techniques identified for use in reliability evaluation can be designated as either 
deterministic or probabilistic. Deterministic techniques have traditionally been used by system 
planners who attempt to predict a network’s operational status using past experience *Billinton 
& Allan, 1992]. Some of the drawbacks identified with deterministic techniques include [Song et 
al, 2006]: 
 Variability in input data  and uncertainty in operating conditions is ignored 
 Contingencies considered neglect unlikely events such as cascading failures 
 No indication is provided on the severity of risks falling beyond the deterministic 
security boundary 
 Plans that satisfy the traditional criteria are assumed free of failure risk which is 
misleading 
Probabilistic techniques complement deterministic techniques. The two techniques are usually 
combined. Probabilistic techniques overcome the fact that deterministic techniques cannot 
account for the stochastic behaviour of power networks [Billinton & Allan, 1992].  
They consider the likelihood of possible outages occurring by capturing the increased risk due 
to multiple scenarios and uncertainty in future operating conditions [Song et al, 2006].  
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Most of the probabilistic techniques identified in literature can be categorized as either 
analytical methods or simulation ones [Singh & Mitra, 1997].  
 
2.3.2.1 Analytical Methods 
The use of analytical methods involves the development of mathematical models to represent 
the network and derive reliability indices through numerical computation [Fong & Grigg, 1994; 
Billinton & Huang, 2005]. Several books and research papers have been published on the 
concepts, models, algorithms software and application of analytical methods [Billinton & Allan, 
1992; Beshir et al, 1996; Li, 2005]. A key component of analytical methods is network reduction. 
Billinton and Allan [1992] and Beshir et al [1996] describe in detail how some reduction 
methods can be applied to a network.  
 
Many analytical methods have been developed such as Markov methods, application of 
conditional probability, fault and event tree method and the cut set approach [Billinton & Allan, 
1992]. The most significant analytical method, with regard to bulk networks, is the State 
Enumeration Method (SEM). This method analytically evaluates all possible system states up to 
a specified maximum contingency level or probability threshold According to Li [2005], 
evaluation of system reliability using SEM is based on the expansion of (2.1) to (2.3). 
P(S) = ∏    ∏   
   
   
 
         (2.1) 
 
F(S) = P(S) ∑   
 




∑   
 
   
       (2.3) 
P(S), F(S) and D(S): probability, frequency and mean duration of a system state (S) occurring 
Pi and Qi: success and failure probabilities of the i
th component 
N: total number of components in the system 
F and N-f: number of failed and non-failed components in system state S respectively  
λi: departure rate (either failure or repair rate) of the i
th component from state S 
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According to Solver and Amelin *2006+, “analyzing risks using numerical reliability methods is 
rather complicated even for small systems, and the altitude level of the complexity grows rather 
quickly to cumbersome proportions as the system grows larger.” This can be explained by the 
fact that power networks are complex systems, highly integrated and almost always with a 
great number of components. The failure of these networks is not only dependent on other 
network components but also on the environment in which the network operates [Haroonabadi 
& Haghifam, 2009]. Given (2.1) to (2.4) and that the number of system states increases 
exponentially with the number of system components, it is clear that application of SEM to 
large real networks makes the analysis a cumbersome task [Billinton & Allan, 1996; Yongji et al, 
1999].  
 
So as to reduce the number of failure states enumerated in an analysis a maximum contingency 
level (fault level) is selected or a minimum system state probability threshold is set. Some 
system states are thus deemed negligible [Zhang & Billinton, 1998]. A contingency level is 
determined by the number of components in a given system outage state. The first contingency 
level involves only single component outages. The second and third contingency levels consider 
up to two and three simultaneous component outages respectively [Billinton & Allan, 1992]. It 
is usually assumed that higher contingency levels are unlikely to occur i.e. they have very low 
probabilities of occurrences such that system states with probabilities lower than the specified 
threshold are neglected. The likelihood of occurrence of extreme events such as the 25th/01/ 
2009 widespread power outage in Northern France and Southern Spain [BBC news, 13th 
/10/2009] or the Italian black-out on 28th /09/ 2003 [UCTE report, 2004] may be low. When 
such events do occur, the impact is very severe. With analytical methods, such events or system 
states are neglected. As a network gets larger more assumptions are required such that the 
final network model developed could be unrealistic [Endrenyi, 1978; Billinton & Allan, 1992].  
 
Analytical methods are thus more suitable when an overview of a system’s reliability is 
required. This makes such methods more applicable to planning studies which are based on the 
average performance of a network.  
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Analytical techniques could provide snapshots of the operational state of a network. Network 
operation is however so variable that corresponding reliability studies require more dynamic 
techniques. 
 
2.3.2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation methods 
Monte Carlo simulation consists of randomly sampling system states, testing them for 
acceptability, and aggregating the contribution of loss of load states to the reliability indices till 
the coefficients of variation of these indices drop below pre-specified tolerances [Singh & Mitra, 
1996].  
 
Simulation methods, through random sampling, simulate the actual performance of a network 
[Haroonabadi & Haghifam, 2009]. One significant difference between analytical methods, SEM 
in particular, and Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) methods, is the way system states are chosen 
and analyzed. With SEM, the system states are chosen from a predefined list [Rei et al, 2006]. 
One key SEM assumption, for application of (2.1), is that system states are mutually exclusive 
such that the failure of a given component is never dependent on, or as a result of, failure of 
another component [Li, 2005]. This is not a realistic condition since cascading network failures 
are usually due to operational dependencies [Chen, 2004; Lee, 2008].  
 
The most common simulation method used is Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). With MCS, the 
stochastic nature of power networks is taken into account and system states are generated 
randomly. It is usually necessary to evaluate not only simultaneous outages of a number of 
system components, but also dependent failure system states due to the severity of their 
impact [Rei & Schilling, 2008].  
 
According to the Blackout White Paper compiled by IEEE PES Power System Dynamic 
Performance Committee [PSDPC, 2004]: 
“On August 14th 2003, a cascading outage of transmission and generation facilities in the North 
American Eastern Interconnection resulted in a blackout of most of New York state as well as 
parts of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Ontario Canada. 
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On September 23rd 2003, nearly four million customers lost power in eastern Denmark and 
southern Sweden following a cascading outage that struck Scandinavia. Days later, a cascading 
outage between Italy and the rest of central Europe left most of Italy in darkness on September 
28th.“ 
 
Apart from consideration of all system states, MCS methods treat the input parameters of a 
reliability analysis as random variables and let them take on values according to specified 
probability distribution functions (PDFs) [Alvehag, 2008]. If the system components are 
statistically independent, system states are determined by sampling from PDFs of each 
component [Rei et al, 2006]. Also, through repetition, a whole set of values can be computed 
from a given reliability analysis. Index data sets can thus be derived that are not estimates of 
the average index value. The underlying probability distributions can be determined from these 
data sets [Miranda et al, 2009]. The derivation of statistical parameters from reliability data sets 
and the use of PDFs to model component failure rates and present reliability indices will be 
discussed later. 
 
Two main MCS methods have been identified in literature: 
 Non-Sequential MCS: State Sampling Method (SSM) 
 Sequential MCS: State Duration Method (SDM) 
 
Non-Sequential MCS: State Sampling Method (SSM) 
This MCS method samples all states of the components without considering the chronology of 
time-dependent events. The concept is based on the fact that a system state is a combination 
of component states and each component state can be determined by sampling the probability 
of the component appearing in that state [Li, 2003; Li, 2005]. 
 
Random numbers are generated and compared to the failure probabilities of the components. 
The range of a given random number determines the state of the component (available/up, de-
rated or failure/down).  
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The steps below describe the procedure for using non-sequential MCS: 
1) For each component, generate a random number Ui. It is assumed that the behaviour of 
each component can be categorized by a uniform distribution (0, 1) 
2) Compare the random number generated with the respective component’s forced outage 
rate (FOR). Probability of component outage is determined based on comparison with 
the FOR i.e. if Ui is less than the corresponding FOR, the component is deemed to be in a 
failed state, otherwise, it is in service (up-state) 
3) Outage of a component can directly lead to load curtailment at a load point. Otherwise, a 
DC load flow could be applied to evaluate any resulting load curtailments  
4) Steps 1 and 3 are repeated for all the components  
5) The load curtailment states are accumulated and the adequacy indices computed for 
different load points and the overall system 
 
The flow chart in Figure 2.1 shows how steps 1–5 are implemented for an SSM analysis. The 
only network parameter input required by SSM for the sampling process is each component’s 
FOR. It then becomes easy to simulate component and network unavailability due to different 
factors like ageing and weather. The results of SEM are always estimates of the network 
reliability or unreliability on an annual basis. This is not always the case with SSM. Simulations 
can be easily performed over any length of time; short term weekly, monthly, or seasonal) or 
long term (yearly, every 10 years etc) [Li, 2005].  
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Figure 2.1: Data Flow for applying State Sampling Method [Edimu, 2009] 
 
The SSM does not allow for variable inputs and is thus suitable for analyzing states with static 
conditions. Also, the inability of SSM to allow for chronology of time-dependent events means 
that realistic failure frequency and duration cannot be evaluated. From SSM, the frequency of 
the given state occurring can be determined. The inverse of this provides the maximum 
expected duration of lying in the state. Thus, SSM does not provide a well rounded impression 
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Sequential MCS: State Duration Method (SDM) 
SDM is applied when dealing with chronological events such that the probability of occurrence 
of different states, frequency and duration can be evaluated [Billinton & Li, 1994]. Random 
numbers generated are converted into state durations using the component state distribution 
functions. The system state transition cycle is then obtained by combining the probabilistically 
generated up-and-down component cycles [Fong & Grigg, 1994; Billinton & Tang, 2004]. The 
steps below describe the basic procedure when using the conventional sequential MCS: 
1) Assume the initial states of the system components in the analysis period. A component 
can either be in or out of service  
2) For a given component, generate two uniformly distributed random numbers, Ui and Ri  
3) Use the random numbers to compute the component time-to-failure (TTF) and time-to-
repair (TTR). Component TTFs and TTRs can be described by any distribution. The 
reliability data dictates the distribution used i.e. the distribution that best fits the data is 
selected. Goel [2000] illustrated how different distributions can be applied in a 
sequential MCS. For any distribution, an inverse translation function is derived so that 
time random numbers generated are changed in time-to-failure and time-to-repair 
quantities. The exponential distribution has a simple inverse translation as shown in 
(2.4) and (2.5). This could explain why it has had extensive use in reliability studies. 
 
     
 
 
            (2.4) 
 
      
 
 
            (2.5) 
λ: failure rate  
µ: repair rate 
Tup: time to component failure 
Tdn: time to component repair 
 
4) Repeat steps 2 and 3 to create a chronological state transition cycle for the component 
in the time span required 
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5) Repeat steps 2-4 for all components 
6) Combine the component cycles to generate the chronological system state transition 
cycle 
7) Analyze system cycle and compute: load point indices, based on failure states that 
occur, and system indices  
8) Simulation runs until coefficient of variation in duration index is less than specified 
threshold 
 
Figure 2.2 shows a flow diagram for carrying out SDM. SSM and SDM MCS techniques were 
applied to a bulk test network and the results compared for different load models [Billinton & 
Sankarakrishnan, 1995].   
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One key advantage of SDM over SSM is the inclusion of component repair rates so that, unlike 
SEM and SSM, simulations over a long period of time in which many failures and repairs have 
occurred can be carried out. Frequency and duration indices can also be computed.  Thus, SDM 
not only has a high reality potential, it is flexible in terms of modelling repair state duration 
distributions and provides a well rounded impression of the reliability of a given network [Goel, 
2000; Li, 2005]. 
 
While SDM based algorithms are more powerful when complex systems have to be analyzed, 
the computation effort required is significantly higher than SSM [van Casteren & Bollen, 2000]. 
The computation times have however been reduced significantly through the development of 
fast computer processors and new computation time reduction techniques [He et al, 2010].  
Methods such as state space pruning [Singh & Mitra, 1996] and outage screening [Yongji et al, 
1999] aimed at screening the states simulated. Extensions to conventional SDM such as the 
sequential cross-entropy [Gonzalez & Leite da Silva, 2011] and pseudo-chronological [Leite da 
Silva et al, 2000] MCS have been proposed. These methods aimed at only reducing the 
computation effort by either identifying the most significant component transition rates 
[Gonzalez & Leite da Silva, 2011] or determining the most likely state transitions [Leite da 
Silvaet al, 2000]. The methods assumed that a system is exposed to a non-changing 
environment so that a component’s transition rate between any two states is constant. 
 
Annual time lines have been predominantly applied in SDM analyses. All network risks were 
assumed to be dominant over the whole analysis period. This research will show that such an 
assumption is valid only for network planning where each network risk can be regarded on an 
average scale. Sequential MCS has also been applied to studies with a time span shorter than 
one year. Network operational analyses however also consider short-term periods such as a 
couple hours during a given day. Unlike planning analyses, the major challenges in system 
operation reliability assessment include probabilistic simulations of various operational 
measures, remedial actions, and system dynamics at different timescales, as well as special 
requirements in input data and computing speed [Li, 2013].  
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Further, identifying chronology for operational reliability assessments could be an issue with 
SDM. In fact, collecting, representing and modelling the data required for a complete time-
simulation is the main problem when implementing a sequential MCS.  
 
Simulation methods, particularly SDM are easy to apply and offer great versatility in modelling 
and analyzing complex systems. Mettas and Sawa [2001] indicate however that there are some 
limitations to their effectiveness. For example, if the number of simulations performed is not 
large enough, these methods can be error prone. In addition, performing a large number of 
simulations can be extremely time-consuming. This thesis will present a new reliability 
evaluation approach that is based on the SDM. The modification to the SDM will aim at making 
the approach less dependent on the number of simulations and improving its computational 
efficiency. 
 
2.4 USING PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS (PDFs) IN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
Non-parametric statistical procedures can be regarded as those procedures that do not require 
an assumption about the shape or form of the probability distribution from which a sample 
data set has been derived [Sheskin, 2011]. However, the ‘truth’ about the population from 
which the sample dataset has been drawn is what is usually sought. As such, parametric 
methods that rely on estimates of the parameters of the population are usually employed. Such 
estimates are particularly significant in reliability studies where the underlying distribution of 
reliability datasets could impact on the results and decisions made based on the computed 
results. The use of deterministic values for the input failure parameters in a reliability analysis 
may yield unrealistic outputs. The expected values of reliability indices are also sometimes 
computed. These are estimates of the mean values of the indices in question. Only considering 
the average of a given index provides network planners and operators with very little 
information on which to base decisions regarding the system performance, costs, planning and 
operation decisions.  
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Current work on reliability is taking a probabilistic approach. Haldar and Mahedavan [2000] 
suggested the use of probability-based methodologies whilst developing a risk-based model 
that can account for both cognitive and non-cognitive sources of uncertainty. Suntanto et al 
[2002] apply a probabilistic approach to power generation cost and reliability calculations. The 
authors derive equivalent generating capacity PDfs using the Z-transform method and operate 
them on the system demand. Krahl et al [2009] investigate the impact of using the distributions 
of reliability indices when evaluating the effect of different electricity quality regulation 
mechanisms on network operators.  
 
External network conditions contribute to variability in component reliability parameters. The 
use of average values disregards any uncertainty in reliability parameters and so insufficient 
descriptions of reliability inputs and outputs are derived. Instead of using single deterministic 
values, a range of values can be developed to describe reliability parameters and conversely, 
the computed reliability indices. The issue then is which value best represents a given reliability 
parameter or what level of confidence can be attached to a given index value? So as to quantify 
the uncertainty in a reliability data set, Haldar and Mahadevan [2000] proposed the use of 
probability density functions (PDFs).  
 
The probability density function fy (Y) is a mathematical function that provides a model for the 
probability that a value of a continuous random variable lies within a particular interval. It is a 
mathematical model for the population histogram containing relative frequencies which must 
be greater than or equal to zero, and must sum up to unity [Nelson, 1982]. When represented 
graphically this probability is the area between the grapgh of the function and the x-axis, 
bounded by the particular interval. A probability density fy (Y) is a function of y with the 
properties.  
a)             ; for all y in the range φ  
 
b) ∫             ;  where the integral runs over the range φ 
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‘Density’ relates to the height of the graph. At places on the x-axis of the PDF graph where 
values of the random variable are closely packed, the height is greater than at places where the 
values are sparse. 
 
2.4.1 Commonly used probability distributions in reliability related studies 
The choice to use a specific family of distributions is justified by the goodness of fit of that given 
distribution to the data. Most times this is not known and as such distributions with versatile 
characteristics are applied. Several distributions have been proposed for use in reliability 
analysis. Some common distributions are described in Table 2.1. They include the negative 
exponential, Gaussian, lognormal, gamma and Weibull PDFs. This section will describe their 
characteristics and application thus far in reliability analyses. 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of some probability distributions [Papoulis, 1991; Leon-Garcia, 1994; 
Walpole, 2007] 
Distribution f(x) Range Parameters 
Negative 
exponential 
               k 
Gaussian 
 
    








]         µ,  
Lognormal 
 
      








+              
Gamma 
                
    
 




       










   





       ,   
 
The negative exponential has been applied extensively in reliability analyses. This is due to the 
assumption that a component’s failure rate is constant during its useful life period. The 
negative exponential was described by van Catesteran et al [2000] as being mathematically 
elegant because its PDF is simple and easily manipulated in analytical studies.  
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Analytical calculations, with distributions other than the negative exponential, are cumbersome 
and almost impossible [Li, 2002]. In addition, reliability approaches such as the sequential MCS 
described in Section 2.3.2.2 are hinged on the use of the negative exponential PDF because of 
the simplicity of its corresponding inverse time transformation1 [Billinton & Allan, 1992; 1996]. 
Bollen et al [2008] defined network operational reliability assessment as one that investigates 
its reliability in very short periods of time of the ranging between 1 to 5 hours. To demonstrate 
the concept, the failure rates were modelled using the negative exponential PDF. The 
justification lies in the assumption that because of the short periods being investigated, a 
component’s failure rate does not change.  
 
The Gaussian distribution is symmetric about the mean. The mean, median, and modal values 
are identical and can be estimated directly form the data being described [Haldar and 
Mahadevan, 2000]. As such, it is mainly used in the analysis of manufactured items and their 
ability to meet specifications. The Distribution is also used to model failures that are a result of 
component ageing or wear and tear [Li, 2002]. The negative exponential and Gaussian 
distributions exhibit specific shapes so that they can only be applied to specific data sets. The 
decision to use these two PDFs for modelling purposes is thus based usually on experience.  
 
The lognormal, gamma and Weibull distributions can take on more than one shape. A random 
variable has a lognormal distribution when its natural logarithm has a Gaussian distribution. Its 
distribution can only be skewed to the right which limits the shapes it can match. Similar to the 
Gaussian, the lognormal distribution is used to model physical fatigue of components. Gray and 
Schucany [1969] show the suitability of the lognormal distribution for modelling repair rates. 
The authors however neglect the influence of other time-dependent factors, such as availability 
of labour, on repair. Secui et al [2009] probabilistically characterized the operational behaviour 
of 110 kV power equipment. The results showed that the lognormal distribution function 
provided the highest quality of fitting to the empirical function representing the time to 
equipment corrective maintenance. 
                                                     
1
 Key MCS requirement for changing randomly generated numbers into time to failure or time to repair values 
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The gamma and Weibull distribution each have a shape parameter that allows them to be 
either left or right skewed. They are more versatile and can represent or approximate a wide 
range of distributions *Sahinoĝlu et al, 1983+. The Weibull distribution has been extensively 
used in modelling and mapping wind speed data. The improved data fitting method proposed 
by Deaves and Lines [1997] indicated that the two-parameter Weibull distribution can be fitted 
to the complete range of wind speeds. Lun and Lam [2000] also applied the two-parameter 
Weibull distribution to numerical estimations of the wind speed frequency distribution function 
of a given set of wind data. The Weibull distribution was also used to show that the occurrence 
interval of strong wind speeds is a random variable with a certain probability distribution [Xiao 
et al, 2006]. For reliability purposes, a Weibull-Markov model for stochastic durations was 
proposed to allow for analytical computations [van Casteren et al, 2000]. The model produced 
only bell shaped duration distributions that could be used in non-sequential reliability 
assessment methods.   
 
Wang et al [1991] verified that the failure mode of power capacitors can be represented by 
Weibull distributions. Using data from operating records, Xianhe et al [1999] verified that the 
Weibull distribution could also be used to represent the random failure mode of distribution 
transformers. Table 2.1 shows the range of the different distributions. The lognormal, gamma 
and Weibull distribution functions are not suitable for data sets bound by finite positive ranges 
[Herman & Gaunt, 2008]. 
 
Goel [2000] investigated the use of different PDFs in a distribution network reliability analysis 
to represent component times-to-repair. The data-fitting capability of a range of PDFs was 
analyzed on different reliability parameter data sets was investigated by Cross et al [2006]. The 
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2.5 THE BETA PDF 
 
Section 2.4 described the PDFs commonly applied in reliability studies. Two key limitations of 
the PDFs presented with regard to representing historical data were identified: Some of the 
PDFs like the exponential and Gaussian exhibit specific shapes while others like the gamma and 
Weibull have infinite ranges. The Beta PDF describes the distribution of a random variable that 
lies within the interval (0, 1) and is defined by (2.6) and (2.7). Similar to the gamma and Weibull 
distributions, the Beta PDF can also be used to represent left or right skewed data. This is first 
accomplished by varying the values of its two shape parameters, α and β *Gupta & Nadarajah, 
2004; Cross et al, 2006]. 
 
      
            
     
                (2.6) 
for 0 ≤ x ≤1, α >0 and β >0 
where 
        ∫     
 
 
          
                   
(2.7) 
 
Marantes and Pais da Silva [2009] used PDFs to stress how quantifying the probability of 
networks performing within certain boundaries or not beyond specific thresholds is important 
to assessment of system reliability performance. Unlike other PDFs, the Beta also has a scaling 
parameter that allows the Beta PDF to be scaled to a finite range. A Beta random variable Y, 
defined in the interval [0,1], can thus be rescaled or shifted to obtain a Beta random variable Z 
in the interval [a, C] of the same shape by using (2.7) and (2.8). 
 
               (2.7) 
 
       
 
     
(
                
          
)    (2.8) 
where a ≤ Z ≤ b ; α > 0; β > 0 
a: lower bound; C: upper bound (scaling factor) 
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The scaling factor of Beta PDFs must be equal to or greater than the maximum value recorded 
in the data set being described. For example, failure statistics are usually based on historical 
records. Planning studies that cover more than 10 years have to include unlikely events that 
may have very low probabilities of occurring but are associated with catastrophic effects. For 
such extreme events, emphasis is on the tails of the distributions. The tails can be thus 
extended by adopting a scaling factor based on extreme value theorem [Smith, 2003].  
 
Most reliability analyses in operation and annual planning studies, such as those carried out in 
this research, are however more concerned with the most likely event from a fixed possible set. 
These can be predicted based on the historical performance of a network and its components. 
For such studies future extreme events may not be modelled. The range of the Beta PDF would 
thus be dependent on the maximum value of a given historical data set.   
 
The shape of a given Beta PDF is thus described by α, β, and a scaling value, C. The shape 
parameters can be computed using (2.9) and (2.10) from the mean, variance, and scaling factor 
of measured or computed data. 
   
            
   
      (2.9) 
 
   
                 
   
      (2.10) 
μ: mean of data; σ 2: variance; C: scaling factor  
 
The Beta PDF is very versatile in the shapes it can exhibit. Figure 2.3 illustrates some shapes of 
the Beta PDF. Both symmetrical and asymmetrical shapes are displayed. All the Beta PDFs 
presented in Figure 2.3 have the same scaling factor (C=100). The values of α and β are 
however varied to yield a different shape. For example, to achieve a Bell shaped PDF, α and β 
should both be equal to or less than 0.5. 
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Figure 2.3: Different shapes exhibited by the Beta PDF by varying α and β for C=100 
 
The mean, variance and moment of a Beta PDF can be equally computed from given Beta shape 
parameters using (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13). 
 
   
  
     
         (2.11) 
    
    
             
      (2.12) 
    
    
        
       (2.13) 
r: an integer; µr: r
th moment about the origin; yr = y(y+1)……..(y+r-1) 
 
Extensive research has been carried out, using the Beta PDF, to perform voltage drop 
calculations along distribution feeders. It is now the prescribed method for residential LV-
feeder analysis in South Africa [SANS 507; Herman & Heunis, 1998].  
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As far as reliability analyses are concerned, Pham and Turkkan [1994] assumed Beta-distributed 
component life-cycles in the reliability analysis of a standby system. Nadarajah and Kotz in 
[2006] present a generalized distribution called the Beta-exponential distribution. However, 
just like the conventional negative-exponential, the Beta-exponential is also limited to 
applications that consider constant failure rates. It has however been shown that the Beta PDF 
can be applied in a sequential MCS reliability analysis to capture variability in failure parameters 
and represent the influence of such variability on the indices computed [Edimu et al, 2011(1); 
Edimu et al, 2011(2)]. A comparison of the Beta PDF with other commonly used ones will be 




The review of the concept of reliability, particularly its measurement and representation, 
provides some answers to the research questions developed in Chapter 1. 
 
Qn.1: How is bulk network reliability evaluated and how are the results represented? 
A review of the main approaches developed for bulk network reliability evaluation was 
presented. The sequential MCS is useful to this research because it is applicable to 
chronological events and can produce the PDFs that describe the computed indices. A number 
of probability distributions can be used in conjunction with the sequential MCS. One should 
however be able to derive the inverse translation function for each choice of distribution. Thus 
far this is not possible for the Beta distribution and as such can not be used in the conventional 
sequential MCS. An approach that is not hinged on deriving the prerequisite inverse translation 
would be required.  
 
Qn.2: How applicable are continuous probability distributions in network reliability analyses? 
A number of PDFs have been proposed for use in reliability studies with the exponential 
extensively applied.  
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Seasonal and time-of-day variations in external conditions induce variability in component 
outages so that the PDFs that describe failure parameters will exhibit a range of shapes. To 
capture the different shapes, the Weibull and gamma PDFs are used. However, failure 
parameters are usually derived from historical data which is defined by a specific range. The 
Beta PDF can also exhibit a variety of shapes but unlike the Weibull and gamma, it can be 
rescaled to another finite range. The Beta PDF appears to be the most suitable PDF for 
reliability studies that apply distinct failure data sets. It has however been seldom applied in 
reliability studies. It may thus be necessary to investigate the suitability of the Beta PDF 
compared to others for reliability analyses. 
 
2.5.1 Onward 
The next chapter will analyze the different models proposed thus far in literature for 
component failure parameters. The chapter will focus on identifying those modelling 
approaches that consider variability in failure parameters.  
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Several factors influencing reliability as a whole have been identified in the literature. The 
network’s configuration, loading and component characteristics are some of the generally 
known factors. Extensive investigative work has thus been carried out in these fields.  
 Network configuration: Mili and Qiu [2004] conclude that interconnection of various 
critical infrastructures has increased the vulnerability of networks to outages and thus 
contributed to the depreciation of bulk network reliability. Zhu [2007] also analyzed the 
impact of altering the design and configurations of power networks on their reliability 
  
 Network loading: Cheng et al [2009] use a graph trace based analysis technique to 
evaluate the reliability of a power network with time varying loads.  The relationship 
between reliability indices and the daily load curve is also investigated on a real network 
by Jadrijev et al [2009] 
 
 Network components: Kolowrocki and Kwiatuszewska-Sarnecka [2008] apply limit 
reliability functions, particularly the asymptotic approach, to a multi-state network with 
ageing components. Koonce et al [2008] also rank infrastructure components according 
to the impact of their failure to operate on the network’s reliability  
 
Blake et al [2009] however, state that there are other drivers tending to increase the level of 
risk to continuity of electricity supply. One of these is external threats such as adverse weather. 
Local weather elements, according to Koval et al [2006], are primary contributors to network 
interruptions. The weather elements create variability in the inputs of reliability analyses such 
as component failure and repair rates.  
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3.2 VULNERABILITY OF BULK NETWORKS TO EXTERNAL THREATS 
 
This section provides an overview of the contribution of external elements to network outages. 
The section will also detail the influence of external (local and global) threats on bulk network 
facilities. Emphasis is put on threats common to South African conditions.  
 
Bulk networks cover vast areas, in particular the transmission lines that traverse several 
geographical regions. Distribution networks on the other hand are usually confined to small 
specific geographical regions such that at any given time all the distribution network 
components are exposed to similar external conditions. Different geographical regions are 
associated with different external conditions so that the external threats to which a distribution 
network is exposed are region dependent. Thus, analysis of component failures within a utility’s 
distribution systems provides an insight to the different elements that could also influence bulk 
network reliability. Pahwa et al [2007] investigated the contribution of external network threats 
to outages in distribution networks in South Africa and USA. The results are indicative of 
network risks in the different geographical areas that South African transmission lines traverse.  
 
The IEEE data analysis task force [1994] developed codes aimed at capturing different aspects 
of USA and Canadian overhead transmission outages at 230 kVA and above. The aspects 
considered ranged from type and cause of transmission circuit faults, to circuit restoration and 
effect of outage events. The categories of outage causes developed included foreign 
interference, human element, defective line equipment, environmental factors, network 
condition and unknown causes. The task force also presented the sub- causes under each 
category.  A causal and seasonal contribution to forced outages of bulk transmission lines was 
analyzed for the Mid-Continent Area Power Pool (MAPP) in North America [Chowdhury & 
Koval, 2008]. Figure 3.1 shows the 230 and 365 kV lines’ outage data based on the IEEE outage 
cause categories.  
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Figure 3.1: Cause contribution to line-related sustained outages [Chowdhury & Koval, 2008] 
 
Environmental factors, particularly weather contributed significantly to line outages. Koval et al 
[2006] indicate that the major adverse weather elements contributing to Alberta Power 
Limited’s transmission line outages are lightning, precipitation and wind. Literature discussing 
outage data from different power networks around the world also indicates the significant 
contribution by adverse weather to power outages [Makkonen, 1998; Lundstedt, 2005; Zhou et 
al, 2006; Almeida et al, 2009; Gu et al, 2010]. In 2004 a list of primary fault causes and sub-
categories was introduced by the South African utility, Eskom, to provide analysis that could 
trace the root cause of faults [Vosloo, 2005]. The primary causes and some sub-categories are 
presented in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Causes of South African transmission outages [Sukhnandan & Hoch, 2002; Vosloo, 2005; 
Jandrell et al, 2009; Vosloo et al, 2009] 
 Primary Categories 
























 Human element 
 Foreign objects 
 Wind 
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An extensive analysis of fault records for South African transmission lines was carried out to 
identify the major causes of the faults and their characteristics [Minnaar et al, 2012]. The four 
most significant individual causes of faults were identified as: Birds, Lightning, Fire and 
Pollution. Together the four external conditions contributed 89 % of all transmission outages as 
shown in Figure 3.2.    
 
Figure 3.2: Fault causes for 132 kV to 765 kV transmission lines [Minnaar et al, 2012] 
 
3.2.1 Effect of local weather threats on power generation 
Local weather threats are specific to utilities i.e. the threats vary from one utility to another and 
are thus dependent on the local geographic conditions to which the network (or portion of the 
network) is exposed.  
 
A significant push towards implementation of renewable energy technologies is on-going 
worldwide. Several proposals incorporating renewable energy have been put forward so as to 
develop an optimum mix between different sources of energy. The “Global Energy Scenario” 
predicts that half of the worldwide primary energy demand will be supplied by renewable 
energy sources by 2050 *EREC, 2007+.   In a South African context, a “progressive renewable 
scenario” in which renewable energy plays a moderate role in power generation forecasts 15 % 
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While renewable energy sources such as wind, solar and oceanic waves, provide a means for 
‘clean2’ electricity generation, they are vulnerable to environmental conditions *Ozgener & 
Ozgener, 2007]. Breslow and Sailor [2002] also agree that productivity and efficiency of most 
renewable energy sources is dependent on environmental conditions. The significant drop in 
hydro power generation levels, in East Africa, between 2000 and 2006, is attributed to long 
droughts [USGAO, 2005; Mason et al, 2006]. 
 
Wind turbines are designed to ‘cut off’ when wind speeds fall below or above specified 
thresholds. However, variability still exists within the operational range of wind speeds, thus 
impacting on the quality of power generated and, particularly, leading to supply voltage and 
frequency fluctuations [Heier, 2006]. The wind speed models developed by Breslow and Sailor 
[2002] showing variations in projected wind speeds due to global warming indicate potential 
reduction in continental United States wind power generation of the order 30 % to 40 %. Solar 
energy, whether from solar thermal energy conversion or photovoltaic (PV) energy generation, 
is vulnerable to variations in cloud cover and atmospheric turbidity [Patel, 1999]. PV generation 
has variable output characteristics dependent on irradiation and ambient temperature [Park et 
al, 1999]. Cha et al [2004] show the necessity to include weather effects when investigating 
impact of PV systems on reliability of a given network.  
 
3.2.2 Effect of local weather threats on transmission facilities 
The key transmission line reliability inputs affected by variability in the network environment 
and thus sensitive to adverse external conditions are component failure rates and restoration 
times.  
Transmission line failure rates 
Globally, adverse weather contributes most to network failures compared to other external 
factors. The physical stresses on the network components are higher in adverse weather 
conditions than those encountered under normal weather conditions [Billinton & Wu, 2001].  
                                                     
2 No green house gas emissions during power generation 
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The increased stress causes network component failure rates, which are otherwise low for most 
the year, to increase significantly for short periods when adverse weather is prevalent. Some 
adverse weather elements include lightning, adverse wind, ice storms, fog and rain.  
 
Lightning strokes cause direct and induced flash-overs in a network as shown in Figure 3.3(a). 
Direct flash-overs occur when a lightning stroke strikes a phase conductor(s) leading to phase-
to-phase, phase-to-neutral or phase-to-ground flash-overs. Induced flash-overs are due to 
surges occurring due to lightning striking the ground near a line structure. Also, back-flash-
overs can occur when a shield wire, struck by lightning, fails and allows the lightning to reach 
the phase conductor [Balijepalli et al, 2005]. Transformers have also been known to fail due to 
lightning strikes. 
 
   
(a)       (b) 
   
(c)        (d) 
Figure 3.3: (a) Consecutive line flash-overs due to lightning strike [Staco website] (b) Collapse of 
Hydro-Québec pylon during the 1998 Ice Storm [Vancouver Island Powerline website] (c) Birds on 
transmission lines in Mexico [Tena et al, 2010] (d) Insulator flash-over experiments [Zhou et al, 2009] 
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Alvehag and SÖder [2011] cited wind as a significant cause of overhead line failures in Sweden. 
Adverse winds usually cause line to line faults and contribute to flash-overs but have also been 
known to bring down transmission line structures [Brostrom et al, 2007]. Transmission 
structures are designed to withstand wind and ice loads up to specific thresholds. Loredo-Souza 
and Davenport [1998] through aeroelastic tunnel tests investigated possible explanations for 
transmission line failures in adverse winds. The authors confirmed the importance of turbulent 
wind characteristics to a conductor’s dynamic response to wind. Loredo-Souza and Davenport 
[1998] also determined that the aerodynamic damping plays a key role in conductor motion of 
overhead lines under adverse wind conditions. Thus, the quasi static action in response to 
slowly varying wind loads and the resonant response are the main contributors to a conductor’s 
fluctuating response under adverse winds. 
 
High voltage outdoor insulators are exposed to pollution because of salt in regions near the sea 
and dust and chemical residues in industrial regions. There are mainly two types of flash-overs 
due to pollution. The first type occurs when ionisable materials drift between line conductors 
so that the line-line clearance and effective air-insulation is compromised. The second type is 
due to pollutants deposited on insulation discs [Looms, 1988]. Pollution deposited on the 
insulator surface becomes a conductive electrolyte when the insulator surface is wetted by rain 
or fog or under humid conditions *Gençoğlu & Cebeci, 2008+. Line insulators are normally 
designed to withstand about twice the operating voltage [Habib & Khalifa, 1986]. The 
development of partial discharges on an insulator’s surface and propagation of these discharges 
over a period of time allows the leakage currents to increase over the surface. The electrical 
withstand voltage of the insulator thus decreases so that a flash-over and possible power 
outage may result [Aydogmus & Cebeci, 2004].  
 
Birds contribute to line failures in three ways; bird streamers, electrocution and bird 
contamination [Sundararajan et al, 2004]. Bird droppings are a mix of urine and excrement 
passed out when birds perched on transmission structures take flight. 
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Bird streamers were first determined as one of the contributors to ‘unknown’ transmission line 
faults in the 1920s [Michener, 1928]. Bird streamer flash-overs occur when large birds release 
long continuous emission of conductive fluid droppings which partially or totally short the air 
gap between the line structure and conductor [Burnham, 1995, Naidoo et al, 2006]. Streamer 
outages in Florida, Nevada, California and South Africa have been found to exhibit similar 
characteristics. These include [Burnham, 1995, Taylor et al, 1998, Sundararajan et al, 2004]:  
 Unknown cause, neither lightning, switching surge, contamination or any known cause. 
 The presence of large bodied birds, such as eagles, hawks, ospreys, vultures, and 
herons. 
 Outages that occur between the hours of 2300 to 0600 giving the suspicion that it may 
be a contamination flash-over. 
 The lack of natural roosts, such as trees in the area of the outages. 
 The abundant availability of food, agricultural land, sugar cane field and ponds. 
 Outages involving typically the central phase. 
 Seasonal pattern related to the presence of birds or their feeding habits. 
 Instantaneous relay actions with successful reclosure, typically not more than two in 
the same area. 
 Flashed insulators, hardware, or structures, possibly evidencing burn spots on the 
upper bridge of metallic structures. 
 The presence of dead or injured birds or burnt feathers near the structure after an 
outage. 
 
It was believed that bird streamers caused flash-overs generally at lower voltage levels such as 
110 kV and 220 kV due to shorter insulation gaps as compared to 500 kV lines. However, in 
recent years bird streamer flash-overs in 500 kV lines have been reported [Zhou et al, 2009]. 
Bird contamination flash-overs occur due to the accumulation of bird droppings. This is mainly 
due to birds building nests in the gaps and on the structures in substations as shown in Figure 
3.3(C).  
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The highly conductive droppings and the wetness of bird excrement on insulators reduce the 
surface resistance to an extent that the nominal line voltage easily establishes an arc across the 
insulators [Sundararajan et al, 2004].  Bird contamination develops from overnight or long-term 
accumulation of faecal contamination at sites that attract birds. Long-term contamination 
creates conductive paths during wet external conditions such as rain storms. Flash-overs due to 
electrocution and collision occur when birds come into direct contact with conductors. Many 
collisions with power lines occur during daily flights within a daily use area [IEEE task force, 
1994]. According to van Rooyen et al [2003], bird electrocution mainly occurs below voltages of 
132 kV where clearances are smaller. Other line flash-overs occur due birds nesting on line 
structures. Nest building could lead to bird contact in tight places where the energized 
equipment is close to grounded surfaces. Nesting materials dropped by birds lead to short 
circuits while the presence of nests also attracts predators and increases the risk of outages due 
to animal electrocution. 
 
Lanoie and Mercure [1989] concluded that a correlation exists between proximity of fires and 
line faults. Bush fires, either due to clearing of vegetation, sugar cane harvesting, natural 
sparking during extreme temperature conditions or human error, cause transient earth faults 
on transmission lines. This usually occurs for short periods of time particularly when the fires 
are in the vicinity of the transmission lines. Sometimes the flames are large enough to engulf 
the conductors as depicted in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4: Sugar cane fire and smoke engulfing transmission line conductors [Sukhnandan, 2004] 
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A major part of the air-gap is filled with the flame leaving a small gap between the flame-tip 
and the conductor. This gap is often filled with smoke and particles so that flash-overs are 
either induced through the conductive flame or due to a reduction of the air gap between 
conductors [Sukhnandan & Hoch, 2002]. The presence of the flame reportedly causes phase to 
phase and phase to earth flash-overs. This not only causes damage to transmission line 
hardware but also causes voltage dips due to the large fault currents. According to Sukhnandan 
[2004] this type of fault is more serious than other transient faults because the line often re-
trips and locks out. 
 
Transmission line repair rates 
The restoration time of a failed network component is a variable parameter dependent on a 
range of factors such as the utility response to create repair orders, waiting time to serve a 
repair order and transportation time of the repair crew [Zapata et al, 2008]. Other key 
influencing factors include the time the failure occurs and the cause of the failure. Generally, 
outages that occur at night have longer restoration times than in the day-time. This is 
attributed to unavailability of sufficient work force at night [Cha et al, 2004]. Restoration times 
increase as the magnitude of a fault increases. Repair on a network, especially on transmission 
lines, usually commence only after adverse weather subsides. For example, unless strong winds 
subside, repairs cannot commence on any fallen transmission lines. This increases the duration 
of the outage. Billinton and Singh [2002] make a case for the relative reduction in outage 
duration with repairs carried out in normal and adverse weather conditions. 
 
3.2.3 Effect of global space weather threats on power networks 
Space weather refers to conditions on the sun, in the solar wind, the magnetosphere and the 
ionosphere that can influence space and ground man-made technologies (Pulkkinen, 2003). The 
space weather chain starts at the surface of the sun in the form of either solar flares or corona 
mass ejections and culminates as geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) on the surface of the 
earth [Kappenman et al, 2000].  
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GICs are typically driven to or from various power system electrical ground points as shown in 
Figure 3.5 by the voltages induced in the transmission lines [Ngwira, 2011].  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Induced voltage drives GIC to and from neutral ground points of power transformers 
[Ngwira, 2011] 
 
Unlike local weather threats, space weather elements create large-scale problems because a 
storm’s footprint can extend across a continent. According to Kappenman et al [2000], power 
networks in the upper latitudes of the Northern hemisphere are at increased risk because 
aurora activity. Gaunt and Coetzee [2007] presented findings that testify to GICs contributing 
significantly to transformer failures in Southern Africa (mid and low latitude countries). 
Exposure of power transformers to GICs leads to the phenomenon called ‘half-cycle saturation’ 
[NERC report, 2012].  
 
Most external threats to network reliability directly lead to immediate component outages. 
Saturation of power transformers and reactors is known to have short and long-term effects on 
network reliability. In the short-term, exposure of a network to GICs results in harmonic 
currents which could cause protection relays to trip required equipment [Boteler et al, 1989; 
NERC report, 2012]. GICs exposure would also increase internal reactive power losses (Vars 
consumption) in transformers. This ultimately impacts on network vulnerability by increasing its 
reactive power supply requirements, components’ loading and voltage dips *Koen & Gaunt, 
2001]. 
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Loss of reactive power support could thus lead to voltage instability and power system collapse. 
Internationally, the best known example of the devastating effects of GICs on network 
reliability occurred during the 13th March 1989 super storm. The complete blackout of the 
Hydro Quebec power grid was attributed to the GIC events associated with the super storm. 
The power outage occurred because of widespread transformer saturation and the network’s 
failure to compensate for reactive power due to tripping of its shunt capacitors [Kappenman & 
Albertson, 1990].  
 
GICs generate fringing magnetic flux i.e. flux that flows outside the core. Gaunt and Coetzee 
[2007] state that, “without adequate control of the flux under saturation conditions, local 
heating in parts of the transformer may not be cooled effectively, leading to rapid temperature 
increase. The intensity of overheating depends on the saturation flux paths, cooling flow and the 
thermal condition or loading of the transformer. Overheating causes the breakdown of oil and 
paper insulation.” Development of hotspots within the transformer puts stress to the winding 
insulation. If the stress surpasses the design withstand level, the transformer could fail. Damage 
to insulation could also be the root cause of failure of transformers exposed to future stresses.  
Inspections of failed generation step-up transformers in Tutuka and Matimba sub-stations 
(South Africa) identified heat damage, mostly to paper insulation, in various parts of the 
transformers, as illustrated in Figure 3.6.  
   
(a)                             (b) 
Figure 3.6: (a) Overheating LV terminal one of the Tutuka transformers (b) Failure of HV windings in 
Matimba transformer [Gaunt & Coetzee, 2007] 
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 Six modern transformers failed 7 months after the geomagnetic storm –the “Halloween storm” 
of November 2003 [Gaunt & Coetzee, 2007]. 
 
The NERC report [2012] presents more detail on the thermal effects of GICs on transformers 
and also presents an overview of reported instances where transformers have been reported to 
be affected by GICs. Lundstedt [2006] also provides a historical description of disturbances in 
the Swedish electrical system, up to November 2004, related to occurrence of adverse space 
weather. The report showed that GICs are induced at different frequencies. Network 
component’s that operate at higher frequencies could thus also be affected by space weather 
effects.  
 
3.3 APPROACHES APPLIED TO MODELLING NETWORK COMPONENT FAILURES 
 
Network failure events are associated with uncertainty. The uncertainty arises either from the 
random nature of the phenomenon that cause network failure or, from the lack of knowledge 
of the events themselves [Kim & Singh, 2002]. Representation of the former type of uncertainty 
has been attempted by a number of authors through fuzzy methods [Zhou, 2005; Li et al, 2009; 
Liu & Singh, 2011]. The scope of the work presented in the thesis is however limited to 
uncertainty induced in network failures due to variability in the root-cause phenomenon. 
 
This section will present the modelling approaches developed to capture the vulnerability of 
network facilities to failure. The models can be categorized, based on the relationships derived 
between a component failure event and the time-of-occurrence of the event, into: 
 Time-independent failure modelling approaches 
 Time-dependent failure modelling approaches 
Literature indicates that of all external network threats, local external threats are the most 
common contributors to transmission outages, world wide. As such, most of the literature 
identified on reliability modelling in the network operational paradigm has been limited to local 
weather, particularly adverse weather. 
 Page 54 
 
3.3.1 Time-independent failure modelling approaches  
Time-independent approaches do not consider the influence time-of-occurrence has on the 
failure rates of components. The bath tub curve is a common model of component 
vulnerability: the failure rate initially decreases, stays constant and then increases with time.  
 
Most literature on reliability considers the period when component failures are deemed 
constant so that network reliability parameters are represented as single deterministic values, 
usually an average. This is the criterion commonly followed when reliability models are 
developed for planning purposes. An ‘average year’ is derived such that the ‘average’ failure 
and repair rates computed are based on several years that cover many operational states and 
all kinds of external factors [Bollen et al, 2008].  
 
Several authors however agree that while this may suffice for an overview of a network’s 
reliability, the use of single average values to represent failure and repair rates of components 
is most times unrealistic and could provide misleading results [Billinton & Allan, 1996; Bollen, 
2001; Billinton & Singh, 2006; Carer & Briend, 2008].  
 
Alvehag *2008+ states that “using average values may, therefore, be misleading since the 
‘average year’ never occurs. In the majority of years a small number of interruptions occur, and 
during extreme years with for example a major storm, many interruptions can occur. Average 
indices are based on all years, but a year that produces these average indices may never have 
occurred.” Reliability parameters have inherent uncertainty dependent on a network’s 
configuration, component location and inter-relationship with other components and, the 
network’s environment. Operational reliability analysis considers a network’s performance in 
short periods of time ranging from hours to a couple of months. External factors have a 
significant influence on reliability parameters during such short periods. Using reliability 
parameters derived from long-term observations may not be sufficient when reliability models 
for operational purposes are required.  
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The time-independent modelling approaches identified in literature can be grouped into : 
 Discrete (N-n) adverse state modelling approaches 
 Stochastic adverse state modelling approaches 
 
3.3.1.1 Discrete (N-n) adverse state modelling approaches 
This approach develops deterministic states, for adverse external conditions, capturing various 
levels of severity. The main model used when considering stochastic causes of outages is the 
two weather state representation. This can be regarded as the conventional model applied 
when considering adverse weather in reliability analysis. The modelling approach is illustrated 
in Figure 3.7. A normal-weather state and an adverse-weather state are defined [Billinton & 
Allan, 1996]. Ai and Ni represent the duration of the i
th adverse and normal weather periods 











Figure 3.7: Random failure rate history [Billinton et al, 2002] 
 
According to Billinton and Allan [1996] the decision to categorize a type of weather as either 
normal or adverse depends on the impact on failure rates during the exposure period. Those 
weather conditions having little or no effect on the failure rate should be classified as normal 
and those having a large effect, classed as adverse. Component failure rates are derived from 
failure data collated for the two weather states and are expressed as average number of 
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A component’s failure rate is assumed constant during normal weather conditions. Different 
constant failure rates that apply for the duration of adverse weather conditions are used to 
compute the average failure rate for adverse weather. This allows for the probability 
distributions associated with the failure and duration parameters to be negatively exponential. 
Billinton and Allan [1996] detail the two weather state model further, together with numerical 
examples.  
 
Extensive reliability-related work has been carried out using this conventional model. Bollen 
[2001] showed that the two weather state model is applicable to simple analytical reliability 
calculations involving non-constant failure rates due to adverse weather. Using the weather 
model it was deduced that adverse weather needs to be included in the reliability analysis 
when parallel components are involved. Billinton & Wu [2001] developed a Markov state space 
diagram and corresponding steady state probabilities for a two component redundant system 
exposed to normal and adverse weather conditions. The analysis showed that the failure rate 
increased as the percentage of failures occurring in adverse weather increased. By 
differentiating weather as normal and adverse, Sannino and Bollen [2003] showed that the 
load-tripping frequency of a static transfer switch increases when the percentage feeder 
outages is higher in adverse weather. The tripping frequency however decreased with 
reduction in duration of adverse weather exposure.  
 
A two weather state model is not sufficient to capture the variability in local weather conditions 
[Lecomte et al, 1998; Billinton et al, 2002]. Makkonnen [1998] states that the data sets used to 
develop previous weather models, in particular for freezing precipitation, seldom include 
extreme situations. The IEEE Standard 859-1987 proposed the division of a network’s weather 
environment into three categories: normal, adverse and major adverse weather [IEEE Standard, 
1988]. Thus, the two weather state model provides a framework for adding other weather state 
conditions [Billinton & Singh, 2002]. The three weather state model, incorporating major 
adverse weather is illustrated in Figure 3.8.  
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In which a, m and n are transition rates between adverse, major adverse and normal weather 
states. Failures occurring in major adverse weather are not combined together with adverse 








Figure 3.8: Three weather state model [Billinton & Singh, 2006] 
 
Billinton and Singh [2006] illustrate the impact of dividing bad weather into adverse and major 
adverse weather. A significant difference in the reliability indices computed was noted when 
major adverse weather failures were also considered. The authors also use the model to 
illustrate the reduction in outage duration when repairs are carried out during adverse weather 
conditions as opposed to after the conditions subside [Billinton & Singh, 2002]. Billinton and 
Acharya [2005] extended the three weather state model to include additional adverse weather 
severity levels. Using the Markov approach, they showed that the three state weather model is 
inadequate as far as showing a wide range of weather conditions is concerned. A multi-state 
weather model was thus proposed to account for continuously varying levels of stress due to 
weather.  
 
Zhou et al [2005] apply the multi-state weather modelling approach. Numerous combinations 
of the wind gust speeds and the lightning stroke currents were categorized into 15 weather 
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Section 3.2.1 described the effect of changing weather conditions on renewable sources of 
energy such as solar and wind. Literature shows that the failure rate function of wind turbines is 
a negative exponential curve [Ozgener &Ozgener, 2007]. The multi-state weather approach is 
commonly used to model such fluctuating primary energy sources. Various capacity states are 
evaluated from the level of the weather parameter being considered.  
 
Singh and Lago-Gonzales [1985] grouped unconventional power units (renewable) into different 
subsystems with varying capacity levels. Cha et al [2004] use the radiation intensity to develop 
PV generation models for a distribution network reliability study. Wen et al [2009] investigated 
the effect varying wind speeds, within three categories, on the reliability of a network 
incorporating wind turbines. Discrete power outputs were determined for each wind speed 
considered. The three wind speed categories considered included the cut-in, rated and cut-off 
wind speed. Figure 3.9 shows typical power output models for a solar cell generation unit and a 
wind turbine. A relationship between power output and weather parameters, wind velocity and 









Figure 3.9: (a) Power output model of a solar cell generating unit [Park et al, 1999] (b) Wind turbine 
power out characteristic [Deshmukh & Deshmukh, 2008] 
Rc: radiation point 
Gstd: solar radiation in a standard environment 
Vci, Vr and Vco: cut-in, rated and cut-off wind speed 
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Discrete models are usually developed on an annual basis. The reliability parameters are 
computed as average values over a year of the given weather state conditions. Failure rates, 
repair rates and capacity levels are thus assumed constant for a particular weather state. 
However, weather patterns are intermittent in nature such that using constant values neglects 
variability of network component reliability parameters within each specified weather state.  
 
Furthermore, weather patterns and other external factors such as presence of birds vary 
according to seasonal changes in a given year such that the network risk posed occurs only for 
short periods during a given year. Bollen et al [2008] state that the failure rate of, especially, 
overhead lines increases several orders of magnitude with intensity of adverse weather 
conditions. The probability of having various levels of adverse weather within short periods is 
no longer negligible so that discrete (N-n) models are no longer sufficient, particularly for 
reliability assessments that relate to external conditions.  
 
3.3.1.2 Stochastic adverse state models 
Stochastic adverse state models are based on a random parameter of the adverse phenomenon 
being investigated. The random parameter could be an integral part of the external factor(s). 
For adverse weather, the random parameter describes the severity of the weather element 
such as wind speed for wind related outages or ground flash density and the magnitude of the 
lightning crest for lightning strokes. The parameter could also be as a result of the occurrence 
of the external factor(s) such as the electric field on the surface of an insulator due to deposited 
pollutants. Stochastic adverse state modelling is more commonly applied in network operation 
reliability studies. The network state is determined based on prevailing conditions. 
 
Haghifam and Omidvar [2006] derive stochastic output electric power of a wind farm based on 
historical wind velocities. Using recorded speeds for daily, monthly and seasonal periods, wind 
velocity profiles were developed. The corresponding wind turbine power output model is 
constant for wind speeds within the rated and cut-out values, a normal distribution between 
rated and cut-in values, and zero for all other wind speed values.  
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The model developed is not generic as the wind velocity data used in the modelling was 
obtained for a specific location and not tested with other locations. Also, the authors state that 
the binomial distribution was assumed and fitted to the data collected. 
 
Brown et al [1997] derived quadratic functions of the wind speed to model the expected 
number and duration of faults due to a potential storm event. For overhead line failures, each 
line was characterized by a base storm failure rate, λbase, at a base storm wind speed, Sbase. The 
storm failure rate of the overhead line at wind speed, S, was then described as shown in (3.1). 
 
           (
 
     
)
 
     (3.1) 
 
The quadratic function was based on the fact that the pressure exerted on trees and poles is 
proportional to the wind speed squared. The model was used to formulate criteria to 
determine whether a potential storm threat could actually develop into a storm event. The 
model was however applied to a single location and not verified against storm related failure 
data. Brostrom et al [2007] developed a weather impact model such that the risk of a 
transmission outage is connected to the specific weather conditions. The authors modelled ice 
storm severity levels through exponential functions of the ice and wind load factors.  The latter 
computed as an integral factor.  For a given component outage however, weather was regarded 
as deterministic and the component’s vulnerability, stochastic. Thus, discrete storm severity 
levels were considered so that component vulnerability could also be regarded in discrete 
levels.  
 
Carer and Briend [2008] also considered a localized area when modelling failure rates of MV 
electrical network components exposed to adverse wind. A critical wind speed was specified 
such that for wind speeds below this threshold, component failure rates were deemed 
constant. Failures were assumed to grow exponentially for wind speeds above the threshold. 
Only one year’s failure data was used such that only a partial model was developed.   
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Alvehag and SÖder [2008] propose a stochastic weather dependent reliability model to 
investigate the effect of variable failure and restoration times of a radial distribution network, 
due to adverse wind, on the interruption cost. The model is based on the stochasticity of 
adverse weather severity and duration. The model proposed by Brown et al [1997] is adopted 
by the authors such that a quadratic function is achieved as shown in (3.2). The model applies 
only for wind speeds greater than the critical wind speed (wc). 
 
          (    (
     
  
    ))           (3.2) 
λn, λa:  constant normal weather and adverse wind failure rates 
 : scaling parameter 
w(t): wind speed at a given time t 
 
Alvehag and SÖder [2011] compare the quadratic model in (3.2) and an exponential model. The 
quadratic model regarded wind speeds below wc as normal weather such that the failure rate 
was deemed constant. However, the data presented indicated that the range of wind speeds, 
w(t) < wc,  contributed almost 40 % of the recorded wind–caused overhead line failures. To 
model varying restoration times due to adverse weather, an approach similar to Wang and 
Billinton [2002] was adopted. Weight factors were used to account for variation in restoration 
times due to availability of a repair crew and duration of adverse winds conditions. The failure 
rate model was tested using data from only one location. Further, the application of weight 
factors varies from one utility to another. Utilities have different restoration protocols such that 
factors influencing the restoration time in two utilities could differ. 
 
Network failures due to lightning are usually modelled using the ground flash density (Ng). 
Balijepalli et al [2005] defined the Ng as the average number of lightning strokes per unit area 
per unit time at a given location. The lightning line flash-over rate was then modelled linearly 
using Ng for both direct and induced over head line flash-overs. Further, the repair rate for 
lightning failures was modelled as an exponential distribution. The two models developed were 
based on data collected from a single utility.  
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Alvehag and SÖder [2011] also applied a linear relationship between overhead line outages due 
to lightning and the ground flash density as shown in (3.3).  
 
                           (3.3) 
 
      : failure rate in normal weather and lightning conditions  
   scaling parameter 
A constant failure rate was assumed for normal weather. This model was applied, together with 
a wind vulnerability model previously estimated by the authors [Alvehag & SÖder, 2008] to a 
distribution network that experienced both adverse wind and lightning conditions. The 
validation however did not consider scenarios when components concurrently experienced 
adverse wind and lightning conditions. Furthermore, the model only investigated a discrete set 
of lightning storm levels and corresponding failure rates. 
 
Experimental and analytical tests have been developed to assess the flash-over performance of 
polluted HV insulators. Experimental tests usually require the insulators to be separate from 
the power network and are set in special sites for measuring the degree of pollution [Habib & 
Khalifa, 1986]. Analytical tests on the other hand use mathematical models to compute the 
flash-over voltage of polluted insulators [Gençoğlu & Cebeci, 2008+. The most common 
mathematical model is the dynamic model that allows the prediction of discharge activity 
leading to a flash-over on a polluted surface. The stochastic parameter modelled by the 
dynamic model is the discharge arc. A relationship exists between the propagation of the 
discharge arc, and subsequent flash-over voltage, and variations of pollution film conductivity, 
temperature and peak leakage current [Streubel, 1983; Amer, 1987]. The dynamic model 
accounts for the instantaneous changes of the arc parameters [Aydogmus & Cebeci, 2004].   
 
Stochastic modelling approaches are particularly important to network planning that considers 
periods that are longer than 10 years. The patterns and intensities of external threats such as 
adverse weather could change significantly over such periods due to climate change.  
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By linking a component’s failure parameters to specific weather parameters, stochastic models 
are able to reflect the effect of future changes in the weather element on the component’s 
performance. The stochastic models proposed thus far are however applicable to specific 
weather parameters. With such modelling, significant effort must also be put into modelling 
not only the weather conditions but also how component failure parameters relate to each 
weather element. The modelling approaches relate component failures to time-varying 
weather parameters.  
 
3.3.2 Time-dependent component failure modelling approaches 
The timing of an outage has a significant bearing on the consequences a utility and its 
customers face. According to Alvehag and SÖder [2008], severe weather intensity changes with 
time-of-day so that component failure rates are time-dependent. The failure rates of some 
components such as some underground cables, protection equipment and indoor substations 
are independent of external factors. However, overhead lines, transformers and outdoor 
substations are strongly exposed to external risk factors and so experience strongly time-
dependent failure rates [Bollen, 2008]. In South Africa, the power network faces its highest 
loading during the winter season during which outages impact greatly on the reliability of an 
already strained network. This suggests the need to include the time when interruptions may 
occur. 
  
Wang and Billinton [2002] recognized the importance of the time-of-occurrence of fault events 
and introduced time-varying weight factors. The weights represent the effects of weather and 
available (time-dependent) restoration resources on component failure and repair rates. The 
‘normal’ weather component failure rate, λn, is weighted by a time-varying weight factor, w(t),  
to obtain the time-varying failure rate in (3.4). In (3.5) the authors represented the effect of 
available restoration resources on the restoration time using weekly, daily and hourly weight 
factors as shown. 
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                    (3.4) 
 
                                 (3.5) 
r(t), r: time varying and normal weather restoration times 
ww, wd, wh: weekly, daily and hourly weight factors 
 
In the text the authors however did not show how the different weights can be computed. Thus 
it is not clear whether the time varying weight factor for component failure rate is a function of 
the component’s characteristics or the fault causing weather element. Further, the use of 
weight factors component restoration is utility specific. Utilities have different restoration 
protocols and resources so that a vast array of influencing factors would need to be weighted. 
Also the weight assigned to a given factor would have to change from one utility to another. 
  
 
Wangdee and Billinton [2004] characterized a feeder using a time-dependent feeder cost 
priority index (FCP). The FCP is divided into two categories, a day time high cost priority index 
and a night time low cost priority index. In determining the curtailment priority of the feeders 
in a network, feeders are assigned either a low or high FCP depending on the time an outage 
occurs. This however does not take into account the cause of faults such that for a given feeder 
the same interruption cost is assigned to all faults occurring during the day. Similarly, it is 
assumed that all faults at night have the same cost impact. Faults that occur during peak hours 
of consumer demand usually have a more significant impact than faults recorded outside peak 
hour intervals. 
 
Kjolle and Holen [1998] applied a different approach and develop component statistics based 
on all types of failures caused by weather or by technical and human aspects. The data was 
grouped into monthly, weekly and hourly periods and conditional probabilities extracted from 
the data sets.  
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The probability of failure occurrence (qλ) in a particular hour (h), on a particular day (d) and in a 
particular month (m) was then determined using (3.6) while assuming independence between 
the three factors.  
 
                    
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
    (3.6) 
λh, λav : hourly based failure rate and average annual failure rate of a component 
  
   
 : conditional probability of failure in a particular hour 
 
Using (3.6) a component’s failure was time tagged by month, day and hour so that it’s time-
dependent failure rate pattern can be regenerated. The authors stated that by developing 
conditional probabilities, a random sampling of time of failure occurrence can be performed 
while still keeping track of the particular month, day and hour. A weather model is thus not 
required because the effect of the weather on failure is embedded in the conditional 
probabilities. The failure statistics are an aggregated result of all failure causes.  
 
From a planning point of view, the approach provides a better approximation of the overall 
vulnerability of network components to outages compared to the use of deterministic average 
values. However, the data sets developed do not allow the vulnerability to specific threats to be 
evaluated. Applying the models to operation scenarios would provide misleading results. The 
analysis periods are quite short and yet the conditional probabilities are based on annual data 
sets. As described in Section 3.2.2, specific threats are prevalent in distinct periods in a year. 
The modelling approach described assigns the same likelihood of occurrence to all failure 
causes. 
 
Herman and Gaunt [2010] also considered the segmentation of failure data. They proposed a 
time-dependent characterization of interruptions so that duration and frequency of 
interruptions could be associated with seasonal and time-of-day intervals as shown by the 4X4 
matrix in Table 3.2.  
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The matrix vulnerability model in Table 3.2 shows four seasons and four time-of-day intervals. 
Each cell or time window represents a specific season and time-of-day interval.  
 
Table 3.2: Time windows for frequency or duration of interruptions [Herman & Gaunt, 2010] 
Season (S) 
Time Period (P) 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
S1 µ11 , 11 µ12 , 12 µ13 , 13 µ 14 , 14 
S2 µ 21 , 21 µ 22 , 22 µ23 , 23 µ24 , 24 
S3 µ31 , 31 µ32 , 32 µ33 , 33 µ34 , 34 
S4 µ41 , 41 µ42 , 42 µ43 , 43 µ 44 , 44 
 
µij, ij : mean and standard deviation of failure data in season i and time slot j (cell ij) 
 
The authors state that the seasons need not coincide with annual climatic seasons, calendar 
months or be of equal duration. Rather, categorization should be based on the periods in the 
year when components are vulnerable to interruptions. The time-of-day intervals could also be 
variable and dependent on the more likely period of vulnerability. Such a vulnerability model 
can be consistently applied to both long-term and short-term reliability analyses. For long-term, 
the length of the season in Table 3.2 is increased to a year or longer.  Short-term studies could 
consider climatic seasons in a year, a calendar month, week or a couple of hours.  
 
A matrix is developed for a component. Similar to Kjolle and Holen [1998], the components 
historical failure data is distributed into each of the cells, or time window, and failure 
parameter statistics (mean and standard deviation) derived. Each time window takes into 
account those threats that occurred during the selected window. The data in each cell can thus 
be analyzed further so that failure statistics can be derived for each network threat or the 
cumulative effect of all the threats that occur during the same time window. 
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Unlike the conventional approach that only uses average values to represent interruptions and 
component parameters, the modelling approach proposed by the authors includes the standard 
deviation to account for variability within different time intervals. The standard deviation 
however only describes the degree of dispersion about the mean value. Component 
parameters are influenced by stochastic external elements so that fitted probability 
distributions could exhibit any shape. The model, as is, would thus provide no indication to the 
shape or the level of skewness of a parameter’s underlying distribution. This model is discussed 
further in Chapter four. It is extended so that more realistic failure data distributions can be 
achieved. 
 
3.4 ANALYZING SEASONAL AND TIME-DEPENDENCY OF NETWORK FAILURES 
 
This section analyzes the impact of seasonal and time-of-day variations on network failures. 
External network threats are stochastic [Habib & Khalifa, 1986]. They vary for different lengths 
of time and also have a range of severity levels. External threats mostly occur within specific 
seasons of the year such that a pattern can be attached to their occurrence. Also, some 
interruptions have specific time-dependence. Burnham [1995] described a time-of-day 
approach to investigating the cause of unknown faults. The investigation on Florida Power and 
Light (FPL) company transmission lines showed that outages due to lightning storms 
predominantly occurred during summer months particularly in the afternoon as shown in 
Figure 3.10.  
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Figure 3.10: Hour of day of lightning caused outages on FPL transmission lines [Burnham, 1995] 
 
Weather data from the South African Weather Service (SAWS) also indicates a high likelihood of 
lightning activity during summer afternoons [SAWS, 2010]. Summer rainfall in South Africa is 
generally associated with summer thunderstorms and lightning [Jandrell et al, 2009]. The 
lightning flash density maps for South Africa are presented in Appendix B.  
 
According to Naidoo et al [2006], faults due to pollution and to bird streamers occur at similar 
times during the day. Pollution related flash-overs due to insulator contamination mainly occur 
in drier non-summer periods. The number of outages increases at night when humidity levels 
rise and reach a peak just before the sun rises. A review of transmission outages on the South 
African 200 and 400 kV network showed that pollution related failures occurred mainly 
between 2200 hrs and 0600 hrs as shown in Figure 3.11 [Bekker et al, 1999].  
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Figure 3.11: Histogram for fault times of South Africa’s rogue transmission lines *Bekker et al, 1999+  
 
Burnham [1995] indicated that recorded bird related outages occurred during the same time of 
day interval. The author deduced that the peak, in bird related outages, at 23:00 hrs occurred 
due to birds processing the last large meal of the day. The peak at 06:00 hrs was due to by birds 
not eliminating when asleep and eliminating large volumes upon waking. 
 
3.4.1 Time-dependent characterization of South African transmission line failures  
Minnaar et al [2012] performed an extensive analysis of fault records to identify the major 
causes of faults on the South African transmission network and their characteristics. Failure 
events occurring between 1993 and 2009 were considered and the failure data analyzed. 
 
South Africa can be divided geographically into two areas indicating the dominant nature of 
rainfall activity that is present i.e. frontal and thunderstorm rainfall activity regions. More 
rainfall falls in the thunderstorm region. The South African power network is composed of 
transmission lines operated at voltage levels of 220 kV, 275 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV. However, 
lines operated at 400 kV comprise the bulk of the South African transmission system that is 
extensively exposed to both frontal and thunderstorm activity.  
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The failure data analyzed with respect to the geographical regions is shown in Table 3.3. The 
average fault frequency values depicted in Table 3.3 shows that lines within the summer rainfall 
area (thunderstorm region) have a higher fault frequency than those in the frontal region. 
 
Table 3.3: Fault frequency statistics based on geographical regions [Minnaar et al, 2012] 
Rainfall activity Total line  
Length (km) 




Thunderstorm 18,416 2.9 0.649 
Frontal 7,906 1.6 0.265 
Whole country 266,322 2.5 0.451 
 
Figure 3.12 also illustrates the higher fault frequency, particularly for lines rated at 400 kV, in 
the thunderstorm region. Analysis of the data also showed that the network is mainly 
influenced by four external threats which include lightning, bush fires, pollution and birds. 
Figure 3.13 depicts the fault frequency of 400 kV lines based on the identified failure causes 
and on the geographical regions. It is noted that bird streamers contribute most to line failures 
in both regions. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Average fault frequency per 100 km per year per rainfall activity area [Minnaar et al, 
2012] 
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The fault frequency due to bird streamers in both regions is however high. Thus, the difference 
in rainfall patterns between the two regions does not significantly influence the likelihood of 
bird streamer line faults. The fault frequency statistics for other failure causes are however 
significantly different in each geographical region. 
 
Figure 3.13: Average 400 kV line fault frequency by fault cause and geographical region [Minnaar et al, 
2012] 
 
To analyze the seasonal and time-of-day patterns associated with fault events due to each 
failure cause, the data collected was distributed into the 4X4 matrix proposed by Herman and 
Gaunt [2010]. Figure 3.14 provides a visual inspection of the frequency of line failure statistics 
for bird streamer faults.  Quarter years and six hour intervals were considered by the authors.  
 
 
Figure 3.14: Seasonal and time-dependent frequency of bird streamer faults on South African 400kV 
lines [Minnaar et al, 2012] 




This chapter was able to answer some of the research questions. However, there is need to 
develop some aspects in literature further so that the hypothesis can be validated. The research 
questions addressed in the chapter include: 
 
Qn.3: What block of a power network is required for this analysis? 
Most of the literature encompassing reliability and adverse weather is limited to distribution 
power networks. Such networks are usually confined to one geographic area such that all 
network components are exposed to the same adverse weather element. The thesis will 
consider the effect of different adverse weather elements affecting the same component. 
Transmission lines traverse different geographical regions and as such are exposed to threats 
different adverse environment. A bulk power network will be considered for this thesis. The 
thesis will aim to adapt those reliability techniques developed that only apply when the effect 
of an external threat is localized. 
 
Qn.4: What is the effect of external threats on bulk networks and what contingency 
approaches have been developed for modelling vulnerability of network components to 
external threats? 
The chapter discussed the impact of exposure to adverse local and global space weather on 
bulk network facilities. The failure rate of components is a variable parameter. The local 
weather threats discussed result from different factors so that their occurrence and severity of 
impact within a given analysis period could also be variable. While different approaches have 
been proposed to model vulnerability of network component to external threats, time-
independent approaches do not consider the time-of-occurrence of fault events. Failure 
parameters are modelled as time-varying quantities. The time-dependent models discussed in 
the chapter were mainly suited for network planning studies. Applying them to operational 
scenarios could yield misleading results. As far as the author is concerned, no modelling 
approach has been developed to capture threats geomagnetically induced currents (GICs).  
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Such threats could have either immediate or deferred effects on a component’s failure. A 
flexible modelling approach, applicable to both planning and operational studies, is thus 
necessary. The matrix vulnerability model proposed by Herman and Gaunt [2010] has great 
potential in this regard. It however needs to be extended so that component parameters 
derived from historical data can be represented more realistically i.e. accounting for both 
dispersion and skewness in the failure parameter distributions. 
  
Qn.5: How significantly do seasonal and time-of-day variations impact on component 
reliability parameters? 
Different authors indicated that local weather threats have specific time-dependence and 
predominantly occur in certain seasons and times-of-day during the year. Minnaar et al [2012] 
showed that South African transmission line failures have a high season and time-dependency. 
The failure statistics (mean and variance) for the threats considered changed during the year. 
The use of PDFs to represent the statistics presented could highlight the variation in the failure 
statistics due to change in season and time-of-day. 
  
3.5.1 Onward 
The next chapter will develop a time-dependent probabilistic technique required for the 
analyses performed in this research. The chapter will: 
 Extend the Herman and Gaunt [2010] vulnerability matrix model so that a more 
versatile PDF can be incorporated  
 Investigate the suitability of the Beta PDF over the commonly used ones, for 
representing reliability data in the PDF-based matrix model.  
 Present the methodology applied by the new techniques when developing PDF-based 
models for failure parameters 
 Develop a new sequential MCS technique that will be used to apply the PDF-based 
matrix model.  
 Test and analyze the performance of the time-dependent probabilistic technique using a 
published test network 
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Overhead lines, transformers and outdoor substations are strongly exposed to external risk 
factors so that they experience strongly seasonal and time-dependent failure rates [Bollen et al, 
2008]. The reliability evaluation techniques identified in literature are however unable to 
realistically capture the induced variability in component failure rates. A time-dependent 
probabilistic approach (TDPA) is developed in this chapter. Unlike previous approaches, the 
approach will be able to: 
 Simultaneously account for the effect of seasonal and time-of-day variations when 
developing network failure models. 
 Realistically model historical data such that both the skewness and dispersion of their 
underlying distributions are considered at the input stage of a reliability analysis. The 
finite ranges that characterize such failure data should also be considered.  
  Apply any distribution in the simulation process. The limiting requirement to develop 
the inverse transform for each distribution applied should be overcome. The 
approach should be able to apply the Beta distribution as input failure models. 
 Perform similarly to or preferably better that the conventional sequential MCS. The 
potential of the approach for high computational efficiency should be high. 
  
4.2 SUITABILITY OF THE BETA PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION FOR RELIABILITY STUDIES 
 
It is important to investigate how suitable the Beta PDF is for reliability analyses compared to 
other PDFs. Goodness-of-fit tests are carried out for this purpose. These tests match empirical 
frequencies to theoretical models and consist of absolute and relative measures. A graphical 
technique for evaluating goodness of fit is drawing a histogram and a PDF curve together.  
Goodness-of-fit tests are thus used to determine whether a random sample comes from a 
particular distribution.  
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Three goodness-of-fit test methods are available: Chi-square (C-S), Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
and Anderson-darling (A-D) tests *O’Connor, 2002+. Each test has different advantages and 
disadvantages and as such, used in specific applications; some are more suitable to large 
samples and others to small samples. The dispersion or distance tests are either based on the 
probability density functions or the cumulative distribution functions. The power of the tests to 
reject the null hypothesis, that a sample fits a certain distribution, varies with the number and 
type of data available, and the assumption being tested [O’Connor, 2002].   
 
Preliminary work was carried out by Cross et al [2006] to investigate the possibility of using the 
Beta PDF to describe various parameters in the reliability analysis of power systems. The 
Kologomorov-Smirnov (K-S) method was used to compare the ‘goodness-of-fit’ achieved by 
several distributions, including the Beta distribution, when fitted to reliability data sets. The 
results showed that the Beta PDF is one of the best fits generally for reliability data sets. Cross 
et al [2006] also noted that the Beta PDF fitted better in cases where the tail of the distribution 
was in the direction of the minimum value of the data set. The K-S test is however suitable for 
analyzing the tails of distributions. The A-D test is a modification of the K-S and is thus also 
suitable for analyzing the tails of distributions. The C-S test however is dependent on the 
number of bins and thus provides a better analysis of the goodness-of-fit around the mean 
value of a given data set. A summary of the differences between the three tests is presented in 
Table 4.1. 







Binning of data No              No Yes 
Sample size Small Small Large 
Distribution 
specific 
No Yes No 
Considers tail of 
the distribution 
No Yes No 
 
To get a more rounded impression of how the Beta PDF compares to other commonly used 
ones, an analysis similar to that presented by Cross et al [2006] was carried. 
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 Table 4.2 shows some typical inputs to a reliability analysis and the probability distributions 
commonly used to describe them.  
 
Table 4.2: Probability distributions usually considered for reliability inputs 
Parameter Probability Distribution 
Failure rate Exponential 
Restoration rate Exponential, Lognormal, Weibull 
Switching  time Uniform, Gaussian, Gamma, Lognormal, Poisson 
Time to failure (TTF) Exponential, Gamma, Gaussian, Lognormal, Poisson 
Time to repair (TTR) Exponential, Gamma, Gaussian, Lognormal, Poisson 
 
Goel [2000] investigated the use of different PDFs in a distribution system reliability analysis. A 
component’s TTF was assumed to be exponentially distributed while the TTR was described by 
exponential, lognormal, normal, and gamma distributions. This thesis proposes the use of the 
Beta in reliability analyses. The exponential PDF is however the most commonly applied 
function. The Beta PDF should thus be able to represent the same data sets as the exponential. 
Also, the results computed using either the exponential or the Beta PDF for reliability inputs 
should be comparable. 
 
A key step in the conventional sequential MCS is the translation of randomly generated 
numbers into time variables. Given the Beta shape parameters and scaling factor of a 
component’s TTF or TTR distribution, the Beta PDF-based TTF or TTR is generated in the 
MATLAB software package using (4.1). 
 
          (     )          (4.1) 
Tj : either TTF or TTR  
Cj: scaling factor of either TTF or TTR data sets 
betarnd(α,β): random number generator (0,1) from Beta PDF with shape parameters (α, β)  
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Figure 4.1: TTF data set fitted with exponential and Beta PDFs [Awodele et al, 2012] 
 
Figure 4.1 shows a Beta PDF fitted to an exponentially distributed TTF data set using EasyFit 
software. The three Goodness of fit test were applied. Table 4.3 presents the results of the 
goodness-of-fit tests.  
 







Statistic Rank Statistic Rank Statistic Rank 
Exponential 0.034 1 1.49 1 16.80 1 
Beta 0.035 2 3.45 2 16.90 2 
 
As expected the exponential PDF is ranked higher than the Beta PDF. It is however important to 
note that test statistics of the exponential and Beta PDFs, from the K-S and Chi-square tests, are 
very close. The difference in the test statistics derived from the A-D test could have resulted 
from the differences in the respective tail regions.  
 
To validate the use of Beta PDF based TTFs and TTRs, Awodele et al [2012] performed a 
comparative analysis between results obtained using exponential and equivalent Beta PDFs to 
represent component failure parameters.  
Probability Density Function
Histogram Beta Exponential
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Component TTFs and TTRs were thus derived, in the MCS performed, using either the 
exponential inverse translations shown in (2.4) and (2.5) or the MATLAB function in (4.1). Figure 
4.2 shows a comparison of one of the indices computed the different TTF PDF inputs. The index 
PDFs have the same range and almost overlap which indicated that the Beta PDF could be used 
in place of the exponential to represent component TTFs. Similar observations were made from 
other the load point indices computed. 
 
Figure 4.2: Probability of failure at load point for exponential and Beta represented reliability inputs 
[Awodele et al, 2012] 
 
 Awodele et al [2012] also checked the goodness of fit of the Beta PDF for the reliability index 
data sets computed. Figure 4.3 shows a histogram developed by Awodele et al [2012] from the 
frequency of failure data set computed for a load point and the Beta, gamma, lognormal and 
Weibull PDFs fitted. The results of the goodness-of-fit tests are presented in Table 4.4.  
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of Frequency of failure at a load terminal with fitted PDFs [Awodele et al, 2012] 
 







Statistic Rank Statistic Rank Statistic Rank 
Beta 0.07 1 0.59 1 10.18 1 
Gamma  0.07 1 0.80 2 12.64 3 
Lognormal 0.08 3 1.05 3 12.73 4 
Weibull 0.10 4 1.37 4 10.91 2 
 
With finitely ranged TTF and TTR inputs, the Beta PDF was ranked as the best fit of the 
frequency of failure index of the selected load point. The results also showed a high ranking 
attached to the Beta PDF for other load points and system indices computed. 
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY APPLIED BY THE TDPA 
 
This section will describe the methodology applied by the TDPA and identifies the key 
differences with the conventional sequential MCS.  
Probability Density Function
Histogram Beta Gamma Lognormal Weibull
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Even though many adverse conditions are stochastic, with variable severity and duration, a 
season- and time-dependent pattern can be associated with their occurrence and the outages 
they cause [Minnaar et al, 2012]. In contrast to the conventional sequential MCS, the TDPA 
samples from PDF models of component failure data that simultaneously account for seasonal- 
and time-dependency. The TDPA simulates when and for how long component failures affect a 
network by randomly sampling from frequency and duration PDFs that characterize 
component failure events in a selected time window. These failure events define the 
chronological cycle for each component. During the rest of the time the component is in the up 
state. 
 
4.3.1 Analysis of network failure data in terms of time windows 
The Herman and Gaunt [2010] matrix model described in Section 3.3.2.1 is extended in this 
section. The model previously used the mean and standard deviation to represent component 
reliability parameters. Parameters representing the stochastic reliability (outage frequency or 
duration) of a component are expressed probabilistically in each cell using Beta PDFs. A scaling 
factor is thus introduced for this research. The scaling factor describes the range of a given 
component parameter data set in each matrix cell. Extreme events are not considered in the 
work presented here. As such, a given cell’s scaling factor was determined as the maximum 
parameter value recorded in the cell. The matrix dimensions applied by Minnaar et al [2012] 
are considered here. The matrix is thus characterized by quarter-year seasons and daily 
variation over six-hour intervals as shown in Table 4.5. 
 
The matrix model allows one to analyze historical failure data for different purposes. A matrix 
can be built with regard to a specific component, the whole network, a specific threat and/or 
geographical region. However each matrix relates to a specific reliability parameter such as 
frequency or duration of failure.  
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Table 4.5: TDPA 4X4 matrix model with Beta PDF shape parameters 
Season (S) 
Period (P) 
0000-0559 hrs 0600-1159 hrs 1200-1759 hrs 1800-2359 hrs 
January - March α11 β11 C11 α12 β12 C12 α13 β13 C13 α14 β14 C14 
April – June α21 β21 C21 α22 β22 C22 α23 β23 C23 α24 β24 C24 
July - September α31 β31 C31 α32 β32 C32 α33 β33 C33 α34 β34 C34 
October – December  α41 β41 C41 α42 β42 C42 α43 β43 C43 α44 β44 C44 
 
αij, β ij, C ij : Beta PDF describing a component parameter in season i and time slot j 
 
The dimensions of each matrix cell are dependent on the type of analysis i.e. either planning or 
operation. The component’s failure data for a parameter is distributed into the different time 
windows. The failure data in a given time window (Tpt) is then categorized according to the 
failure causes that occurred in the Tpt.  It is important to note that in practice, irrespective of 
the type of analysis, the dimension of a Tpt is limited by the availability of failure data required 
to populate the Tpt. The statistical parameters, mean and standard deviation are computed for 
each failure cause data set.  
 
It may be necessary in some analyses to aggregate the data sets corresponding to each 
identified failure cause. Aggregated results can be regarded as the composite of the 
contributing failure data or sub-data sets. Composite data sets are required in planning 
analyses where two or more operational cells may need to be combined. Aggregation across 
the matrix enables the derivation of planning failure data sets from matrices describing 
operational failure data. For example, four quarter-year operational cells can be aggregated, 
along a matrix column, to yield an annual planning Tpt. The time slot is retained. With this type 
of aggregation the same reliability approach can be applied consistently to network planning 
and operation scenarios by evaluating different periods (e.g. 6 hours or a year) and even 
changing the component parameters to reflect their discrete adverse conditions.  
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Aggregation can also be performed within a given cell. The sub-data sets corresponding to the 
failure cause categories can be aggregated to yield a composite cell data set. This is applicable 
to cases where a given component is exposed to more than one of the failure causes occurring 
in the given cell. For example a transmission line may be exposed to more than one external 
threat simultaneously.  
 
A new mean, standard deviation and maximum value is computed for the composite data sets. 
When developing aggregated data sets for long-term periods, the covariance between different 
external threats could be relevant; occurring due to the presence or absence of similar 
conditions [Minnaar et al, 2012]. The failure statistics (mean, standard deviation and scaling 
factor) of the composite data set are derived by aggregating the mean, standard deviation and 
maximum value of each sub-data set using (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) [Papoulis, 1991; Leon-Garcia, 
1994].  
            ∑     
 
        (4.2) 
 
            √(∑        
 
     ∑ ∑     
 
     
 
         )    (4.3) 
 
            ∑      
 
        (4.4) 
 
          ,           : mean and standard deviation of composite data set 
          : scaling factor of composite data 
  : maximum value of sub-data set i ; (i є N) 
COV [xi, xj]: covariance of variables xi and xj 
 
Over long-term periods, the covariance between different failure causes could be relevant, due 
to the presence or absence of similar external conditions. Mostly, external failure causes such as 
birds, lightning and fires are unrelated and even occur predominantly in different seasons, so the 
failure events can be considered as independent.  
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The work presented in this thesis considers South African external conditions. South African 
weather conditions and patterns are geographically based [Minnaar et al, 2012]. As such, each 
external threat has a unique seasonal and time-of-day dependency such that they can be 
regarded as independent of each other. The use of the matrix model strengthens the 
independence between different threats, particularly in operational analyses. The second term 
in (4.3) can thus be disregarded to yield (4.5).  
 
           √ ∑        
 
        (4.5) 
 
Discrete and stochastic modelling approaches evaluate failure rates for different seasons to 
cater for the effects of weather on a network. Seasonal variation is just one dimension of 
component failure dependency. The matrix model ensures that the independent effects of 
seasonal and time-of-day variations on network failures can be analyzed concurrently without 
extensive modelling. Further, the vulnerability models described in Section 3.3 were developed 
for specific applications i.e. either planning or operational studies.  While the reliability data 
sets used in either analysis are the same, the methodologies required tend to be different. The 
matrix model applied in the TDPA ensures that a multi-dimensional approach can be applied to 
the analysis of component parameter data sets. By varying the dimensions of the TDPA matrix 
model, the same vulnerability modelling approach can be applied to either a planning or 
operational analysis. The failure data sets are however manipulated so as to take into account 
the dissimilar adverse conditions in planning and operation studies.  
 
4.3.2 Deriving PDF models from failure data sets  
 
With the network failure data distributed in the different windows of the matrix model, the 
statistical parameters (mean, standard deviation and maximum value) of each window are 
determined. These are then applied in the expressions (2.9) and (2.10) to derive the shape 
parameters of the required Beta PDF models.  
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For each component, a Beta PDF model is derived per failure parameter from a single or 
composite failure data set. The TDPA focuses on component down states and as such considers 
the frequency and duration of component failure. Frequency and duration of failure Beta PDFs 
are thus derived for each component in every Tpt. The Beta PDFs are derived from component 
failure data sets corresponding to the parameter being modelled.  
 
The number of times a component fails in a Tpt during each TDPA simulation run is randomly 
selected from the component’s Beta PDF frequency-of-failure model. The Beta PDF will 
represent the component’s vulnerability to either a single failure cause or combination of 
multiple failure causes. The duration of each failure is randomly selected from a component’s 
duration of failure Beta PDF. The duration-of-failure PDF model is derived for each time window 
in the same way as the frequency-of-failure model. This research is concerned with the most 
likely component reliability parameter values and corresponding reliability index values. The 
Beta PDF describing a given data set is thus scaled using the maximum value of the data set.  
 
4.3.2.1 Network planning considerations when deriving TDPA failure models 
 
Extensive historical data regarding network component outages, the root cause of each outage, 
time of outage occurrence and outage duration is usually required when developing models for 
planning purposes. For the TDPA, more sets of data are required. These could relate to: 
 
Extensive historical data regarding network component outages, the root cause of each outage, 
time of outage occurrence and outage duration is required in developing models for long term 
or planning purposes. For the TDPA, more sets of data are required. These could relate to: 
 Network configuration; such that components are assigned to geographical locations 
and specific network risk factors.  
 Space and weather data; such that network outages are correlated with seasonal 
variations in space and weather. 
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 Restoration protocols; such that variation in restoration times are associated with time-
dependent factors such as day of the week. 
 Maintenance protocols; to capture network vulnerability and response to scheduled 
maintenance activities 
The vulnerability of a given component to any external threat, on any given day is thus 
represented by the single composite PDF. In planning, data is collated over many years such 
that the PDF model derived would represent the ‘average’ vulnerability model for the analysis 
period i.e. the vulnerability model on a day with ‘normal’ external network conditions. Using 
the TDPA planning the same network threat PDF model is applied on every day of the time 
window. Each day of the time window thus has the same model for likelihood of failure 
assigned.  
 
Using deterministic average values to describe a parameter infers that that the parameter will 
take on that value 100 % of the time. A PDF model however not only shows the range of values 
that a given parameter can take on, but also attaches a degree of confidence (or risk) to each 
value: The confidence that the actual parameter value will not exceed (or the risk that it will 
exceed) the value selected from the PDF. Deterministic average values are single risk values 
that allow for a 50-50 chance of exceedance. PDF models on the other hand allow selection of 
parameter values at various levels of confidence. Selecting the 50 percentile of a distribution is 
equivalent to selecting the value with 50 % level of confidence attached. For a Gaussian 
distribution, this value also corresponds to the average of the data set described by the PDF. 
When the distribution is skewed however, selecting the 50 percentile value yields the median 
of the distribution. Attaching confidence levels to values provides a means of quantifying the 
uncertainty in that value.  To obtain the most likely value of a parameter, one would have to 
select values from a PDF at higher levels of confidence. A comparative analysis between the use 
of deterministic average values and PDFs for inputs in a planning reliability analysis will be 
presented later in the thesis.   
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4.3.2.2 Network Operation considerations when deriving TDPA failure models 
The planning PDFs derived using the TDPA are to be regarded as the ‘average’ model for a given 
network threat. Reliability analysis for network operation is on a short-term basis i.e. months, 
days or hours. In a planning analysis, an overview of the network’s reliability is required so that 
using ‘average’ vulnerability models and values may suffice. Intermittent network risks like 
adverse weather however vary considerably in short periods such that the single network risk 
models applied in planning may not be adequate for short-term time windows. The severity at 
which a given external threat is forecasted is thus very significant when modelling vulnerability 
of exposed network components. 
 
It is well known that the impact of external threats on network components varies with 
geographical location. Adverse weather may not affect the entire transmission network 
simultaneously so that different transmission lines may experience different weather 
conditions. Billinton and Li [1991] developed a weather model that divides the network 
coverage area into geographical divisions. With the model, different sections of a single line 
may also be exposed to different weather conditions. The model however neglects the fact that 
different sections of a single line may be exposed to the same weather conditions but at varying 
levels of severity.  
 
A case can be made for the analysis of network threats in terms of their level of severity. A 
number of factors that influence the likelihood and impact of lightning flashes have been 
identified. Some of these include the type of tower, location of transmission towers, type of 
lightning, and tower footing resistance. Procedures for calculating the risk of outages, based on 
these and other factors, due to lightning have been published [IEEE Guide, 1997]. Almeida et al 
[2009] however showed how variations in these factors impact on the lightning withstand 
performance of over-head lines in different sections of the Portuguese power system.  
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 Location of transmission tower: Each geographical area is characterized by specific 
weather conditions which directly relate to occurrence of lightning. No lightning, no risk 
of lightning over-current flash-overs. The higher the number of lightning flashes and 
ground flash density, the higher the likelihood of lightning related outages 
 Type of lightning: The negative downward lightning strokes represent the majority of 
the lightning that affects the Portuguese transmission system [Almeida et al, 2009]  
 Type of transmission tower: The heights of towers vary with the terrain geography. 
South African failure data shows that transmission lines at lower voltage levels are more 
predisposed to lightning flashes [Minnaar et al, 2012]. However, within the same 
overhead lines, several tower types can occur so that the risk of exposure is different 
 Tower footing resistance: Measurement depends on, amongst other variables, the soil 
resistivity. While this varies from location to location due to geographical characteristics 
like soil type, during a year weather conditions like precipitation causes the soil 
resistivity and thus tower footing resistance, of a specific location, to vary climatically  
 
The location of transmission lines and the activity in the areas through which the lines traverse 
can be used to categorize the severity of pollution related outages. Gençoğlu and Cebeci *2008+ 
identify four levels of pollution severity; light, medium, heavy and very heavy pollution. The 
authors tabulated different levels of pollution and provided a description of some typical 
environments for each severity level. A similar table could be developed for other network 
threats.  The table did not include the effect of time-of-day on the severity levels.  
A correlation could be made with the daily activity pattern of say mining and the flash-over 
pattern of power lines within the mine’s vicinity. 
 
The concept of varying severity levels of external threats is not limited to local weather threats. 
The levels of GICs are significantly higher in networks located in the high-latitude regions such 
as Canada and Sweden. The values of GICs have also been known to vary in the different 
sections of a power network particularly due to change in the transmission line orientation and 
earth’s resistivity *Molinsky, 2002+.  
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The IEEE working group on Geomagnetic disturbances and Power system effects [1993] 
reported that “there is also an important coastal effect resulting from induced ocean currents 
that must be continuous as they impinge on land masses where the resistivity is much higher; 
this effect will produce high values of earth-surface potential and GICs in power systems located 
in low conductivity regions that are close to some coastal areas.” 
 
Since operational risk assessment deals more with dynamic events, the models used should be 
as realistic as possible. The likelihood of external threats occurring at different levels of severity 
should be considered. The predominance of specific network threats in different time windows 
becomes evident under operational conditions. Table 4.6 shows the dominant network threat 
affecting operational time windows developed for the South African Transmission network.  
Table 4.6 is developed from collated failure data [Minnaar et al, 2012]. The failure patterns due 
to the threats presented in Table 4.6 are as described in Section 3.2. 
 
Table 4.6: Dominant network threats affecting operational time windows 
Season 
Period 
00:00–06:00 hrs 00:06–12:00 hrs 12:00–18:00 hrs 18:00–24:00 hrs 
January-March Birds Pollution Lightning Lightning 
April-June Birds Birds Fire Birds 
July-September Birds Birds Fire Birds 
October-December Birds Birds Lightning Lightning 
 
Bhuiyan and Allan [1994] state that the behaviour of weather elements, occurrence and 
duration, impacts on the stress level each element imposes on the failure and repair processes 
of exposed components. Bhuiyan and Allan [1994] extended the weather model developed by 
Billinton and Li [1991] to transmission lines and computed the proportion of failures, of a given 
line, that occurred in different geographical regions. The fraction of a line exposed to a given 
set of conditions could thus be identified. A similar approach is applied by TDPA to derive 
operational vulnerability models.  
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The severity of a given external threat can be categorized based on a random parameter of the 
threat being investigated; wind speed and ground flash density for wind and lightning related 
failures. Each level of severity causes different levels of stress on an exposed line so that the 
number of failures is different. Appendix B shows the template developed by the IEEE data 
analysis task force [1994] for use in capturing overhead transmission line outage causes. While 
a significant range of outage cause categories were identified, no provision was made for 
variation in the severity of the stochastic outage causes. Correlation of metrological data and 
failure data would yield operational sub-failure data sets corresponding to each severity level. 
The correlation would show that the number of failures increased with the severity level of the 
external threat. One thus has to allow for say low and high extremes in the component 
vulnerability models developed for operational reliability analysis; Beta PDFs are derived for 
each severity level sub-data set.  
 
To predict the severity level of an imminent threat, forecasts are carried out by monitoring and 
measuring specific parameters of the given external threat. A network threat will be predicted 
at a range of severity levels over the course of a day. Variations in daily weather forecasts or 
predictions of occurrence of storms testify to this. Not only do day-to-day recorded values 
change, daily forecasts also predict high and low readings per weather parameter. In practice, a 
threshold can be set. Depending on the severity level, sub-data sets can then be identified in 
the historical data.  
The severity threat-level is thus identified depending on the margin by which the parameter of 
the threat being investigated exceeds the threshold value. The corresponding severity level 
Beta PDF is then assigned to components exposed to the threat. A composite network threat 
model can also be derived in operational analysis. However unlike in planning where 
aggregation was carried out along different cells, in operation the severity level sub-data sets 
are aggregated within a single cell. The corresponding composite cell PDF describes the 
expected (average) performance of a given line when exposed to the given external threat i.e. 
vulnerability on a normal day. 
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Three severity level models were defined for each external threat in this research; average, high 
and low severity level. Analysis of collected failure data, for an operational reliability analysis, 
would yield component failure models for low and high severity level failures. High severity 
levels are characterized by high frequency of interruptions and longer repairs. Low frequency of 
interruptions and short component repairs correspond to low severity level failure models. Low 
and high severity level models are aggregated to derive average severity level failure models. 
For such models the frequency and duration of interruptions are within the expected mean 
range. Table 4.6 showed that in the first quarter of the year between noon and 06:00 pm, 
lightning is the dominant threat.  
 
In the planning approach, the same single PDF models will be applied on every day of the 
analysis period. Given the variability in short-term periods, operational analyses have to 
consider the duration of exposure of a component to a given threat or more importantly, to 
each severity level of the threat. Consider the first quarter of the year between noon and 
06:00 pm. The same time window can be expanded, as shown in Table 4.7, to include each of 
the 91 days. The external threats occurring within the cell vary over the 91 days so that the 
severity of each threat and corresponding failures could be high or low on certain days within 
the time window; high number of failures on days when the severity level of a given threat is 
determined as high and vice versa. 
 
Table 4.7: Expanded time window for period of 91 days between 12:00am and 06:00 pm 
 12:00 – 18:00 hours 
Season (91 days) Day 1 Day 2                 Day 90 Day 91 
 
The duration of each severity level of a given threat can be determined by analyzing 
metrological data. According to the weather data collected from the South African Weather 
Service (SAWS), variation in weather parameters, in a specific location, is captured by recording 
the weather parameter values thrice a day [SAWS, 2010]. It is expected that the severity of a 
given weather parameter will have changed by the next reading. A given reading thus predicts 
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30 % of the day’s weather. It was thus assumed for this research that for days, in the time 
window, with high severity level forecasts, the dominant threat is at high and low severity 
levels for 60 % and 30 % of the given day respectively. On other days, all external threats are 
simulated either at a low severity level or ‘average’ level for the whole day.  
 
The portion of a component, particularly the length of a transmission line, exposed to each 
severity level on a given day within the time window should also be assessed. Distribution lines 
are confined to small geographical areas and one could apply a given risk model to their full 
lengths. Transmission lines traverse various regions and this was considered by Bhuiyan and 
Allan [1994]. The severity of a given external threat however also varies from location to 
location within a specific region. Instead of considering only the proportion of line failures in 
each geographical region, this analysis also considers the portion of the line exposed to each 
severity level of a threat. Figure 4.4 shows the section of a line (100 km) in a specific region and 






Figure 4.4: 100 km of a line exposed to a different severity levels of a given threat 
 
Xnk: portion on line exposed to threat k at n
th severity level 
For simplicity, the section of a line in a specific region was divided into four equal portions. The 
severity level models developed would thus be applied to the sections of line exposed to the 
specific threat affecting that portion of line. Depending on the storm, the portion of line 
exposed to a given severity level can change. For this research the quarter sections were 
maintained throughout the operational analysis. It was however assumed that the high severity 
level PDF model would always be applied to a quarter of the affected line on simulated days 
with the threat at high level of severity. On such days a uniform random number generator is 
used to apply either a low or average severity model to the rest of the line.  
 
0          100km  
X1k    X2k          Xnk 
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With the line fraction model proposed by Bhuiyan and Allan [1994], each line was regarded as a 
combination of series elements. Each element corresponded to a geographical region. The 
same principle is applied here. The total number of line failures is computed as the sum of the 
failures due to each severity level of a network threat. Figure 4.5 shows three severity level PDF 
for lightning related failures as applied to the entire network.  
 
Figure 4.5: Severity-based Beta PDF models for lightning frequency of failure 
 
The effect of the severity level PDFs on the likely maximum number of failures on different days 
is shown in Table 4.8 for lightning related failure. It is clear that the use of severity models, as 
opposed to the single risk models used in planning could yield higher failure frequencies.  
Table 4.8: Maximum number of lightning related failures on different types of days 
Type of day 





High severity  35.7 (35.7X1) + (13X3)  = 74.7 
Low severity  13.0 (35.7X0) + (13X4) = 52 
“Average”  severity 48.7 48.7 
 
The collated data used to develop planning reliability models is also used for operational 
reliability analysis. The data only has to be refined to include: 
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 Network risk severity classification; Historical data such as storm data needs to be 
categorized according to levels of severity e.g. low, medium and high storm level 
 Forecasts for operational purposes, usually based on monitoring storm parameters, 
should be complemented with a likelihood of occurrence and duration index. 
A network operator thus knows the likelihood of a potential storm occurring and the 
expected duration. This would help categorize the storm and the relevant severity 
model can be applied to the affected components 
 Network risk vulnerability; It is necessary to reclassify outage data according to the risk 
severity classes. This captures the network’s response to variation in the risk severity 
levels such that the operational Beta PDF models developed are also risk-severity based 
 Length of transmission lines; Transmission lines traverse great distances such that 
different portions of one line are exposed either to different network risks or, to 
different severity levels of a given risk. The failure data should be represented in per 
exposure length to ensure more accurate application of the vulnerability models 
 
4.3.3 Simulation steps required by the TDPA  
Section 2.3.2 presented the different techniques available for evaluating bulk network 
reliability. Sequential MCS is the most commonly applied technique. The prerequisite inverse 
translation limits the application of the method when distributions like the Beta PDF have to be 
used.  
Also, the significant computation time associated with the approach makes the approach in its 
conventional form unsuitable for operational studies. This section presents a new simulation 
technique based on sequential MCS that can apply Beta PDF-based failure models. By contrast 
with the conventional sequential MCS, the TDPA samples from frequency and duration of 
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A prerequisite to any network reliability analysis is the determination of the failure states of the 
network and its load points and, the combination of components whose outages contribute 
each state. A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is usually incorporated in the reliability 
simulation for this purpose. A network power flow is one of the FMEA techniques available and 
was applied in the analyses performed. The power flow was however decoupled from the 
reliability analysis. This ensured that the computation time was only dependent on the 
reliability simulations. The network planning and operation simulation was thus performed in 
two parts: A network power flow and reliability simulation. This section describes how each 
simulation was performed. 
   
4.3.3.1 Power flow analysis simulations  
A power flow analysis is one of the methods commonly used to carry out adequacy analysis on 
a network. DIGSILENT software package was used for this purpose. The procedure included:  
1) Build network in DIGSILENT and run power flow to ensure network is stable.  
2) Run a Failure Mode and Effect analysis (FMEA) on the network. This analysis was used to 
determine the components in the network whose outage affects a particular load point. A 
component outage was simulated by taking it out of service. 
3) The power flow was re-run to determine affected load points. Any failure state was recorded 
including the components and load points involved. A failure state was regarded as one that 
met the following conditions:  
 Capacity deficiency in the system due to component outage 
 Isolation of load points due to overloading of other network components  
 Voltage collapse at any system bus  
 MVAr limit violations detected 
 Failure of load flow to converge due to voltage and power limits  
4) Reconnect component. Repeat steps 1-3 for all components.  
 
4.3.3.2 TDPA reliability analysis simulation procedure 
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The MATLAB software package was used to develop the TDPA simulation technique. The 
simulation procedure is represented by 12 steps shown in the Figure 4.6 and described below: 
1) Assume all components are in service i.e. up state. Simulation begins with an array of 
“ones” representing an only up-state life-cycle of a component. The approach only 
simulates component failure events (down states) 
2) Select a component and a time window (Tpt). The dimension of each matrix cell 
depends on the type of analysis i.e. either planning or operation and represents a 
selected period (days, months, a year or longer or a climatic season) and the time/s of 
day. 
3) Select the adverse conditions (Ci-CN) that affect the component. Each time window takes 
into account only those failure causes a component is exposed to within the time 
window. 
4) Aggregate the component frequency-of-failure data corresponding to each identified 
failure cause. 
4a. In planning studies, component failures may be affected by more than one failure 
cause, in which case the failure parameters for each cause are aggregated. A 
component’s planning failure data set is derived either for a single failure cause e.g. 
FCip (µip, σip) or FCjp (µip, σip) for failure causes i and j respectively or for multiple 
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Figure 4.6: Flow chart representing TDPA simulation procedure  
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4b. For operational analysis an aggregated data set, FCijo (µijo, σijo) can also be derived 
for a component exposed to more than one failure cause. Additionally, the severity 
level of a given failure cause is considered in operational analysis. A component’s 
exposure to a threat varies according to the prevailing conditions or the proximity 
of the component to the corridor of a moving threat such as fire or thunderstorms. 
Threat-severity-dependent failure data, FCilt (µilt, σilt,), are derived from correlated 
historical weather data and failure data.  As an example, dissimilar PDFs for high, 
low and average lightning threat level can be based on the failure data 
corresponding to high, low and average values of lightning ground flash density for 
a time window. 
5) Derive the component’s frequency of failure PDF, FL1(αpt, βpt, Cpt), from the appropriate 
failure data sets. The component’s PDFs are derived from the failure statistics presented in 
the matrix cell identified using (2.9) and (2.10).  
6) Generate the number of component failures in Tpt. The number of times a component fails 
in Tpt during each simulation run is randomly selected from FL1(αpt, βpt, Cpt). The Beta PDF 
represents the component’s vulnerability to either a single cause (FCn) or combination of 
multiple network risks (FCnm) as given by (4.6). 





     (           )
     (              )
    (4.6) 
n, m: failure cause index; n= (i, j, ………, N); m = (j, k,………….., N) 
N: total number of failure causes occurring in Tpt 
q = either planning (p) or operation (o) 
7) Randomly assign each failure event to a specific day within the analysis period using a 
uniform random generator.  
8) Generate the duration of failure per event by randomly selecting from the component’s 
duration of failure PDF, DL1(αpt, βpt, Cpt) aggregated and derived for each time window in 
the same way as for the component frequency-of-failure, depicted by the dashed lines 
in Figure 4.6. 
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9) Develop the component’s chronological (up and down) state cycle for the analysis period. A 
failure event is represented by a string of bit zeroes. The length of a string depends on the 
duration sampled from DL1(αpt, βpt, Cpt). The number of strings depends on the failure 
frequency sampled from FL1(αpt, βpt, Cpt). The strings of bit “ones”, in the component’s 
original up-state lifecycle, corresponding to the failure days randomly selected are replaced 
by the string of zeroes to yield a new up-down lifecycle.  
10) Repeat steps 2 to 9 for all components and combine the components’ cycles to develop 
the system lifecycle and provide failure state cycles for different load points based on 
the FMEA analysis. 
11) Analyze the system failure states to compute required load point and system reliability 
indices. Attach Beta PDFs to computed index data 
12) The simulation is repeated until the coefficient of variation in a selected index is less 
than a specified threshold.  
 
The same procedure is applied to both network planning and operation reliability analyses. The 
only variation in the procedures is the size of the matrix windows and the vulnerability models 
derived for a given component in each analysis. It should be noted that to improve the 
computation time of the simulation process, one could decide on a contingency level i.e. N-1, 
N-2 etc. As the contingency level increases, the number of components that influence failure 
within the network also increases. By predefining a contingency level at the FMEA stage, the 
number of failure states that would be yielded is reduced. This in turn reduces the number of 
component lifecycles that would be generated in the simulation process. This research 
investigates the most likely failure events in either a planning or operation analysis. Higher 
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The key differences between the conventional and TDPA based sequential MCS techniques are 
summarized below: 
1) The conventional sequential MCS calculates the time-to-failure (TTF) during the simulation 
procedure. The exponential PDF is commonly used due to its simplistic inverse transform 
[Billinton & Sankarakrishnan, 1995]. While other PDFs have also been applied in subsequent 
sequential MCS applications [Goel, 2000], the Beta PDF has thus far been overlooked. This 
could be attributed to the complexity in deriving the Beta inverse transform. The TDPA does 
not calculate TTF and thus overcomes the need to derive the Beta inverse transform. The 
TDPA applies the Beta PDF to simulate the number and duration of failures in a period as 
well as randomness in the time of failure. 
2) Conventional sequential MCS builds the chronological cycle of a component by simulating 
the TTF and TTR. It starts with the up state, and then adds each set of outage states for the 
total length of the analysis period e.g. 8760 hours. The TDPA builds the same chronology by 
simulating how many down states will appear (using the frequency of failure PDF), when 
each down states begins (using a uniform distribution for now) and how long each down 
state lasts (using the failure duration PDF). At all other times the system is in an up state, but 
these do not have to be calculated.  
3) Chronology is easily identified when long-term periods are considered. Conventional 
sequential MCS is thus usually applied in planning studies to compute annual or annualized 
indices. The TDPA recognizes chronology based on either seasonal to time-of-day variations. 
It can thus be consistently applied to either planning or operation studies. 
 
4.4 POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE TDPA 
 
Allocation of failures in a time window: Failure data can be analyzed to determine the 
distribution or for this research the Beta PDF that represents the actual distribution of failure 
events within a time-window. This is a specification assigned during the collation of failure data 
and would contribute to a more comprehensive analysis of failure data. This set of data was not 
available for this thesis.  
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For illustration purposes a uniform distribution was applied so that this aspect has negligible 
influence on the variation induced in the results. The density of number of events is captured in 
the Beta PDF model derived for a given time window. It is expected that weekend and weekday 
variations mainly impact on the duration of a failure event and not its occurrence. 
 
Accounting for failures that occur at the boundary of time windows: This aspect is dealt with 
during the collation of data. The time windows developed are flexible and vary depending on 
the network. The dimensions of the time-window are developed so as to capture those periods 
that have the highest density of failure events. A given time window thus reflects the periods in 
which the network is most vulnerable to the considered threats. The collator of failure data 
thus has to decide on the matrix dimensions and then the time window to which a given failure 
event is allocated. The TDPA is then applied based on the matrix and corresponding failure 
models developed. 
 
Accounting for two down states overlapping for the same component: The TDPA derives the 
total number of failures occurring in a time window and then assigns them to different days in 
the time window. The thesis assumes more likely failure events so that each down state is not 
extreme. The length of each failure event is such that the next failure will find the component in 
an up-state. The repair times are thus sufficiently small that two down states do not overlap 
and the distribution of failures is dependent on the variability of the contributing network 
threat. The phenomenon may however be significant in operational studies that consider short-
term windows lasting only a couple of hours. This is because the failure events would now be 
allocated on an hourly basis. The simulation procedure can however be adjusted so that the 
next failure event is assigned when the previous event has ended. 
4.5 ANALYZING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TDPA 
 
This section will first test the performance of the TDPA on a published test system and 
compare it to that of the conventional sequential MCS approach. The effect of aggregating 
input failure data sets on a reliability study will also be analyzed. 
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Various reference networks exist for testing reliability techniques and models. According to 
Billinton et al *1989+, “a technique, however elegant it may be, should first be applied to a small 
system which can be easily solved and appreciated by the student using hand calculations 
before being extended to computer development.” For this reason, Billinton et al [1989] came 
up with the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) shown in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7: Roy Billinton Test system [Billinton et al, 1989] 
 
It is simple enough to enable easy application and comparison of different techniques but still 
ensures that the studies have enough detail to reflect the actual complexities involved in 
practical reliability analysis. The results published in literature for the RBTS provide a 
benchmark against which the TPDA can be assessed. 
Three case studies are investigated on the test system. The case studies analyzed were 
developed based on the models of failure parameters typically inputted in a reliability 
simulation. The case studies include: 
 Base case: Constant input failure parameters 
 Case two: Impact of dispersion in input failure parameter PDFs 
 Case three: TDPA with practical (skewed) Beta PDF shapes 
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4.4.1 Base case: Constant input failure parameters 
The conventional sequential MCS and the TDPA use different processes to develop the required 
chronological cycles for a sequential MCS. The SDM uses an inverse translation function to 
derive time to failure and repair parameters. The TDPA, as described in Section 4.3, however 
develops frequency and duration of failure PDFs. When the same failure data sets are 
considered, the two methods should be able to yield the similar results. This base case study 
was thus used to determine if the TDPA can replicate an analysis previously performed using 
the conventional sequential MCS. The base case thus validates the TDPA simulation by 
comparing its computed results against those from the conventional sequential MCS. To 
validate the TDPA based simulation, it should yield results similar to those computed by the 
conventional sequential MCS when applied to the same system. It was thus necessary to 
replicate the same conditions or reliability inputs considered by the conventional sequential 
MCS. With reference to the RBTS this included: 
 The conventional sequential MCS when applied to the RBTS considered an annual analysis 
[Billinton & Sankarakrishnan, 1995; Li, 2003]. The time window considered by the TDPA has a 
period of one year and 24 hour time slot.  
 The conventional sequential analysis considered deterministic (average) values for the RBTS 
component failure rate and repair duration [Billinton & Sankarakrishnan, 1995; Li, 2003]. The 
TDPA analysis developed symmetrical Beta PDF models from failure rate and repair duration 
data sets that have average values corresponding to those used in the conventional MCS 
analysis. 
The outage frequency and duration parameters of RBTS components are presented as 
deterministic values (average) [Billinton & Tang, 2004]. The conventional sequential MCS would 
thus use the exponential PDF to describe the corresponding TTFs and TTRs. To represent the 
same deterministic averages value in the TDPA, a symmetrical (α = β) Beta PDF with the same 
mean and a scaling factor equal to twice the mean is required.  
Finally, a deterministic value can be represented by increasing the values of α and β so that the 
variance tends to zero, essentially making the PDF a spike, as illustrated in Figure 4.8.  With the 
same mean and scaling value, the width of the PDF reduces.  
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Figure 4.8: Gaussian-shaped Beta PDFs used in TDPA analysis 
 
The Beta PDF with (α, β, C) = (500, 500, 20) is spike-like with a variance of 0.03. It is used in the 
TDPA base case to represent the average values of the failure and repair parameters of the 
RBTS. The average component failure rates and repair durations applied in each sequential MCS 
analysis are presented in Table 4.9, together with the corresponding scaling values required for 
the symmetrical Beta PDFs. While the standard deviation of a Beta PDF varies with the scaling 
factor, the coefficient of variation is maintained for a given set of shape parameters (α, β). Using 
the same set of (α, β) parameters ensured that the same level of ‘spikiness’ was applied to the 
components in Table 4.9. 
 
The simulation reduction technique based on the covariance [Billinton & Li, 1994] was applied 
by both techniques. Three key aspects affect results computed from different analyses; the load 
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Conventional sequential  
and  TDPA  
TDPA 
Average values 
Scaling factor for 









 L5,L8, L9 1 10 2 20 
1 - 3 L1, L6 1.5 10 3 20 
2 G20X4 2.4 55 4.8 110 
2 G40 3 60 6 120 
1 G20 5 45 10 90 
2 - 4 L2, L7 5 10 10 20 
1 (G40X2) 6 45 12 90 
 
The load point indices computed by different analyses depends on the load point priority order 
assigned. The load shedding protocol has a significant impact on load point indices. A load point 
priority order is usually specified to guide the load shedding. The Interrupted Energy 
Assessment Rate (IEAR) index for each load point was used to determine the RBTS load point 
priority order presented in Table 4.10 [Billinton & Tang, 2004].  
 
Table 4.10: IEAR index values for the RBTS load pointes [Billinton & Tang, 2004] 
System load point number IEAR($/kWh) Priority order 
2 7.41 1 
3 2.69 5 
4 6.78 2 
5 4.82 3 
6 3.63 4 
 
System indices are not affected by the priority order but by the stopping criterion considered in 
the simulation process. The contingency level affects both load point and system indices.   
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The analysis considered an annualized load of 185 MW and a maximum of three simultaneous 
component outages in the FMEA. The RBTS indices computed, for an annualized system load, 
are available in literature [Billinton & Li, 1994; Li, 2003]. Billinton and Li [1994] considered a 6 % 
stopping criterion with no defined load priority order. The same priority order shown in Table 
4.10 was applied by Li [2003] and a limit of 2,000,000 simulation runs specified.  
 
The reliability indices computed for load point 6 and the overall system include the Probability 
of Load Curtailment (PLC) and Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (EFLC) [Billinton & 
Kumar, 1990]. Table 4.11 shows a comparison of the system index values computed using the 
TDPA and those presented in literature. The TDPA results are computed for a 6 % stopping 
criterion.  
 
Table 4.11: System reliability indices computed using the two sequential MCS techniques 
Index 
Conventional  








PLC 0.0099 0.0099 0.0098 
EFLC (1/yr) 4.1 5.3 4.2 
Simulation runs 150 2,000,000 78 
CPU (seconds) 733 - 4.9 
 
Load point 6 index values computed with the TDPA, for different stopping criteria, are 
compared with values presented by Li [2003] in Table 4.12. 
 
Table 4.12: Comparison of load point 6 index values 
Index 
Conventional  





PLC 0.0014 0.0016 0.0015 
EFLC (1/yr) 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Simulation runs 2,000,000 78 2880 
 
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show that the TDPA index values are close to those presented in literature 
for the system and load point 6.  
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One can thus conclude that the TDPA was able to replicate the conventional sequential MCS 
analysis. It is important to state that the SUN and MECORE reliability software were used in 
Billinton and Sankarakrishnan [1995] and Li [2003] respectively. It is thus possible that higher 
contingency levels were considered which would mainly affect the EFLC index. It is also 
important to note that the Li [2003] states that 2,000,000 runs were deemed sufficient for 
simulation convergence. This could be a specification of the software used or due to application 
of a different simulation reduction technique. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the variation in the average PLC index value computed for load point 6 using 
the conventional and TDPA based sequential MCS techniques and a stopping criterion of 1 %. 
The rate of simulation convergence is influenced by the variability induced in the index 
computation. In the conventional sequential MCS, a component’s up and down state lengths 
are derived from TTF and TTR PDFs with an infinite range. The conventional sequential MCS 
could thus yield extreme values which would disrupt the convergence process. The TDPA on the 
other hand, limits the down state durations to finite ranges which ensures that less variability is 
achieved in the computed index.  
 
   
(a)                     (b) 
Figure 4.9: Convergence of load point 6 PLC index for (a) Conventional sequential MCS (b) TDPA 
sequential MCS 
 



























Moving mean of index
Mean of final index data set




























Moving mean of index 
Mean of final index data set
 Page 107 
 
Figure 4.9 shows that for the same simulation conditions the TDPA converged faster than the 
conventional sequential MCS. For a stopping criterion of 1 %, the conventional sequential MCS 
required more than double the number of simulation runs to reach convergence. The 
simulation computation time is a function of the number of simulation runs. While the two 
sequential MCS techniques yielded similar results, the TDPA appears to be significantly faster.  
 
4.4.2 Case two: Impact of dispersion in input failure parameter PDFs 
In reality, reliability parameters are not constant values. Variability in the parameters can be 
captured through the dispersion and skewness of the PDFs representing them. This section will 
test the impact of PDF dispersion on the performance of the TDPA. Figure 4.8 showed the 
symmetrical PDFs applied to modelling the reliability inputs i.e. component failure rates and 
repair durations. They have the same mean (10 hours) and scaling factor (20 hours). However, 
the variance about the mean is different, being 5.02, 0.61, 0.5 and 0.03 for the PDFs with shape 
parameters (2,2), (20,20), (100,100) and (500,500) respectively. The RBTS reliability analysis was 
performed using each of the Gaussian-shaped Beta PDFs as input models. The computed 
average load point and system indices are presented in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, using the same 
stopping criterion of 1 %.  
 
Table 4.13: Reliability indices computed for load point 6 
Index 
TDPA results for different Beta shape parameters 
(2,2,C) (20,20,C) (100,100,C) (500,500,C) 
PLC 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 
EFLC (1/yr) 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.10 
 
Table 4.14: System reliability indices 
Index 
TDPA results for different Beta shape parameters 
(2,2,C) (20,20,C) (100,100,C) (500,500,C) 
PLC 0.0094 0.0099 0.0096 0.0093 
EFLC (1/yr) 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 
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The indices computed change as the dispersion of the input PDFs is reduced. This is particularly 
evident from the system indices. To capture any underlying trend, more PDFs were considered. 
The level of ‘spikiness’ varied between that of the (2,2,C) and (500,500,C) Beta PDFs. Figure 
4.10 shows the variation in the system PLC index as the dispersion of the Beta input PDF shapes 
is reduced. The indices were computed for different stopping criteria: 1 % and 0.1 %.  
 
Figure 4.10: Variation in index values due to reduction in input PDF dispersion 
 
Figure 4.10 clearly shows that the indices computed are influenced by the level of dispersion in 
the input PDFs. The variability in the index value is also affected by the stopping criterion. The 
indices computed are more variable when a higher stopping criterion is applied. The fitted 
trend lines indicate that as the dispersion is reduced, the index values computed tend towards 
that value computed with the least level of dispersion. This trend is noted for results computed 
for either a 1 % or 0.1 % stopping criterion. The results presented in Figure 4.10 show that it is 
not sufficient to represent reliability inputs using only average values. The input PDFs had the 
same mean but different index values were computed. The TDPA analysis showed that as the 
input representation was improved (spike-like PDF achieved), the indices computed tended 
towards a single value. 
y = 1.0007x-0.012 
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The fitted trend lines in Figure 4.10 tend towards similar index values at the point α = β = 500. 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show the system indices computed for different stopping criterion values. 
Table 4.15 was developed for the Beta PDF of (α, β) = (500, 500) and shows that index values 
computed using the TDPA, corresponding to different stopping criteria, are significantly close.  
 
Table 4.15: Variation in system indices due to reduction in stopping criterion (α=β= 500) 
Stopping 
criterion 
1 % 0.1 % 0.01 % 
PLC 0.0093 0.0091 0.0092 
EFLC (1/yr) 3.5 3.4 3.4 
 
Table 4.16: Variation in system indices due to reduction in stopping criterion (α=β= 20) 
Stopping 
criterion 
1 % 0.1 % 0.01 % 
PLC 0.0097 0.0099 0.0098 
EFLC (1/yr) 3.9 4.0 3.9 
 
One could attribute this to the application of spike-like PDFs which as shown previously, yields 
indices closer to those computed from the conventional sequential MCS. Table 4.16, developed 
using PDF inputs with more dispersion around the mean i.e. (α, β) = (20, 20), however presents 
a similar internal observation. While the index values are higher than those presented in Table 
4.15, the indices presented in each column of Table 4.16 are quite similar. 
 
The significance of a stopping criterion to MCS based analysis cannot be discounted. For 
example, a stopping criterion of 6 % is quite high and as such, the indices computed would be 
quite variable due to a lack of convergence.  The results in Tables 4.15 and 4.16 indicate that 
TDPA results depend significantly on the representation of the reliability inputs. For stopping 
criteria lower than 1 %, the simulation converged to more or less the same value. This is quite 
significant since a lower stopping criterion is associated with more simulation runs and thus, 
longer computation times.   
 
4.4.3 Case three: TDPA with practical Beta PDF shapes 
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Section 2.4 discussed the need to account for variability in component parameters so as to 
achieve more practical and realistic reliability models. In this section the effect of using practical 
component failure data represented by skewed Beta PDF models (with high variance about the 
mean) is investigated.  
 
The TDPA analysis presented in this section was performed with failure rate and repair duration 
Beta PDFs based on real failure data collected on the South African power network [Minnaar et 
al, 2012]. The statistics presented for bird related failures affecting 275 kV transmission lines 
were considered. The Beta PDF derived from the statistics was applied to the lines of the RBTS. 
The seasonal based data sets were aggregated to yield an annual data set. The normalized 
annual frequency of the line failure PDF is shown in Figure 4.11, together with the normalized 
duration of repair Beta PDF applied to all components. The right-skewed repair duration Beta 
PDF is similar to a lognormal distribution. Still using the RBTS network data, the generator 
failure rate PDF was maintained as a symmetrical Beta PDF with (α,β) = (500,500).  
 
Figure 4.11: Bird related transmission failure PDFs based on South African data 
 
The line failure rates were represented by the practical failure data, scaled so that the RBTS 
average line failure rates shown in Table 4.9 were maintained.  
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A comparison of the scaling factors applied to the Gaussian and practical Beta PDF shapes is 
presented in Table 4.17, for line failure rates, and Table 4.18 for repair duration. 
 
Table 4.17: Corresponding scaling factors for different Beta PDF inputs (failure rates) 
Model Line failure rates (1/year) 
RBTS mean values 1 1.5 4 5 
Spike-like PDFs 
(α,β) = (500,500) 
2 3 8 10 
Practical PDFs 
(α,β) = (20,66) 
3.5 5 13.2 16.5 
 
Table 4.18: Corresponding scaling factors for different Beta PDF inputs (repair duration) 
Model 
Component repair duration 
(hours) 
Lines Generators 
RBTS mean values 10 45 55 
Spike-like PDFs 
(α,β) = (500,500) 
20 90 110 
Practical PDFs 
(α,β) = (1.6,3.8) 
34 151.9 185.6 
 
The system indices computed using the TDPA with practical PDF inputs are presented in Table 
4.19. A stopping criterion of 1 % was considered. The indices are higher than those previously 
computed when the symmetrical shaped (α,β) = (500,500) PDF was applied.  
 
Table 4.19: Comparison of TDPA results for different Beta PDF inputs 
System index Symmetrical Practical, skewed 
PLC 0.0093 0.0095 
EFLC (1/yr) 3.5 4.1 
 
The variation in the mean of the load point 6’s PLC index is shown in Figure 4.12. An increase, 
not only in the mean of the index (0.00165), but also in the number of simulations required for 
convergence (3500) is indicated.  
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Figure 4.12: Variation in mean PLC index for bus 3 with practical Beta PDF inputs 
 
Representing computed system indices as PDFs instead of simple average values (spikes) 
illustrates the effect of practical variability. Instead of determining the average values, PDFs 
were fitted to the index data sets computed from each simulation. The results are shown in 
Figure 4.13 for the system probability and frequency of load curtailment. 
 
   
(a)         (b) 
Figure 4.13: (a) Frequency and (b) duration of system load curtailment computed with deterministic 
(symmetrical, small variance) and practical PDFs as inputs 
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The skewness of the computed index distributions is clearly affected by the failure parameter 
models used (input PDFs). When the skewness of a probability distribution changes, for 
example the shapes in Figure 4.13 (a) became more left skewed, the values near the tails 
become more significant as practical outcomes. A PDF model provides the full range of values a 
given index can take. Values can thus be selected from an index PDF with particular levels of 
confidence attached according to the analysis or the decisions to be made. Decisions with 
potentially high financial impact may justify high levels of confidence or an indication of how 
the expected outcome varies with the risk. The concept of confidence level also applies to 
reliability inputs, particularly if deterministic values are used. The mean or 50th percentile value 
with a 50 % level of confidence corresponds to the average index usually derived from a 
simulation study. 
 
4.4.4 Computation times 
A disadvantage of sequential MCS processes is the computation time required.  A comparison 
of the number of simulations and computation time required by the SDM analyses in literature 
and the custom SDM code written for this thesis is presented in Table 4.20. 










Custom SDM code 
written for this thesis 
7000 4.9 
 
It is important to note that Billinton and Sankarakrishnan [1995] required fewer simulations 
than the custom SDM code. Their computation time was however significantly higher than that 
required by the custom SDM code. This could be a case of capability of computing system used 
to run the code.  
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Table 4.21 compares the computation times required by the custom SDM code written for this 
thesis and that written for the TDPA, for different stopping criteria. The analyses were 
performed on the same computer and the same approach to programming applied3.  
 
Table 4.21: Computation times for TDPA and sequential MCS for same system and parameters 
Stopping criterion 6 % 1 % 0.1 % 
Conventional sequential < 5mins < 2.8hrs >> 2.8 hrs 
TDPA with spike-like PDFs < 5s < 2.5mins < 12mins 
TDPA with practical PDFs < 6s < 3.2mins < 21mins 
 
The times for corresponding stopping criteria are significantly different, with both TDPA 
methods considerably faster than the conventional sequential MCS. The TDPA’s faster speed, 
even with realistic Beta PDFs, can be attributed mainly to its simulation of the down states 
(zeros), which are inserted into the initial lifecycle of up states (ones). The higher speed and 
capability to model short periods (e.g. 6 hours) suggest the TDPA method might be suitable for 
on-line operational reliability assessment. 
 
A difference is noted in the computation times of the two TDPA analyses. The dispersion in the 
reliability inputs is higher when the practical PDF models are applied as opposed to spike-like 
PDFs. A comparison of the shapes in Figures 4.9(b) and 4.12 shows that variability in the 
reliability inputs influences the computed reliability indices. Practical PDFs are however more 
dispersed so that the convergence of the corresponding simulation is expected to be slower. 
The performance of the TPDA in each analysis is however still comparable for stopping criteria 





                                                     
3
 The simulations were run on an HP Intel (R) Core (TM)2 Duo CPU with a 2 GHZ processor. The programming was 
performed in carried out in the R2009b edition of MATLAB software).  
 




The chapter addressed the gaps identified in literature. A new reliability evaluation technique was 
presented and its performance tested on the Roy Billinton Test System. The research questions 
addressed in this chapter included: 
 
Qn.2: How applicable are probability Density functions in network reliability analyses? 
The suitability of the Beta PDF for use in a reliability analysis was tested. Different PDFs were fitted 
to reliability input and output data sets. The goodness-of-fit tests ranked the Beta PDF as one of the 
best fits for the data sets considered. The Beta PDF has had limited application in reliability studies 
thus far. For this research, the Beta PDF is scaled by the maximum value recorded in the data set 
being described. Maximum values based on extreme value theory can be applied in analyses aimed 
at investigating extreme events. 
 
Qn.6: How can continuous probability distributions be incorporated in either planning or 
operational reliability analyses? 
The Herman and Gaunt [2010] matrix failure model was extended so that Beta PDF-based models, 
required by the TDPA, could be developed for failure and repair rates in each cell. The new matrix 
model provides a better and more realistic representation of reliability input parameters; 
dispersion and skewness in parameter distribution is represented. The planning PDF models 
derived did not have Gaussian shapes. The use of average values for annual planning studies is thus 
questionable. The occurrence and dispersion of outages is influenced by more factors in the short-




Chapter 5 applies the TDPA to a real bulk power network. The input failure models derived for 
both planning and operational based reliability analyses are presented. South African adverse 
local weather threats are considered.  
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Chapter four discussed the time-dependent probabilistic approach applied in this research. It 
discussed how vulnerability models can be developed for either a network planning or 
operational reliability analysis while using the same failure data sets. The simulation procedure 
required was also developed and the TDPA tested on a published test network. This Chapter 
will now apply the TDPA to a real power network and input Beta PDF models based on real 
failure data.  
 
5.2 INPUT FAILURE MODELS DERIVED FOR PLANNING CASE STUDIES CONSIDERED 
 
The bulk power network shown in Figure 5.1 represents a portion of the real South African 
transmission network and is used here because real and relevant data is available, allowing 
realistic conditions to be modelled. The network is composed of 36 buses with a total load of 
6.3 GW. The maximum generating capacity is 2.2 GW with make-up in-feed (slack-bus) from 
Terminal 01. Transmission lines at a voltage level of 400 kV were considered. The base voltage 
and power for the network is 400 kV and 100 MW respectively. Other network component 
ratings are presented in Appendix C.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows two distinct geographic regions; the frontal and thunderstorm regions. The 
regions are based on the rainfall activity of South Africa which is significantly higher in one half 
of the country. As a result, the weather patterns and intensities also vary such that the 
likelihood of occurrence and severity of a given failure cause is different in each region. 
Depending on the location of a given component, its exposure to a given threat could be 
understated or overstated. The sub-regions in which each external threat is dominant are also 
shown in Figure 5.1.  
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Lightning Birds     Bush Fires      Pollution        Frontal region       Thunderstorm region 
Figure 5.1: Portion of South African bulk network showing sub-regions of external network risk 
influence 
 
The main external network threats influencing component failure of the bulk network in Figure 
5.1 were determined as birds, lightning, bush fires and pollution. The sub-regions in which 
these external elements have significant influence are also shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
5.2.1 Network component restoration time model 
The Beta PDF in Figure 5.5 represents a restoration time model for the network components. 
The shape is also similar to models derived from South African repair data. The mean of the 
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Figure 5.2:  Beta PDF model for component restoration time (hours/failure) 
 
The shape of the PDF in Figure 5.2 indicates that while repairs that take less than 10 hours 
occur more often, repairs lasting more than 10 hours are still likely.  The factors that affect 
repair of components at either operation or planning are similar. The same model was thus 
applied in both planning and operational reliability analyses for all types of component outages. 
 
5.2.2 Network failure frequency models used as planning reliability inputs 
The failure data presented by Minnaar et al [2012] was collated to yield regional failure data. 
The contributing matrix models corresponding to each failure cause for both frontal and 
thunderstorm regions are presented in Appendix C.2.  
 
Failure statistics, corresponding to a given threat, in the frontal and thunderstorm regions were 
aggregated to yield the overall network failure statistics. The failure data set of every 
component, in each region, was first distributed into four 4X4 network risk matrix models. For 
example, in the frontal region, all component matrices developed for say lightning, were 
aggregated to develop a single 4X4 lightning failure model. A lightning failure model was 
similarly derived for the thunderstorm region. Each region was thus described by four network 
threat matrix models.  
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Using (4.2) to (4.5), the failure statistics of each component matrix, corresponding to a given 
external threat, were then aggregated to yield a regional matrix model for each network threat.  
Corresponding regional matrices were then aggregated to develop models for the entire 
network. The aggregation process, from component matrix to overall network matrix model, is 
illustrated in (5.1) and (5.2) for lightning related failures.  
 
                    ∑              
 
       (5.1) 
 
                                                                 (5.2) 
 
             : 4X4 matrix model for lightning related failures of a component in the frontal 
region 
                   : aggregated failure model for lightning related failures in the frontal 
region (4X4 matrix) 
                 : aggregated failure model for lightning related failures in the whole 
network (4X4 matrix) 
n: number of components in the frontal region 
 
At this stage, each network threat matrix model is characterized by a quarter year period and 
different time-of-day. Annual composite models, required for planning, were then derived for 
each network threat by aggregating along different seasons; essentially increasing the analysis 
season to a calendar year. The failure data sets of the new annual matrix were analyzed per 
time window and the corresponding Beta PDF models derived. For each planning cell, four 
network threat Beta PDF models were derived. Each Beta PDF model is applicable to 
components located in the sub-region in which the given threat is dominant. The shape 
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 Table 5.1: Shape parameters for annual time windows given South African conditions 
 
The discussion in Section 3.3 described the different models applied when stochastic external 
factors are considered in a reliability analysis. It was also stated that single deterministic values, 
computed as average values over many years, are conventionally used to model component 
parameters in planning reliability analyses. The use of an average value assumes that the 
distribution that describes the given data set has a Gaussian shape so that the mean value is 
the most likely value4.  
 
The shape parameters in Table 5.1 do not indicate that the planning PDFs have symmetrical 
shapes. This is important particularly with regard to the Central Limit Theorem [Papoulis, 1991; 
Leon-Garcia, 1994]. According to the theorem the summation of a large number of 
independent and identical random variables approximates to a variable with a Gaussian 
distribution. Using average values may thus misrepresent annual planning failure parameters.  
Table 5.1 shows that network components are most vulnerable to outages between midnight 
and 06:00 am. Table 5.1 also indicates that annually, during this period, the main cause of 
component outages is bird streamers. The other significant time slot is between noon and 
06:00 pm. The failures during this period were mainly fire and lightning related. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the plots of the planning Beta PDFs based on the annual network threat 
failure data sets covering the midnight to 06:00 am and noon to 06:00 pm time slots. 
                                                     
4
 For Gaussian shape, mean=mode=median 
Network risk 
Period 
00:00–06:00 hrs 00:06–12:00 hrs 12:00–18:00 hrs 18:00–24:00 hrs 00:00-24:00 hrs 
Birds (17.7,35.5,222.3) (12,31.2,93) (6.2,23.9,34.8) (10.1,26.4,120) (42.2,99,470.1) 
 
Fire (1.5,9.2,12.5) (3.5,12,35.6) (4.7,13.7,149.8) (2.1,11.7, 20.3) (8.1,26.7,218.2) 
 
Lightning (5,19.5,64.4) (2.3,13.4,27.2) (5.9,22.4,114.6) (5.3,18.2, 87.7) (18,69,294) 
 
Pollution (0.1,1.4,132.6) (0.8,6.1,43.2) (0.1, 1,13.2) (0.5, 4.6, 26.8) (0.5,5.2,215.8) 
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Figure 5.3: Annual network risk PDFs for different time slots (a) 00:00-05:59 am (b) 12:00-0559 pm 
 
It is clear that the threat posed by the external threat is elevated between noon and 06:00 pm. 
 
5.2.2.1 Analyzing failure data sets derived by the TDPA aggregation concept  
Section 4.3.2 presented the planning failure PDF models for transmission lines developed using 
the TDPA. The models were based on aggregated failure data. It is important to check that the 
aggregation applied does not in fact compromise the failure data provided. The first step in 
determining this is comparing the composite planning failure data sets derived with data sets 
achieved without applying the aggregation. The failure statistics collated by Minnar et al [2012] 
were categorized into quarter-year seasons for each network threat. In Section 4.3.2, these 
were aggregated to develop the annual planning models. Table 5.2 presents all network failure 
statistics organized on an annual basis. The Beta shape parameters for each time window are 
presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2: Annual failure statistics for six hour intervals 
S/P 
0000-0559 hrs 0600-1159 hrs 1200-1759 hrs 1800-2359 hrs 
mean std max mean std max mean std max mean std max 
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Table 5.3: Shape parameters of the frequency of failure PDF models for all components 
Season 
Period 
0000-0559 hrs 0600-1159 hrs 1200-1759 hrs 1800-2359 hrs 0000-2400 hrs 
January-December (9.8,32.7,431.8) (17,63.5,199) (12.9,42,307.8) (19.4,62.8,260) (45,150,1198.5) 
 
 
The shapes of the Beta PDFs derived are shown in Figure 5.4. It is clear from the PDFs that the 
vulnerability of the network to failure varies during the day.  
 
Figure 5.4: Time-of-day based frequency of failure Beta PDF models 
 
The TDPA through aggregation should also be able to derive the models in Table 5.1 and Figure 
5.4. The annual failure models based on network threats when aggregated yield a composite 
threat model. A comparison of the PDF models in Table 5.1 and the composite threat PDF 
models for each time slot derived is presented in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Shape parameters (α, β, C) for annualized time windows for the entire network 
Selection/period 00:00–06:00 hrs 00:06–12:00 hrs 12:00–18:00 hrs 18:00–24:00 hrs 00:00-24:00 hrs 
January-December (9.8,32.7,431.8) (17,63.5,199) (12.9,42,307.8) (19.4,62.8,260) (45,150,1198.5) 
 
Composite threat (9.8,32.7,431.8) (17.3,63.5,199) (12.3,42.2, 312.4) (18.1,12,254.8) (43.9,149,1198) 
 
 
























00:00  - 06 am
06 am - 12 pm
12 pm - 06 pm
06 pm - 00:00
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The composite threat PDFs derived through aggregation are very similar to the PDFs computed 
from failure data categorized in terms of annual seasons (January to December) and six-hour 
intervals. It is clear that the shapes of the planning Beta PDF models presented and scaling 
factors for corresponding time slots are similar. This shows that the aggregation applied by the 
TDPA did not distort the contributing failure data sets. 
 
5.2.3 Case studies analyzed in the TDPA planning reliability analysis 
The planning case studies aim at showing the importance of using the right input failure models 
in a reliability analysis. The planning case studies presented in this section particularly 
investigate: 
 The effect of using PDF-based models, over deterministic average values, for planning 
reliability inputs  
 The effect of the aggregation concept applied by the TDPA on the reliability indices. 
 The additional information derived when PDFs, as opposed to deterministic averages, 
are also used to represent the outputs of a reliability study.  
The planning reliability analyses were carried out whilst considering an annual time line. Four 
different failure models were used to reflect the vulnerability of network components in the 
same time window. The case studies are thus used in this section to show how the perception 
on a network’s reliability is influenced by the failure models applied. The four cases considered 
for each component frequency of failure model include: 
 Base case analysis that considers average values 
  Single composite PDFs for an annual planning study (region unspecific)  
  Two half-year composite PDFs for an annual planning study (region unspecific)  
 Annual beta PDFs based on geographic regions 
 
Case 1: Base case analysis that considers average values 
A base case analysis provides a set of values to be used for comparison with those values 
obtained from other tests carried out on a given system. This enables the evaluation of 
different action alternatives from a reliability viewpoint.  
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A base case analysis considers no proposed changes in the network topology, operating 
conditions or protection scheme [Alvehag, 2008]. Only unplanned failures are considered and 
the failure rates of the components are assumed to be constant. The component restoration 
times are also assumed to be unaffected by time-dependent activities. Component parameters, 
frequency and duration of failure, were thus represented using average failure parameter 
values. A base case average parameter value is usually an annualized value i.e. the parameter is 
represented on an annual basis. The frequency or duration of failure of a given component was 
derived from a failure data set that corresponded to component outages due to the network 
risk(s) to which it was exposed. If one considers the location of a network component, it can be 
determined that the dominant external element in the given location is the major contributor 
to the component’s outages. One could thus match the outage pattern of a component or 
portion of the component to variation in severity of the dominant external element present in 
its vicinity.  
 
This base case analysis considered the sub-regions in which each external element had 
significant influence. The component failure data sets corresponding to the dominant external 
element in each sub-region were used to derive the average component parameter values. All 
components in a given sub-region and thus exposed to the same dominant external element, 
were assigned the same frequency and duration of failure values. For components in 
overlapping sub-regions (crossing more than one sub-region), average values were determined 
from the failure data sets of the corresponding sub-regions and summated. 
 
An average parameter value was applied to the full length of the transmission lines. Since it is 
an average value, a single level of risk is attached such that the component parameter assumes 
the same value annually. Table 5.5 presents the annual average frequency of failure for 
components exposed to the main external threats in the 12:00 to 18:00 hrs time slot. The 
values presented were computed from the composite failure data sets derived per external 
threat for the whole network (frontal and thunderstorm).  
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The PDFs corresponding to these composite failure data sets are shown in Figure 5.3. For the 
base case however, a spike-like PDF with α = β = 500 was applied with the average values in 
Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Average frequency of component failure due to different external elements 
Network risk 




Birds 7.2 0.8 
Lightning 24.0 1.7 
Bush Fires 38.2 4.2 
Pollution 2.4 0.4 
Birds and Lightning (7.2+24.2) = 31.4 2.5 
 
Case 2: Single composite PDFs for an annual planning study (region unspecific) 
Unlike the base case analysis, frequency and duration of component outages were inputted as 
skewed PDFs. The full range of each network threat PDF was applied in the analysis as opposed 
to the base case which applied only the average values. For each external threat, annualized 
component failure data sets corresponding to the 12:00–18:00 hour time slot were again 
considered. The composite Beta PDFs derived for frequency of component outage due to some 
of the threats, lightning, birds and bush fires, were shown in Figure 5.3 (b). These, together with 
the component restoration model in Figure 5.2, were applied as reliability inputs in this case 
analysis instead of the average values used in the previous section. Similar to the base case 
analysis, a given external threat PDF derived was applied to affected components in either 
region i.e. same vulnerability model for both regions. 
 
Case 3: Two half-year composite PDFs for an annual planning study (region unspecific)  
A key concept with regards to the TDPA is the aggregation of failure data sets within a given 
time window or across different time windows to derive a composite PDF. The aggregation 
concept was checked at the input side of the TDPA in Section 5.2.2.1. It was shown that the 
input failure data sets were not compromised.   
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It is however important to ensure that one can yield similar reliability results if the PDF inputs 
applied describe either the contributing data sets or the corresponding composite data set 
derived.  
 
The analysis in Case 2 applies single composite PDF models to all components exposed to the 
given threat. Instead of a single annual PDF, two half-year composite PDFs could also have been 
derived for each external threat. To further validate the concept of aggregating data sets, the 
indices computed using the half-year PDFs should be comparable to those attained using single 
annual-based PDFs. Each half-year PDF is derived from failures that occur either between 
January to June or, July to December. Figure 5.5 presents the frequency of failure Beta PDFs 
derived for fire and lightning related failures in each half-year between noon and 6 pm. The 
half-year PDFs describe the data sets that could be aggregated to yield the composite data set 
descried by the annual PDF. 
 
The failure PDFs presented in Figure 5.5 show that the external threats affect components 
differently in each half of the year between noon and 6 pm. The frequency of lightning related 
component failures is lower in the second half of the year compared to the first. For fire, the 
highest and lowest number of failure will more likely be recorded in the first half of the year.  
 
   
(a)        (b) 
Figure 5.5: Half-year and annual PDFs for component failures due to (a) fire (b) lightning 
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The expression in (5.6) shows how the two half-year PDFs were applied for a given threat. The 
annual frequency of component failure is the summation of the failures that occurred in each 
half of the year. A component’s annual failure frequency was thus determined in the simulation 
as a summation of the two values randomly selected from the relevant half-year external threat 
PDFs. 
   (           )      (                  )     (                 )  (5.6) 
 
   (           )  failure frequency generator from annual component PDF for threat   
   (                  )  failure frequency generator from first half-year component PDF 
   (                 )   failure frequency generator from second half-year component PDF 
 
Case 4: Annual Beta PDFs based on geographic regions 
The base case analysis and case with single annual composite PDFs, applied the same model to 
components, irrespective of whether they lay in the frontal or thunderstorm regions. As such, 
the vulnerability of a component to a specific threat could either be understated or overstated. 
This section applies external threat models that relate to the geographic regions. The models 
are developed based on the actual conditions in the proximity of the affected component.  
This is more realistic compared to the two previous cases. For each threat, two failure models 
were thus derived and applied to affected components while taking into account their 
geographical locations. These are shown in Figure 5.6 for bird and lightning related failures.  
 
(a)        (b) 
Figure 5.6: Geographical based line failure PDFs for (a) birds (b) lightning 
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The shapes in Figure 5.6 clearly show that the influence of a network threat on network 
outages varies between the two regions. 
 
5.3 INPUT FAILURE MODELS USED AS OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY INPUTS 
This section highlights the need to use different failure modelling approaches in planning and 
operational reliability analyses. Even though each study considers the same network risks, 
different criteria are required when developing and applying the failure models. With the TDPA 
applied in a planning analysis, a single PDF is used to represent the parameter in each cell of the 
developed matrix model. These PDFs have been described as the average model of the 
component’s parameter in a selected time window. External threats and the resulting 
component failure parameters are however quite intermittent in operational time windows. It 
could thus be necessary to base operational failure models on the different severity levels of 
the external threat.  
 
While the planning analysis was carried out over the period of January to December, an 
operational analysis considers shorter periods. Three-month operational periods are considered 
here. PDF models will specifically be developed to represent vulnerability during the 1200-
1800 hr over the first quarter of the year. Similar to Case 4 in the planning analysis, the 
operational failure models were developed with regard to the geographic regions. 
 
The average component failure frequency PDFs corresponding to the different threats are 
shown in Figure 5.7. The PDFs represent a component’s vulnerability, in each region, to external 
threats at an average level of severity.  
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(a)                           (b)    
  
         (c)                   (d) 
Figure 5.7: Operational component failure PDFs due to different external threats in each geographic 
region (a) lightning (b) fires (c) birds (d) pollution 
 
It is clear from the PDFs that in the frontal region, during the first quarter of the year between 
noon and 6 pm, birds cause the most line outages. Lightning on the other hand contributes 
most to line outages in the thunderstorm region. No outages due to pollution were recorded in 
the frontal region. Overall, for the operational time window considered, lightning can be 
regarded as the dominant threat. Variability in lightning intensity, as opposed to other threats, 
would thus have a more significant influence on the network failures. 
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In reality, all the threats vary in severity. For illustration purposes the operational PDFs shown 
in Figures 5.7 (b)-(d) were applied to components exposed to fire, birds and pollution 
respectively. They correspond to the vulnerability of a component to the respective threats at 
an average level of severity. The composite PDFs shown in Figures 5.7 (a) were applied on days 
where the lightning flash density was close or equal to the average value5 and were thus 
considered as the average severity lightning failure models in each region. The normalized low 
and high severity failure frequency PDFs for lightning related outages are shown in Figure 5.8. 
These were applied to lightning outages in either region.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Threat-severity-dependent models for lightning related failures 
 
5.4 ONWARD 
The next chapter will present and discuss the simulation results of the planning and operational 
case studies presented. 
 
 
                                                     
5
 Days with average conditions simulated 
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The indices computed in each case, for every load point and the overall system, include the 
Probability of Load Curtailment (PLC), Frequency of Load Curtailment (FLC) and Duration of 
Load Curtailment (DLC). The values for FLC computed were rounded to the nearest whole 
number e.g. 3.2 = (3 events/year) and 3.5 = (4 events/year). The load point results are 
presented in this section for three buses: T12, T19 and T31. The performance of load points T12 
and T31 is affected by components that lie only in the frontal and thunderstorm regions 
respectively. Load point T19 on the other hand is affected by components in both regions. 
Analyzing corresponding indices of the three load points provides an indication of how the 
network performs in each region.  
 
Index values are dependent on the system topology and, operating philosophy and conditions 
[Wangdee & Billinton, 2005]. A given index would thus take on different values with every 
simulation run. More information could be derived from the outputs of a reliability analysis if 
probability distributions were used to describe them, compared to using the average values 
[Billinton & Huang, 2005]. The level of skewness of the distribution of a given index is very 
important when one has to interpret the given index [Billinton & Allan, 1996]. Since reliability 
indices are stochastic parameters, their underlying distributions can take on any shape. Similar 
to component parameters, index values fall within finite ranges. It could be useful to represent 
the indices using Beta PDFs.  
The failure data collected and published by Minnaar et al [2012] was applied to the real 
network components using (6.1). 
       
    
    
      (6.1) 
fcRt : failure rate of a component due to a specific threat in a given region or sub-region 
NFRt : number of failures, due to threat, in region or sub-region of influence 
NCRt : number of components, in region or sub-region, exposed to given threat 
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6.2 NETWORK PLANNING SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
The planning procedures of a power network rely on the perception of its reliability. Network 
components are however affected by a range of factors. The models used to capture 
vulnerability of network components to failure could be critical to the evaluation of its 
reliability and the decisions made thereafter. This section investigates the effect of using either 
deterministic or probabilistic component failure models in a planning reliability study. Unlike 
most published work, that only consider the magnitude of the reliability indices, the impact on 
the probability distributions of the computed indices is also analyzed. 
 
6.2.1 Case 1: Base case analysis that considers average values 
Spike-like Beta PDFs were used to represent the average values of the input failure parameters. 
The average values of the indices computed are presented in Table 6.1. It was stated in Section 
4.3 that the 50 percentile (50 %) value of a distribution represents the median value of that 
given distribution. These are also presented in Table 6.1. 
 









Mean 50 % Mean 50 % Mean 50 % 
T12 0.0034 0.0035 5 5 29.6 30.5 
T19 0.0057 0.0054 8 8 49.9 47.0 
T31 0.0077 0.0066 11 9 67.1 57.5 
System 0.021 0.022 31 32 185.5 193.5 
 
From the average values, one deduces that load point T12 performs better than T19 and T31 in 
the selected time window. The power network’s line diagram in Figure 5.1 shows that load 
point T12 is close to the external grid so that, unlike T19 and T31, supply to the load is not 
significantly affected by component outages. The performance of load point T12 could also be 
attributed to it location in the frontal region.  
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The external conditions are not as adverse as those in the thunderstorm region. Load point T19 
borders the two regions while T31 is affected only by components located in the thunderstorm 
region. A comparison of the overall system indices, particularly FLC and DLC, shows that T31 is 
responsible for close to half of the outages that occurred in the test network. This indicates that 
T31 is one of worst performing load points.   
 
Without plotting or analyzing the shape parameters of the index PDFs, one cannot determine 
the most likely index value. The mean values and 50 percentile values computed from the index 
data sets are similar, particularly the FLC values. This could indicate that the index PDFs have 
symmetrical shapes which would mean that the indices will most likely take on the mean values 
presented in Table 6.1. The shape parameters of the indices however tell another story. The 
Beta PDF shape parameters corresponding to each load point and system index are presented 
in Table 6.2. A Beta PDF exhibits a Gaussian shape when its shape parameters, α and β, are 
equal6.  
Table 6.2: Shape parameters of the base case indices 
Index 
Shape parameters of the index Beta PDFs (α, β) 
T12 T19 T31 System 
PLC 1.2, 1.8 1.8, 2.3 3.6, 5.6 2.5, 2.0 
FLC (events/year) 1.05, 1.6 1.7, 1.6 3.0, 3.9 2.7, 2.0 
DLC (hours/year) 1.2,1.8 1.9, 2.3 2.9, 4.5 2.8, 2.1 
 
With the exception of the FLC index of load point T19, the shape parameters in each cell of 
Table 6.2 are not close enough to infer symmetrical shapes. In fact, for the load point indices, 
the PDFs are mainly right skewed (β > α). The system indices on the other hand are left skewed 
(β < α). Thus, from the base case analysis, a reliability index for the load points considered will 
in fact more likely take on a value greater than its mean. The system indices on the other hand 
will more likely have values less than the mean. 
                                                     
6
 See Figure 2.3 
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Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show the probability, frequency and duration of load curtailment 
indices computed for the three load points and overall system. Despite using deterministic 
(average) values for every reliability input, the index PDFs take on shapes as  exhibited by the 
differently skewed Beta PDFs. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Base case PLC at different load buses and for the overall system 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Base case FLC at different load buses and for the overall system 
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Figure 6.3: Base case DLC at different load buses and for the overall system 
 
Reliability input parameters vary over a year so that, a maximum and minimum value can be 
determined each year; the failure data of different network components have variable ranges. 
One would thus expect the corresponding indices computed to also have specific ranges of 
values. Using single deterministic values, as inputs, however results in the simulation process 
selecting values from a significantly reduced range. For the base case, the parameter values 
selected are closer to the average values. The effect of this is shown in the base case index 
PDFs. All the indices have a minimum of zero and pattern observed in the shapes exhibited by 
the PDFs; right skewed for the load point indices and left skewed for the system indices.  
 
The base case PDFs also show that, of the three load points, T31 is the worst performing bus in 
the selected time window. The peaks of the load point index PDFs show that T31 is the most 
likely to fail. The tail regions of the load point index PDFs, in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, show that T31 
will experience the highest number and longest outages.  The PDFs also show that T12 is the 
best performing load point with the least number of recorded failures and shortest duration of 
failures annually. 
 
6.2.2 Case 2: Single composite PDFs for an annual planning study 
Unlike the base case, more practical PDFs were considered. A comparison between index values 
computed from the two cases analyzed thus far is presented in Table 6.3.  
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Since the conventional approach used in the base case analysis usually presents the indices as 
average values, a comparison is made in Table 6.3 between the base case indices and the mean 
values of the indices computed in Case 2.  
 






















T12 0.0034 0.0073 5 6 29.6 64 
T19 0.0057 0.015 8 12 49.9 130 
T31 0.0077 0.018 11 14 67.1 155 
System 0.021 0.062 31 48 185.5 545 
 
Table 6.3 shows that T31 is still the worst performing load point and T12 the best performing. 
The analysis in Case 2 however yielded significantly different values; a significant increase is 
noted in all the indices. Using PDFs as reliability inputs thus shows that the components are 
more vulnerable to outages and as such, a higher number of load curtailments events occur 
throughout out the network. The use of PDFs also predicts longer load curtailment events. 
Using average values as inputs as shown in Table 6.3, yields reliability indices that could either 
understate or overstate the vulnerability of load buses and the overall system to the external 
threats that cause component outages. Similar to the case with deterministic values applied, 
the analysis with PDFs produces comparable results for T19 and T31 which infers that load 
point T19 is influenced more by thunderstorm conditions.  
 
The shape parameters of the Beta PDF shapes displayed are presented in Table 6.4. While the 
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Table 6.4: Beta shape parameters for case of single composite PDFs applied 
Index 
Shape parameters of the index Beta PDFs (α, β) 
T12 T19 T31 System 
PLC 5.2, 5.4 7.6, 10 8.2, 6.5 21.2, 8.2 
FLC (events/year) 7.7, 5.8 10.9, 8.6 9.9, 4.0 23.0, 7.1 
DLC (hours/year) 5.0, 5.3 7.5, 7.6 9.0, 7.3 19.6, 7.6 
  
The shape parameters for the PLC index PDF for T12 and, DLC index PDFs for T12 and T19 
indicate that the distributions are closer to symmetrical shapes. The index PDFs for T31 are all 
left skewed. Other index PDFs are either left or right skewed.  
 
The PLC, FLC and DLC index PDFs computed in this case analysis for the selected load points and 
overall system are shown in Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 respectively. It is clear that some of the 
Beta PDFs are shifted horizontally. Using PDFs for reliability inputs allows selection of 
component parameter values from a range of possible values so that the reliability indices 
computed also fall within specific ranges. Using PDFs also ensures that the selection of input 
values was carried out while considering the likelihood of a parameter taking on a given value. 
The skewness of a given component parameter’s PDF ensures that certain values are selected 
more in the analysis because the parameter is more likely to have such values. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: PLC at load buses and overall network for case of single composite PDFs 
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Figure 6.5: FLC at load buses and overall network for case of single composite PDFs 
 
 
Figure 6.6: DLC at load buses and overall network for case of single composite PDFs 
 
From the average values presented in Table 6.3, it was determined that T19 and T31 have 
comparable results. The PDFs also show that the corresponding indices have similar ranges.  
Analyzing T19 and T31 PDFs however shows that there is a difference in likelihood of an index 
taking on a given value.  From Figure 6.6, the DLC indices for T19 and T31 have a range of about 
50 to 250 hours/ year. However the DLC PDF for T19 has a Gaussian shape, (α, β) = (7.5, 7.6) 
while the T31’s PDF is left skewed (α, β) = (9.0, 7.3). This implies that the DLC index for T19 will 
more likely take on values that lie around the mean while the same index for T31 will take on 
values greater than the mean. 
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From the PLC PDFs in Figure 6.4, the range is again similar, 0.002 to 0.03, but index for T19 will 
most likely take on values lower than the average while T31’s will take on values higher than 
the average. Since the FLC index PDF of T31 is more left skewed than that of T19, the likelihood 
of FLC index taking on values closer to the minimum of the FLC range (5 to 20 events/year), is 
higher with T19.  This is illustrated at the lower value tail regions of the FLC curves in Figure 6.5. 
The PDF of T19 is above that of T31. Such observations are missed when deterministic values 
are used to describe the indices. 
 
6.2.1.3 Case 3: Analyzing effect of aggregation in the TDPA on computed indices 
A comparison of the frequency of load curtailment index, for the overall system, computed 
from the TDPA analyses with single and two half-year composite PDFs applied as inputs is 
shown in Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.7: Comparative system FLC index PDFs derived from analyses using single composite and two 
half-year input PDFs 
 
The index PDFs are quite similar. It can be observed from the PDFs that the two analyses, using 
either single annual or two half-year composite PDFs, yielded index values that fall within very 
similar ranges. A slight horizontal offset is observed. This could be attributed to the summation 
carried out in the simulation when deriving an annual component parameter value. Depending 
on the component, a simulation run could yield either higher or lower failure frequency values 
from the half-year failure PDFs than from a single annual failure PDF.  
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This difference is more evident in the maxima of the parameter values derived which in turn 
impacts on the maxima of the indices computed. The vertical offset could be a result of the 
dominance of one half-year PDF over the other. One half-year PDF could have a scaling effect 
on the values selected from the other PDF which affects the likelihood of occurrence of values 
that fall within the middle band; either increasing or decreasing the number of middle band 
values. 
 
While the PDFs provide a good visual impression of the similarity between indices computed, it 
is important to also compare the values selected from each of set of PDFs. Table 6.5 shows 
index values selected at two levels of confidence; 50 % and 90 % level of confidence. The level 
of confidence, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, is an indication of the uncertainty allowed in a 
selected or computed value. Higher levels of confidence ensure lower uncertainty such that the 
most likely values can be selected or computed. 
 
Table 6.5: Comparison of index values computed using annual and half-year PDFs inputs for 50 % and 
90 % confidence levels  
Index 
T31 System 
50 % 90 % 50 % 90 % 
1PDF 2PDFs 1PDF 2PDFs 1PDF 2PDFs 1PDF 2PDFs 
PLC 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.028 0.062 0.064 0.075 0.076 
FLC (events/year) 14 14 18 23 48 49 58 58 
DLC (hours/year) 155.5 152 214 246.5 541 561.5 659.0 665.5 
 
The corresponding values in Table 6.5 are significantly close. This shows that the index data sets 
computed from the two analyses and their underlying distributions are also similar. One can 
thus deduce that aggregating, to derive composite data sets, does not compromise the original 
failure data and is valid. 
 
6.2.1.4 Case 4: Annual beta PDFs based on geographic regions 
The frequency and duration of load curtailment indices for the best and worst performing 
buses, T12 and T31 were computed.  
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These were compared with corresponding indices derived in Case 2. The corresponding FLC and 
DLC index PDFs, for each load point, are presented in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Comparative FLC indices based on single and regionally based composite input PDFs 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Comparative DLC indices based on single and regionally based composite input PDFs 
 
A significant increase is noted on the indices computed for both load points. The shapes of the 
PDFs also change which affects the likelihood of a given index taking on different values.  
Consider indices computed for T31.  
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From Figure 6.8, the number of load curtailment events increases when regional based PDFs 
are applied. However, the likelihood of fewer load curtailment events also increases as seen 
from the lower tails of its FLC index PDFs. The lower tails of the DLC index PDFs almost overlap 
which shows that the likelihood of short load curtailments occurring is unaffected. The length 
of load curtailment events however increases when regional PDFs are applied. 
 
A comparison of values selected from the different PDFs, with a 90 % level of confidence 
attached is presented in Table 6.6. Load point T12 is more affected when the external threats 
are modelled based on the geographic regions; the indices significantly increase. 
  
Table 6.6: Comparison of index values selected for 90 % level of confidence 
Index 
T12 T31 
Case 2 Case 3 Case 2 Case 2 
PLC 0.011 0.026 0.024 0.032 
FLC (events/year) 8 18 18 23 
DLC (hours/year) 96 198 214 281.5 
 
The performance of the two load points is affected by conditions in different geographic 
regions. While the conditions in the frontal region are less severe than in the thunderstorm 
region, the indices for T12 increase more significantly. The use of the single composite PDFs 
thus understated the likelihood of failure in the frontal region.  
 
6.3 NETWORK OPERATIONAL SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
This section will analyze the use severity-level-based PDFs in an operational analysis. The effect 
of considering threat-severity dependent levels in operational reliability of a power network, as 
opposed to the average level of severity applied in planning, will be investigated.  
The section compares the reliability indices computed when the operational input failure 
models are based either on the multiple severity levels of a threat or the average severity. 
 
 Page 143 
 
The frequency and duration of load curtailment indices were computed for load points T12 and 
T31. The Beta PDFs representing the indices computed, with and without severity levels 
considered in the reliability analysis, are shown in Figures 6.10 and 6.11.  
 
 
   
(a)                              (b) 




(a)                              (b) 
Figure 6.11: DLC index PDFs for (a) T12 and (b) T31 derived from the network operation analysis 
 
The difference in the corresponding index PDFs shows that each load point is affected. While 
the index values increase, it is noted that T31 is influenced more than T12. This is attributed to 
the location of T31 in the thunderstorm region where lightning is more severe and would thus 
significantly impact the performance of T31.  
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The use of multiple severity levels of network threats provides a more realistic impression of 
component vulnerability. Even with T12 which is not as affected by lightning, the use of an 
average severity model erroneously understated the vulnerability of components to lightning. 
This is reflected in the increase in the FLC and DLC index PDFs for T12 when multiple severity 
level modelling is applied.  
 
The index PDFs displayed for T31 are a good example of why using PDFs to describe reliability 
indices is more effective than the use of deterministic values. The skewness of T31’s FLC and 
DLC index PDFs changes when multiple severity levels are considers. Variation in PDF skewness 
impacts on the likelihood of low and high extreme index values. A factor neglected when 
reliability indices are represented by deterministic values.  Table 6.7 shows the values for T31’s 
indices when represented either deterministically7 or selected from the PDFs at 50 % level of 
confidence.   
 
Table 6.7: T31 average index values and values selected at 50 % confidence level  
Index 









FLC (events/Tw) 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 
DLC (hours/Tw) 50.3 43.7 49.6 40.8 
 
The results presented in Table 6.7 only predict better load point performance due to a change 
in failure model applied for lightning outages. The PDFs for T31 however indicate that adopting 
the multiple severity model increases the likelihood of the extreme values for load curtailment 
frequency and duration. From the upper bounds of T31 FLS PDFs, a higher likelihood of 
increased load curtailment events is inferred. 
 
Table 6.7 presented values with 50 % risk (50 % confidence level). Table 6.8 shows the FLC and 
DLC index values selected with lower risk attached i.e. 90 % confidence level.  
                                                     
7
 Average of the index (EFLC) 
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The values presented in Table 6.8 confirm the observations made from the PDFs. The number 
of curtailment events is higher. However the duration of the events reduces when the failure 
model is changed to include the multiple severity levels. 
 
Table 6.8: Index values selected with 90 % confidence level attached 
Index 





FLC (events/Tw) 6.0 7.0 
DLC (hours/Tw) 74.0 79.3 
 
A single dimension is achieved when analyzing reliability indices that have been represented 
deterministically. Conventionally average values are used which is equivalent to using values 
with 50 % risk level attached. With PDFs, the full range of possible index values was achieved. 
Analyzing Tables 6.7 and 6.8 shows that the impression of a network’s performance is 
dependent on the risk or confidence level allowed in the index value selection. This directly 
impacts on the decisions based on the computed reliability indices. 
 
6.4 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS FROM THE TDPA SIMULATIONS 
 
Three areas of the decision making process can be targeted when attempting to reduce 
uncertainty; the inputs considered, the methodology applied and the results on which the 
decisions will be based. This section will show how the TDPA helped: 
  
 Improve the representation of reliability inputs 
 Allowed for the selection of the appropriate component vulnerability models 
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6.4.1 Representation of reliability inputs 
 
The results from planning analysis showed that the representation of reliability inputs as PDF is 
more superior to the use of average deterministic values. The PDFs enabled uncertainty in 
reliability inputs to be accounted for. The use of Beta PDFs ensured that the inputs could be 
described while capturing any dispersion and skewness. With PDFs, the full range of failure 
parameter values was also inputted in the analysis. This provided more realistic results.  
 
Most of the software packages used by power utilities for reliability analyses require 
component parameters inputted as deterministic values. They also present the computed 
reliability indices in the same form. To improve the performance of such software, the TDPA 
could be adopted. After developing the PDF based component parameter models, a decision 
would then be made on the level of confidence to be attached to the deterministic values 
selected from the various input PDFs.  In the planning analysis, the chosen level of confidence 
would be applied to all component models. For an operational analysis, the confidence level 
could vary from component to component. The time window selected and particularly the 
severity of the threats to which each component is exposed would determine the confidence 
level applied. For components exposed to the threats at either high or average level of severity, 
parameter values should be selected with high confidence levels attached. The margin between 
parameter values selected from low severity-level threat models, at either high or low 
confidence levels, is negligible. As such, for components exposed to threats predicted at a low 
level of severity, low confidence levels can be attached to the selection of parameter values. 
It should be noted that while indices computed the software packages would still be 
deterministic values, they would be based on significantly improved reliability inputs. 
 
The Case 2 planning analysis presented in Section 6.3.1 showed that the same results could be 
achieved with either single annual or two half-year failure data sets developed per component. 
This justified the concept of aggregation performed when developing the TDPA matrix models. 
This method of failure data manipulation could have its advantages.  
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Traditionally component failure parameters are derived on an annual basis i.e. failure or repair 
rate per year. Using the TDPA, component behaviour over any year can be described using PDFs 
that represent each significant period in a year. Each component’s reliability performance 
would thus be represented by a number of composite PDFs describing its behaviour over 
different periods and times in a year. This would capture all the statistically relevant data while 
also showing the variability in component and network performance over a given planning 
period. It must be stated that the number of periods and corresponding PDFs developed 
depend on the available data. The data must be sufficient to ensure that statistically relevant 
PDFs are achieved. A case could also be made for deriving annual indices from short-term or 
medium-term analyses. Indices from short or medium term analyses could be aggregated to 
yield composite indices. Simulations carried out in planning analyses usually require more 
computation time than those in operational analyses because of the number of years that have 
to be simulated. The simulation time could be reduced by performing simulations for each 
significant period and then deriving composite indices for planning purposes.    
 
6.4.2 Applying the appropriate component vulnerability models 
 
The planning results showed that the choice of modelling approach and the application of the 
selected model have a bearing on the indices computed. The decisions based on the evaluated 
level of reliability would in turn be influenced. Each of the models described can still be used.  
One however has to consider the sensitivity of the analysis and the anticipated application of 
the indices computed. With average deterministic values, the performance of the load points 
could be ranked. Inputting single annual composite PDFs however provided a better indication 
of the actual performance of the load points. The use of single composite PDFs however 
disregarded the variation in external threats due to geographical regions. These two types of 
models are thus more suitable for general analyses which provide an overview of the network’s 
performance in a time window.  
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More sensitive analyses require that the network conditions simulated closely match the actual. 
As such, the vulnerability models should reflect the effect of varied conditions in different 
geographic regions. Using regional based PDFs in the TDPA ensures that the performance of 
each load point can be predicted, for any investment scenario, while taking into account the 
conditions that actually affect the individual buses. For example: 
 Network supply and loading conditions during peak hours can be more accurately 
represented. This ensures that practices, such as energy efficiency techniques, that aim 
to reduce the load in specific areas in the network can be implemented more effectively 
 
 The timing of maintenance practices has to be carefully scheduled so that there is 
minimum impact on the network. The seasonal and time-dependent approach of the 
TDPA ensures that the most suitable period in the year and time slot can be selected 
after running a reliability analysis. 
 
Most of the studies relating to adverse external network conditions have been limited to 
distribution networks so that the impact of the adverse elements are localized in a single 
geographical region and all network components are affected in the same way. In reality, 
adverse conditions such as weather storms are not localized and the impact has variable levels 
of severity depending on the path and span of a given storm. Using average values or planning 
models, for operational studies leads to poor diagnosis on the state of the network. 
Components closer to the eye of a storm are more susceptible to outages. Components in the 
peripherals would be less affected. Also, the severity of a weather storm diminishes with time. 
The component vulnerability models developed should thus account for their proximity to the 
storm’s corridor and the time of exposure to the storm.  
 
Applying PDFs in the operational TDPA ensured that different severity-dependent models could 
be developed for the dominant threat. The failure model applied in the reliability analysis may 
be more critical to network operation. In planning, more time is available to correct planned 
actions based on inaccurate reliability analyses.  
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For operation, network decisions and the subsequent actions have to be made in real time. The 
reliability indices computed impact on network operation practices such as line switching and 
load curtailment. If the vulnerability of the network is overstated, unnecessary switching and 
load curtailment could result. Operators may be unprepared due to understated network 
vulnerability which could result in extreme outage events. 
 
6.4.3 Interpretation of the reliability indices 
 
Representing computed indices using PDFs improved on their description. The computation of a 
finite range of possible values for each load point index is particularly useful to utilities that 
have to measure their performance against standards set by the national regulators. The range 
of index values provides a quick impression on the network’s performance with regard to the 
possibility of a penalty or reward.  
 
The different index shapes exhibited by the PDFs reflected the effect of variability in external 
threats on different load points and overall system. From the shape parameters, and thus the 
skewness of the PDFs, one could identify the likelihood of an index taking on low or high values. 
The selection of an index value, other than the mean is quite significant. Network planners base 
their decisions on reliability study results. A balance between financial investments in a 
network and providing optimal reliability levels is always required. Effective decision making 
requires minimal uncertainty in the process. Using PDFs, allows selection of index values at 
different levels of confidence (conversely risk). This provides a measure of quantifying the 
uncertainty in a decision based on the selected index value. The decision to use either high or 
low levels of confidence is dependent on the purpose and type of analysis. It is clear that values 
with high confidence levels attached should be used for low levels of uncertainty. Decisions 
with potentially high financial impact may justify the application of high levels of confidence. An 
indication of how the expected outcome varies with the risk may also suffice.  
 
 




Qn.7: Does the use of PDFs in either network planning or operation studies yield more useful 
results for each scenario? 
The use of PDFs in the planning analyses improved the representation of reliability inputs so 
that a more realistic impression of the network’s reliability was achieved.  
While the concept of average vulnerability models is valid for planning, the models should be 
applied appropriately. The perception of system reliability that is provided by computed indices 
depends on the input failure models applied. Furthermore, the risk level attached to index 
values also affects a reliability analysis. Variation in the severity of the threats is more distinct in 
network operation so that the average vulnerability model is not sufficient. Multiple severity 
level models are thus required. More information was also available when the reliability indices 
were represented as PDFs; the actual range of each index and the skewness of the index PDF 
were represented. A planner or operator is thus able to quantify the uncertainty in the index 




The simulations thus far show how the TDPA can be applied to either network planning or 
operational studies. The component vulnerability models required by each analysis were 
described and the results computed discussed. The next chapter show how PDFs can be applied 
to link planning and operational analyses. The chapter will show how long-term vulnerability 
models can be translated into operational ones. The chapter will particularly investigate the 
impact of global threats on a network already predisposed to local weather threats. It analyzes 
the effect of network exposure to adverse space weather threats, specifically Geomagnetically 
Induced Currents (GICs), on a reliability analysis. GICs can be categorized as long-term threats 
but cause severe damage in operational time windows.  
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 ANALYZING IMPACT OF THREATS WITH IMMEDIATE AND DEFERRED EFFECTS ON POWER 7.




The TDPA simulations carried out thus far analyzed the reliability of a network exposed to local 
external threats. In Chapter 5, the network threats were considered as affecting either planning 
or operation. The results of these reliability simulations were presented and discussed in 
Chapter 6. Some network threats can not however be regarded to have a distinct impact on 
only planning or operation. This Chapter will consider such a network threat; geomagnetically 
induced currents (GICs). 
 
The May 2013 ruling by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for new reliability 
standards recognized the potentially severe, wide-spread impact of GICs on the reliable 
operation of the bulk power systems [FERC, 2013]. Exposure to GICs is global and can have 
either immediate or deferred effects on network reliability. The most significant impact of GICs 
on power systems is damage to large power transformers.  
It has been reported that the sun goes through a solar cycle every 11 years and that the 
intensity of GICs depends on the intensity of the solar flares [Molinski et al, 2000; Hutchins & 
Overbye, 2011]. GICs could thus be categorized as long-term network threats affecting 
planning. GIC events however occur for short periods during which severe damage can also be 
caused. A single event, lasting just a few minutes, has the potential to cripple portions of a 
power grid for weeks, even years [Hutchins & Overbye, 2012]. GICs thus present a unique kind 
of external threat to networks whereby network operators have to include elevated risk of 
failure due to potential GIC events. The risk of network failure could also be elevated in 
operational time windows due to deferred or neglected maintenance of components.  
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This chapter will use the TDPA to show how operational failure models can be derived whilst 
accounting for the elevation in risk of failure due to a threat with short and long term effects. It 
should be stated that collection of transformer failure data, for the South African power 
network, with respect to GICs is ongoing. Hypothetical failure models were thus derived.  
This however puts no limitation on the methodology presented i.e. the GIC failure models can 
be changed. The transformer failure models derived are however based on real experiments 
carried out within the research group at the University of Cape Town. Some of the experimental 
results are presented herein.  
  
7.2 FAILURE MECHANISM OF POWER TRANSFORMERS 
 
Bossi et al [1983] consider a transformer to have failed if the unit has to be removed from 
service to be repaired. This is quite a restrictive definition. Failure of a transformer as viewed 
from network operators regards the impact of taking it out of service on the reliability of the 
network [Lapworth, 2006]. The IEEE developed guidelines for the collection and reporting of 
transformer failures. The establishment of a databases and statistical analysis of data through 
the calculation of failure rates was recommended [IEEE, 1986]. The IEEE transformer committee 
developed the failure rate evaluation rating presented in Table 7.1 [Kachler, 2001]. According to 
the evaluation scheme, failure rates can vary from being excellent to unacceptable. 
  
Table 7.1: Failure rate evaluation scheme proposed by the IEEE [Kachler, 2001] 
Transformer  
failure rate (λtr) 
Evaluation 
λtr ≤ 0.5% Excellent 
0.5% < λtr ≤ 1% Good 
1.0% < λtr ≤ 1.5% Satisfactory 
1.5% < λtr ≤ 2% Acceptable 
λtr > 2% Not Accepted 
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A summary of transformer failure rates from different surveys is provided in Table 7.2. The 
table is based on failure rates of differently rated transformers from a number of national 
utilities spanning a period of 37 years (1968 to 2005). The table shows that transformer failure 
rates vary with age and application. 
The causes of transformer failure can be grouped into three main categories [Allan & White, 
1995; Sokolov, 2005]: 
 Failures due to weak specification, design deficiencies, manufacturing weaknesses or 
material defects 
 Failures due to system disturbances, operational factors, or interactions between the 
transformers and other equipment on the system, 
 Failures which result from maintenance operations, repairs or refurbishment that have 
or have not been undertaken. 














All voltage levels 
(60kV-700kV) 
1968 - 1978 Pre 1978 2 2 

















69kV & <69kV 
- - 0.35 - 0.8 
Hydro Quebec, 
Canada 
All voltage categories, 
major failures 
- - <0.5 
American Electric 
Power 
345kV & 765kV Pre 1986 Pre 1986 * 1.3 - 2.9 
American Electric 
Power 
345kV & 765kV Post 1986 Post 1986 * 0.35 - 1.35 
Australia & New 
Zealand 
Costly failures Pre 1996 Pre 1996 0.4 
* Indicates studies where the manufacturing period was given. 
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William and Bartley [2003] however state that transformer failures, whether due to a 
combination of mechanical, electrical or thermal factors, ultimately involve and result from 
breakdown of the transformer insulation.  
They performed an analysis of transformer failure statistics received from different insurance 
companies for a 5 year period (1997 to 2001). The highest total amount paid out, as shown in 
Table 7.3, was to insurance claims reporting insulation failure. 
 
Table 7.3: Insurance claims paid out for different transformer failure causes [William & Bartley, 2003] 
Cause of Failure Number of failures Total Paid out ($Millions) 




Unknown 15 29.78 
Oil Contamination 4 11.84 
Oil Contamination 4 11.84 
Overloading 5 8.57 
Fire /Explosion 3 8.05 




Flood 2 2.24 
Loose Connection 6 2.19 
Lightning 3 0.66 
Moisture 1 0.18 
 
The deterioration of transformer insulation is a time function of temperature, moisture content 
and oxygen [IEEE, 1995]. The insulation temperature is however the main controlling parameter 
[Jian et al, 2007]. Section 3.2.3 described the saturation of transformers due to induced GICs. 
The relative permeability of the magnetic core tends to 1 as the level of saturation increases. 
GICs thus generate fringing magnetic flux i.e. flux flowing outside the core. Gaunt and Coetzee 
[2007] state that “without adequate control of the flux under saturation conditions, local 
heating in parts of the transformer may not be cooled effectively, leading to rapid temperature 
increase. The intensity of overheating depends on the saturation flux paths, cooling flow and the 
thermal condition or loading of the transformer”.  
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The windings hottest-spot temperature (HST) and dissolved gas (DG) in the insulation oil are 
used as indicators of the stress (insulation damage) imposed on a transformer.  
A transformer failure occurs when the withstand strength of the transformer with respect to 
one of its key properties is exceeded by operating stresses. Fu et al [2001] state that the 
winding HST in the top or in the centre of the transformer windings is the highest temperature 
subjected to the insulation system. As the winding temperature increases, the mechanical 
strength of the winding insulation material decreases. The potential for transformer failure thus 
increases. Also, gas bubbles may also form which facilitates the breakdown of the dielectric 




















Figure 7.1: Risk of transformer failure due to insulation degradation [Herman et al, 2011] 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the stress in a transformer putting it at risk of damage and the failure of a 
transformer weakened by prior stresses [Herman et al, 2011]. The figure shows that the 
susceptibility of transformers to further damage and failure increases as the withstand 
capabilities of the insulation progressively deteriorates because of stresses. A threshold can 
thus be specified based on either the HST or a DG analysis. Measurements of HST or DG beyond 
the threshold would indicate that the transformer has entered a critical region where failure is 
imminent.  
Stress 
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7.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING TRANSFORMER FAILURE  
 
The failure rate of transformers is not a constant parameter. Transformer insulation life and 
thus the failure threshold, is a function of factors such as the age and application of the 
transformer, and its operating conditions such as MVA loading and ambient temperature. A 
transformer load carrying ability study was performed by Wong [1994]. The author investigated 
the correlation between the time-varying transformer loading profiles and ambient 
temperature profiles and analyzed the impact on the transformer thermal behaviour. An on-
line transformer diagnostic system has also been proposed [Meliopoulos et al, 1998]. It predicts 
transformer loss of life based on historical data. A risk-based probabilistic method was 
proposed by Fu et al [2001]. It considered insulation failure due to transformer overloading. 
The ambient temperature and transformer loading were regarded as stochastic quantities so 
that a range of possible HST could be derived.  
 
Van Schijndel et al [2007] predicted the susceptibility of a transformer to failure based on age 
through the degree of polymerization (DP). The DP test assesses the age of the insulation paper 
of the transformer windings. The Doble laboratory tests [Doble Website] showed that 
“generally, paper in new transformers has a DP of about 1000. Aged paper with a DP of 150-200 
has little remaining mechanical strength, and therefore makes windings more susceptible to 
mechanical damage during movement, particularly during extreme events such as through-
faults.”  
 
Figure 7.2 shows the DP- value predicted for a given transformer based on the probabilistic 
approach proposed by Van Schijndel et al [2007]. The accuracy bandwidths derived for the DP 
value, DP (t), and the DP-threshold are also shown. According to Figure 7.2, the mechanical 
strength of a new transformer is high but deteriorates as it gets older to a value below a critical 
threshold. 
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Figure 7.2: Variation in DP-value and DP-threshold with transformer age [Van Schijndel et al, 2007] 
 
Jagers [2011] analyzed the failure rate patterns of transformers with new and older designs and 
reviewed related studies from different authors. The studies showed that transformer failure 
patterns vary with the transformer manufacturing period and design.  
 
Generation Step-up transformers are usually operated close to their ratings compared to 
distribution units. As such, their insulation has to withstand more stress. Jagers [2011] also 
displayed the variation in transformer failure rates based on the transformer voltage groups.  
Table 7.4 shows transformer failure data categorized according to the application, voltage 
group and manufacturing period. The table shows that failure rate increases with transformer 
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Table 7.4: Average annual failure rate according to manufacturing period, transformer application and 
highest system voltage for transformers with tap changers [Jagers, 2011] 
Application & Voltage 
Groups 









60 ≤ kV <100  
Power Station TRFRs 













100 ≤ kV < 300 
Power Station TRFRs 













300 ≤ kV < 700 
Power Station TRFRs 













60 ≤ kV < 700 
Power Station TRFRs 














7.4 MODELLING TRANSFORMER FAILURES DUE TO GICs 
 
This section will show how failure models of long-term threats are translated into operational 
failure models. The model will account for component failure due to either excessive stress 
imposed by a random shock or due to accumulated damage from multiple shocks.  
 
Other than age and application, the severity and rate of deterioration of the transformer 
insulation is also influenced by external random shocks. The transformer is deemed to be in a 
critical condition as soon as the damage, due to an extreme shock, or the cumulative damage, 
due to multiple shocks, exceeds a predetermined threshold [Wang & Pham, 2011]. The lifetime 
of a transformer is usually specified by the owner (utility). The manufacturer then designs for a 
failure model that enables the transformer withstand different shocks over its lifetime.  
GICs have however been reported to cause extensive damage to affected transformers shortly 
after exposure. The failure of transformers in Tutuka, Matimba and Lethabo power stations, in 
South Africa, after the ‘Halloween storm’ at the beginning of November 2003 testifies to this. 
The units are monitored regularly with on-line DG analysis applied to some.   
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Gaunt and Coetzee [2007] reported that “a transformer at Lethabo power station tripped on 
protection on 17th November. There was a further severe storm on 20th November. On 23rd 
November the Matimba #3 transformer tripped on protection and on 19th January 2004 one of 
the transformers at Tutuka was taken out of service. Two more transformers at Matimba power 
station (#5 and #6) had to be removed from service with high levels of DGA in June 2004. A 
second transformer at Lethabo power station tripped on Buchholz protection in November 
2004.” The manufacturer based models have to be adapted to reflect the threat GICs pose to 
network operation.   
 
While the likelihood of transformer failure is dependent on the state of the transformer i.e. age, 
loading and design, it can also be regarded as a function of the characteristics of a GIC shock 
event. The signature of the induced GICs, either magnitude or duration, should be such that the 
hotspot(s) generated in the transformer is sufficient to cause damage. The time of occurrence 
of a GIC event is also significant because of the effects induced GICs have on transformer 
performance.  
 
The NERC report [2012] compiled investigations from different authors ranging from the 
prediction of space weather, calculation of GICs, effect on power systems to operation 
mitigation strategies. It was reported that GICs impact on voltage and angle stability. Also 
saturated transformers produce unusual MVAr and MW swings [Hutchins & Overbye, 2012]. 
Berge et al [2011 (2)] presented a linear increase in the reactive power absorbed by a 
transformer as the induced GIC levels increased. The effect on the transformers output power 
was not reported on. The definition of a transformer failure state should thus be extended to 
include a drop in performance that impacts on the stability and reliability of a network. 
 
While the NERC report [2012] showed how the transformer temperature increases with the 
simulated induced GICs, variation in transformer reactive power consumption and output 
(voltage and power) was not investigated.  
 Page 160 
 
The laboratory experiment described in Appendix D was used to confirm the reported effects of 
GICs on a transformer, particularly on its input MVars and output MW. The lab set up is shown 
in Figure 7.3. Current (dc) was injected through the transformer neutrals to simulate GICs.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Laboratory test system to simulate injection of GIC into the neutral of the load transformer 
[Gaunt & Malengret, 2012] 
 
The source transformer was significantly over-rated so that the dc component had negligible 
effect on its magnetisation characteristics. A small isolated three-phase generator was used as 
the power supply and care was taken to ensure that the applied voltage across the load 
transformer did not correspond to over-excitation. The dc current was increased gradually and 
the effect on the load transformer’s reactive power (Q) consumption and apparent power 
output (S) noted. The experiment was replicated and some of the results are presented in 
Figure 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.4: Variation in apparent power (S) and reactive power (Q) characteristics of load transformer 
with dc injection 




































 Page 161 
 
Figure 7.4 shows that while the power output dropped, the amount of reactive power absorbed 
increased with increase in dc injection. The risk posed by a GIC event can thus be classified 
either in terms of: 
 the accelerated failure of a transformer after the event (severity of expected damage)  
 and/or reduced transformer capability during the event  
 
Transformer failures due to GICs should thus be defined with respect to the GIC event i.e. 
whether GIC event is extreme or not.  
 
7.3.1 Transformer failure model due to an extreme GIC event 
The shocks experienced by transformers have variable magnitude and occur at random times. 
One of the commonly applied shock models is the extreme shock model [Wang & Pham, 2011]. 
The model considers exposure to an individual shock such that a system fails as soon as the 
magnitude of the shock effect goes into a critical region. Such shocks are deemed as extreme.  
 
Figure 7.5 describes the failure pattern of a transformer with and without the influence of an 
extreme GIC shock. A critical region is identified by a threshold such that the transformer is 






Figure 7.5: Description of transformer failure patterns; predicted and due to extreme shock  
0       TGIC          TfGIC      Tmean      
                   Time (t) 
Expected pattern predicted 
by manufacturer 
New failure pattern due 
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It should be stated that despite the representation in Figure 7.5, TGIC and TfGIC are considerably 
shorter than Tmean. Three key times are also shown in Figure 7.5: 
 TGIC: Time of exposure to a GIC shock. Can be categorized further than just the year 
of exposure by including the season and time-of-day 
 TfGIC: Time of failure due to GIC event. If a GIC event is extreme, the transformer 
fails shortly after exposure. The transformer thus fails (TfGIC - TGIC ) hours or days 
after exposure  
  Tmean: Expected time-to-failure. This is usually specified by the utility and considers 
the ability of the transformer to withstand all expected stresses in its lifetime. 
Power transformers usually have a life span of more than 30 years.  
 
The likelihood of a transformer failing, P(t < Tmean), has three components as shown in (7.1). 
These relate to the probability of a given GIC event occurring, the state of the affected 
transformer, and its manufacturer based failure trend. 
 
                                 (7.1) 
 
 PGIC is the probability that the GIC event that occurs is extreme i.e. can lead to over 
saturation of the transformer or cause extreme damage to the transformer windings. 
GIC events that cause such effects could have a specific signature. The probability of a 
specific GIC event occurring can thus be computed from historical events. The 
probability of GIC events corresponding to different exposure durations or induced GIC 
magnitudes are derived while considering the effect on the transformer.  
 
 HI is the health index of a given transformer. It describes the state of the network at the 
time of exposure to a GIC event. Using on-line monitoring systems and tests, the state of 
the transformer can be graded. The HI is thus a scalar between 0 and 1. Newer or 
‘healthy’ transformers will have HI values closer to 1. 
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 Ptrfr is the probability of a transformer surviving up till the time of exposure to the GIC 
event. It is based on the survival trend designed for by the manufacturer or specified by 
the utility. This represents the transformer failure model applied in planning analyses.  
Such a trend is developed from all shocks that the transformer endured and can be 
categorized into seasonal and time-of-day windows. The probability varies from 
transformer to transformer, in each window, based on age and application.  
 
6.3.2 Transformer failure model due to multiple GIC events 
In the absence of an extreme shock, a transformer could also fail due to the compound effect of 
multiple shocks. The probability of a transformer surviving up till the Nth shock is a function of 
the probabilities of surviving the previous shocks [Esary & Marshal, 1973].  
The cumulative shock model according to Wang & Pham [2011], describes a system’s break 
down when the cumulative shock magnitude exceeds the specified threshold. Figure 7.6 shows 







Figure 7.6: Description of transformer failure patterns; predicted and due to multiple shocks 
 
The multiple GIC shock model considers transformer failure resulting only from insulation 
damage and not due to over saturation. The likelihood of failure is thus derived from (7.2). TfGIC 
is the time-of-failure since exposure to the first GIC event. 
Expected pattern predicted 
by manufacturer 
New failure pattern due 
to multiple shocks 
0            TGIC1     TGIC2  TfGIC  Tmean       
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                       ∑   
 
         (7.2) 
 
The definitions for HI and Ptrfr are as described in Section 6.3.1. Pk is the probability of a non-
extreme GIC shock k occurring. The cumulative component in (7.2) is limited by the number of 
shocks required to push the transformer into the critical region.  
 
7.5 INCLUDING EXPOSURE TO GICs IN A RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
In the absence of the extreme and multiple GIC shock models, the likelihood of failure is 
determined only from the failure PDF based on the manufacturer’s design (Ptrfr). This section 
will analyze the effect of using operational PDF models that describe the elevated risk of failure 
as opposed PDF models developed by the manufacturer.  
 
The span of GIC exposure is widespread so that all transformers of a utility can be influenced 
simultaneously. As stated in Section 7.2, the impact of GICs on individual transformers would 
however depend on location, type of transformer, age, loading and application. The occurrence 
of global and local weather threats is independent of each other. The effect of GICs can thus be 
superimposed onto a network already influenced by local weather threats. It is important to 
note that the parameters described in the GIC shock models are stochastic so that the TDPA 
matrix model can be applied.  
 
Hutchins and Overbye [2012] determine the magnitude and direction of GICs in a network by 
modelling and simulating the induced geoelectric field in a power flow software package. 
Utilities are however more interested in the effect of a given GIC event on the network. It is 
thus important to know the transformer response characteristic for different GIC storms. Berge 
et al [2011] investigated the impact different GIC magnitudes in a power flow study. A 
technique that correlated the magnitude of GICs and the reactive power absorbed by 
transformers was applied. As discussed in previous sections, the drop in power performance of 
transformers is only one of the categories of transformer failure due to GICs.  
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The two power flow studies thus provide an incomplete impression of the effect of GICs on a 
network. The impact of transformer damage can be investigated through a reliability analysis. 
The probability of transformer damage or failure due to GICs must be considered in the context 
of the local conditions that affect the network. A reliability analysis thus ensures that the 
occurrence of local threats is not overlooked. The flow chart in Figure 7.7 shows how effect of 
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Figure 7.7: Simulation required for inclusion of transformer failures due to GICs 
 
The key steps in the flowchart are described below:  
1) Determine the time window depending on the type of analysis i.e. either planning or 
operation 
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2) For a planning analysis, the manufacturer based failure model is adopted for transformers. 
Same model could be applied to a group of transformers e.g. GSU failure model. Long-term 
PDF models can be developed from historical failure data 
3) In a network operation analysis, the factors that influence transformer performance such 
as loading have to be considered while regarding the time window (specific season and 
time slot). The age and application of individual transformers becomes significant 
4) Is there an impending GIC event? 
4a) In the absence of GIC threat the manufacturer based failure model is only 
influenced by the operating conditions identified in Step 3. Short-term failure models 
are developed for each time window 
4b)  With a GIC threat predicted, the seasonal and time-dependent failure model is 
adapted. The new failure model depends on the type of GIC event. 
4b (i) Model applicable to extreme GIC events 
4b (ii) Model applicable to non-extreme GIC events 
5) The frequency of transformer failure in a selected time window is derived from the 
appropriate model (P(t<T) and scaling factor (Ctrfr)  
6) The effect of a given GIC level on the MVars consumed and MW outputted by a 
transformer can be predetermined.  Variation in the performance of a transformer also 
impacts on the power stability of a network. A power flow based FMEA could thus yield a 
different set of failure states for the load points 
7) The transformer failure models and new FMEA are inputs to the reliability analysis 
 
7.4.1  Application to a real bulk network 
The effect of GICs on a network’s reliability was analyzed for the time window characterized by 
the first quarter of the year and the noon and 6 pm time slot.  
The bulk network presented in 5.2 was considered. The operational case study presented in 
Section 5.2 is modified to include the risk of transformer failure due to occurrence of GIC 
events.  
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For illustration purposes, the GIC events were categorized as either extreme or non- extreme.  
It must be stated that sub-categories of GIC events can be identified between the extreme and 
non-extreme categories. As such different PDFs could be achieved for different categories of 
GIC events. The PDFs in Figure 7.8 were assumed for probability of a transformer surviving till 
the time of exposure to a GIC event and the probability of either an extreme or non-extreme 
GIC event occurring. The shape parameters are presented in Table 7.5. 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Hypothetical PDFs representing probability of types of GIC events occurring and of 
transformer survival up till the occurrence of a GIC event as designed by the manufacturer 
 
Table 7.5: Shape parameters of transformer survival and GIC event PDFs 
Type of PDF Shape Parameters 
Transformer survival (Ptrfr) 3, 1.4 
Extreme GIC event 4.7, 1.5 
Non-extreme GIC event 0.06, 0.9 
 
The results of two operational reliability analyses are presented in this section. The first analysis 
did not consider the occurrence of GICs.  
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The transformer failure model was thus based on the survival PDF shown in Figure 7.8 which 
represents the survival of the unit based on the manufacturer’s design. The second analysis 
considered the occurrence of GIC events. The models presented in Section 7.4 were applied to 
the transformers. The manufacturer-design based PDF was thus scaled in each GIC model using 
either the extreme or non-extreme GIC PDFs shown in Figure 7.8. In each simulation run, a 
uniform random number generator was used to determine whether a given GIC event was 
extreme or non-extreme. A uniform distribution was used to represent the transformer health 
index in the selected time window. 
 
A comparison of the frequency and duration of load curtailment indices computed for each 
case is presented in Figures 7.9 and 7.10 respectively. The indices are presented for load point 
T31. 
 
Figure 7.9: Effect of GIC exposure on the FLC index of load point T31 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Effect of GIC exposure on the DLC index of load point T31 
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The inclusion of GIC events in the operational analysis leads to an increase in the frequency and 
duration of load curtailment events at load point T31. This is indicated in the reduced likelihood 
of few load curtailment events and increased likelihood of upper end extreme curtailment 
events. This was expected since the GIC shock models account for an elevation in likelihood of 
transformer outages. A similar impact is noted in the DLC index PDFs in Figure 7.10. 
 
The effect of using the GIC shock models is further analyzed in Table 7.6. The table quantifies 
the increase in index values due to the use of the GIC shock models. A comparison of index 
values selected at 50 % and 90 % confidence level is presented.  Table 7.6 shows an increase in 
the indices at two levels of confidence considered.  
 
Table 7.6: Comparison of effect of GIC exposure on index values at 50 % and 90 % confidence level 
Index 
50 % confidence level 90 % confidence level 
No GIC With GIC 
% 
increase 





3.9 4.5 15.3 6.0 7.8 30 
DLC  
(hours/ Tw) 
40.8 54.6 33.8 76.2 87.3 14.6 
 
The increase in the indices presented shows that the GIC shock models were able to account for 
the elevation in risk during the operational time window considered.  
 
7.6 IMPLICATIONS OF RELIABILITY BASED GIC STUDY 
 
The life-time of a transformer is one of the specifications provided by utilities to guide the 
manufacturer’s design. For planning a failure rate can be assigned to a category of 
transformers, either generation step-up or transmission units, in the network. The failure rate is 
modelled deterministically and usually varies due to aging. The use of manufacturer based 
failure models, particularly in operational time windows is not sufficient. When operational 
time windows are considered, the transformer’s operating conditions have to be considered 
when determining its likelihood of failure.  
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Factors such as loading, moisture content and external threats usually influence the 
transformers so that the risk of failure is elevated. The performance of the considered load 
point deteriorated when failure models that capture the elevation in risk of failure were applied 
in the reliability analysis. The TDPA models incorporated a health index. The index provides a 
means of changing the probability of component failure and system risk in general. It indicates 
the state of the network and its components in different time windows. As such, the influence 
of different seasonal and time-dependent factors on the failure of a component can be graded.  
 
The analysis showed that the impact of GICs can be included in a reliability analysis. Utilities 
strive to minimize costs while trying to mitigate the effects of predicted threats. One of the 
mitigation strategies proposed and adopted by networks where GIC have caused extensive 
damage in the past include the use of series-capacitors in the network. Network transformers 
could also be replaced with units that have a high GIC withstand level. These strategies are 
planning issues and require high time and capital investments especially considering that GIC 
events do not last long. Temporary approaches based on power flow analyses have also been 
recommended [Berge et al, 2011(1); Hutchins & Overbye, 2011 &2012]. The network is 
reconfigured, either through line or transformer tripping, to reduce the magnitude of GICs in 
the transformers. These approaches however do not take into account the real-time availability 
of all network components when a GIC warning is received. Previous chapters showed that 
network components are already influenced by local weather threats which could aggravate 
the impact of a GIC event.  
 
The GIC reliability analysis developed models that allow the impact of GIC threats on an already 
stressed network to be investigated and quantified. Line switching changes the topology of the 
network and the potential load point and network failure states. The TDPA reliability analysis 
would thus be performed for each topology achieved until the optimum (with least impact) 
reliability levels are achieved. This provides operators with a means of monitoring and analyzing 
the vulnerability of their networks for a forecasted GIC event.   
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Operators would thus be able to modify the network depending on the scale of impact of the 
predicted GIC event without neglecting the local threats that affect it. Reconfiguration of the 
network is not a solution to the GIC problem but a means of managing or reducing the impact 
on a network. Permanent solutions can also be incorporated but the decision to use either or 
both depends on the utility (size and structure) and the severity of GIC storms experienced. 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 8.
 
This chapter presents a review of the research questions and the main conclusions drawn. 
Ideas for future work that the research has opened are also identified.  
 
8.1 ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
This thesis was based on a hypothesis. The answers to the research questions aimed at 
validating the hypothesis are summarized below: 
 
Q1) Measurement of reliability and presentation of results 
Sequential MCS is the most suitable reliability evaluation technique for bulk networks. The 
variability in performance of network components due to, among other reasons, a 
stochastic environment can be captured in an analysis. It is also able describe failure 
parameters as PDFs and also derive the underlying distributions of the indices computed. 
Reliability indices are conventionally represented as deterministic values. However, using 
PDFs provides a better description of the indices. More information is derived from the 
inspection of the dispersion and skewness of the index distributions. 
 
Q2) Effect of external network threats and vulnerability approaches proposed 
Network performance is significantly influenced by the environment. The threats faced by 
networks can be categorized as either local or global. Local weather threats like lightning 
have specific regions of influence while global threats like GICs can influence the whole 
network. 
A number of approaches have been proposed to capture the vulnerability of network 
components to external threats. The models however have different limitations such that 
they can not be applied effectively in both planning and operational reliability analyses.   
 
Q3) Impact of seasonal and time-dependent variations on component reliability 
parameters 
A seasonal and time-dependent pattern can be fitted to the occurrence and severity of 
impact of each type of threat.  
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The use of average deterministic value cannot capture such variability. Time windows that 
describe a specific season in the year and time-of-day can be developed. PDF models 
developed for each window exhibit a variety of shapes so that the variation in the likelihood 
of component failure can be captured and quantified. 
 
Q4) Suitable PDF for capturing season and time-dependent variations in failure 
parameters 
Due to the variability induced in component failure parameters, PDFs that can be left and 
right skewed are more useful in reliability analyses. The research showed that the Beta PDF 
can be used in place of other commonly applied PDFs. 
Failure parameters are based on historical record and thus have a finite range. Only the Beta 
PDF can be scaled to a finite range. It was thus the most suitable PDF for the research 
presented.  
 
Q5) Bulk network required for research 
South Africa has a diverse climate and as such the power grid is exposed to a range of 
external local threats. Literature shows that the network is also exposed to GICs. Real failure 
data was also available for use in the analyses considered. The South African power grid 
thus makes an interesting and suitable case study. The test network was thus developed 
based on the South African network and external conditions.  
 
Q6) Incorporation of PDFs in reliability analyses 
A matrix vulnerability model that describes different seasons and time-of day was 
considered. The model was developed so that Beta PDF models could be developed for 
failure parameters in each window. Since the conventional sequential MCS unrealistically 
applies a constant model for failure rates, a new simulation technique was developed. PDF 
models could thus be applied for both failure and repair rates in the analysis. The research 
first showed that the new technique could replicate analyses performed using the 
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Q7) Significance of using PDFs in reliability analyses 
PDFs are very significant to practical reliability analyses. The research showed that realistic 
reliability inputs could be derived with PDFs. A different perception on the network’s 
reliability was also achieved when the reliability indices were also represented using PDFs. It 
was possible to make inferences about the parameters and indices being described based 
on the skewness of their respective distributions. The PDFs also aided decision making at 
both planning and operation levels. They provided a range of values with different level of 
risk or confidence attached. Planners and operators would thus be able to quantify the risk 
induced in their decision making when a given level of reliability is selected. The form of risk 
based decision making proposed in the thesis has not been used before. The PDF results 
thus showed that the conventional approach, as used in the base case planning analysis, 
could be applied only as one of the steps in a reliability analysis.  
 
Q8) Modifying planning failure models for use in operational reliability analysis? 
A key miscalculation made by operators is the use of planning failure models in their 
analyses. Misleading results are usually obtained. Decisions based on such results could 
have drastic ramifications. The research showed that long-term failure models can be 
translated into operational models. PDFs were used to model the long-term failure models, 
the likelihood of occurrence of a given operational threat and the health index that indicates 
the state of the network in an operational time window. The models derived modified the 
long-term failure models so that the elevation in risk of failure during operation could be 
accounted for.  
 
The research questions were addressed. The research was thus able to show that 
simulation-based probability density functions that describe network interruptions, caused 
by adverse global and space weather conditions, can be used for effective network planning 
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8.2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
 
The research applied the Beta PDF in the analyses performed. The Beta PDF has had limited 
application in reliability studies. It may even have never been applied in conjunction with 
sequential MCS reliability assessment. The research showed that it can perform just as well 
as the other commonly used PDFs and may actually be more suited for operational and 
annual planning reliability studies where extreme events are not considered. The 
characteristics of the Beta PDF are such that it facilitates the modelling of variables with 
finite range. This makes it appropriate for modelling not only historical failure data but also 
reliability indices. It must be stated that further research may be required for the 
development of even better Beta PDF based models for reliability variables. The research 
could analyze the methodology applied in deriving shape and scaling parameters of the best 
fitting Beta PDF model.   
 
The research improved and thoroughly arranged the sampling area of a sequential MCS. The 
matrix vulnerability model applied ensures a more realistic arrangement of failure data for 
either planning or operational reliability analyses. This allowed for the correlation between 
failure events and seasonal and time-of-day variations to be carried out simultaneously. The 
use of probabilistic models in each matrix cell ensures that the distinct variations or 
uncertainty in reliability inputs can be accounted for during the sampling process of the 
sequential MCS. The use of PDFs at the sampling stage and even for the representation of 
reliability indices enables planners and operators to quantify the level of uncertainty 
allowed in their decision making process. 
 
The thesis proposed a new reliability evaluation technique that is computationally more 
efficient than its root conventional sequential MCS. The technique is not only 
computationally faster than the conventional sequential MCS but also ensures that the 
results computed are more dependent on the input failure models. The accuracy of the 
TDPA is comparable to that attained with a sequential MCS. The new technique can be 
consistently applied to planning and operational studies while taking into account the 
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distinct effect on the reliability inputs. The technique has significant potential for real time 
reliability applications.  
The thesis provided a base modelling procedure applicable to scenarios in which a 
component’s risk of failure is elevated due to occurrence of a threat. The threats considered 
have immediate and deferred effects on exposed network components. The thesis 
attempted to model the impact of a single threat on a component’s short and long-term 
failure models. The ability to transform long-term failure models into operational models 
ensures that reliability analyses can be used to analyze the impact of impending storms. The 
TDPA was used to evaluate the effect of such threats on a network’s reliability. The TDPA 
based reliability analysis could thus be considered as a tool in operational threat mitigation 
strategies; applicable to any threat and not only GICs 
  
8.3  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The research focused on the modelling of component failure parameters. It can however be 
extended to other aspects of power networks such as integration of renewable energy 
systems and the effects of demand side management techniques on a network stability and 
reliability.  
 
The experience acquired by planners and operators whilst working with their utilities is an 
invaluable asset. One can not however ignore the rapid changes in the power industry, 
particularly with regard to the network risks and the way the risks are managed. The time-
dependent probabilistic approach developed in this research provides a means of 
quantifying the uncertainty allowed in network planning and operating practices. This 
should help ensure that better and more effective decisions are made within the power 
industry. 
 
 Page 177 
 
REFERENCES 
Allan D J, White A, Transformer Design for High Reliability, Proceedings of 2nd IEEE 
International Conference on the Reliability of Transmission and Distribution Equipment, 
No. 406, 66-72, March 1995  
Alvehag K, Impact of Dependencies in Risk Assessments of Power Distribution System, 
Licentiate Thesis, Royal Institute of Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, 
Stockholm, Sweden, 2008 
Alvehag K, Soder L, A Stochastic Weather Dependent Reliability Model for Distribution 
Systems, 10th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power 
Systems, Puerto Rico, 1-8, 2008 
Alvehag K, SÖder, A Reliability Model for Distribution Systems Incorporating Seasonal 
Variations in Severe Weather, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 26, No.2, 910-
919, 2011 
Almeida S A B, Engelbrecht C S, Pestana R, Barbosa F P M, Prediction of Faults caused by 
Lightning for Transmission System Operations, 4 ELECTRA, No. 4, February 2011. 
Almeida S A B, Pestana R, Barbosa F P M, The main causes of Incidents in the Portuguese 
Transmission System-Their Characterization and how they can be used for Risk 
Assessment, 6th International Conference on the European Energy Market, Leuven, 2009 
Awodele K, Edimu M, Gaunt C T, Herman R, Choice of Beta Probability Distribution Function 
for a Power System Reliability Assessment, submitted to Electric Power Systems 
Research Journal, February 2012 
Awodele K, Ip Cho N F S, Impact of Different Load Models on Reliability Evaluation in Power 
Systems, 46th International Universities Power Engineering Conference, Soest, Germany, 
2011 
Aydogmus Z, Cebeci M, A New Dynamic Model of Polluted HV Insulators, IEEE Transactions 
on Dielectrics and Electrical Insulation, Vol. 11, No. 4, 577-584, 2004 
Amer R Y, Temperature and Resistivity Distribution on the Insulator Surface, 5th International 
Symposium on High Voltage Engineering, Braunschweig, Germany, 1987 
Balijepalli N, Venkata S S, Richter C W, Christie R D, Longo V J, Distribution System Reliability 
Assessment due to Lightning Storm, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 20, No. 3, 
2153-2159, 2005 
 Page 178 
 
Banks D, Schäffer J, The Potential Contribution of Renewable Energy in South Africa, 
Executive Summary of Project Report, Available at: 
http://www.eepublishers.co.za/images/upload/Gener%201.pdf 
BBC News, Europe recovers from deadly storm, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7849887.stm#map (viewed: 13/10/2009) 
Bebic J, Power System Planning: Emerging Practices Suitable for Evaluating the Impact of 
High-Penetration Photovoltaics, GE Global Research Report, February 2008 
Bekker H J T, Britten A C, Stevens D J, Bolgna F T, Watridge G M, Light Pollution on Glass Disc 
Insulators as an Underlying Cause of Flashovers in Eskom’s 275 and 400 kV Networks, 
11th International High Voltage Engineering Symposium, 103-106, London, 1999 
Beshir M J, Cheng T C, Farag A S A, Comparison of two Bulk Power Adequacy Assessment 
Programs: TRELSS and COMREL, IEEE Transmission and Distribution Conference 
Proceedings, Los Angeles, 431-437, 1996 
Berge J, Marti L, Varma R K (1), Modelling and Mitigation of Geomagnetically Induced 
Currents on a realistic Power System Network, IEEE Electrical Power and Energy 
Conference, Winnipeg, 2011 
Berge J, Varma R K, Marti L, (2), Laboratory Validation of the Relationship between 
Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC) and Transformer Absorbed Reactive Power, IEEE 
Electrical Power and Energy Conference, Winnipeg, 2011 
Bevers E, Saint B, NRECA Reliability Reporting Survey and the new RUS Interruption 
Reporting Requirement, IEEE Rural Electric Power Conference, A4 1-6, Albuquerque, 
New Mexico, 2006 
Bhuiyan M R, Inclusion of Weather Effects in Composite System Reliability Evaluation Using 
Sequential Simulation, IEEE Generation, Transmission and Distribution Conference, Vol. 
141, No. 6, 575-584, 1994 
Billinton R, Acharya J, Consideration of Multi-State Weather Models in Reliability Evaluation 
of Transmission and Distribution Systems, IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, 619-622, 2005 
Billinton R, Allan R N, Reliability Assessment of Large Electric Power Systems, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/Lancaster, 1988 
Billinton R, Allan R N, Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems, Concepts and 
Techniques, New York, Plenum Press, ISBN: 0306440636, 1992 
 Page 179 
 
Billinton R, Allan R N, Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, New York, Plenum Press, ISBN: 
0306452596, 1996 
Billinton R, Huang D, Basic Considerations in Generating Capacity Adequacy Evaluation, IEEE 
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, 611-613, 2005 
Billinton R, Kumar S, Indices for use in Composite Generation and Transmission System 
Adequacy Evaluation, International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 
Vol.12, No. 3, 147-155, 1990 
Billinton R, Kumar S, Chowddury N,  Chu K, Debnath K, Goel L, Khan E, Kos P, Nourbakhsh G, 
Oteng-Adjei  J, A Reliability Test System for Educational Purposes-Basic Data, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1238-1244, 1989 
Billinton R, Li W, A Novel Method for Incorporating Weather Effects in Composite System 
Adequacy Evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 6, 1154-1160, 1991 
Billinton R, Li W, Reliability Assessment of Electric Power Systems Using Monte Carlo 
Methods, Plenum Press, New York, ISBN: 0306447819, 1994 
Billinton R, Sankarakrishnan A, A Comparison of Monte Carlo Simulation Techniques for 
Composite Power System Reliability Assessment, Communication, Power and Computing 
Conference, Manitoba, 1995 
Billinton R, Singh D G, Reliability Assessment of Transmission and Distribution Systems 
Considering Repair in Adverse Weather Conditions, IEEE Canadian Conference on 
Electrical and Computer Engineering, Vol. 1, 88-93, 2002 
Billinton R, Singh G, Application of Adverse and Extreme Adverse Weather: Modelling in 
Transmission and Distribution System Reliability Evaluation, IEEE Proceedings 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Vol. 153, No. 1, 115-119, 2006 
Billinton R, Tang X, Selected Considerations in Utilizing Monte Carlo Simulation in 
Quantitative Reliability Evaluation of Composite Power Systems, Electric Power Systems 
Research, Vol. 69, No.2-3, 205-211, 2004  
Billinton R, Wangdee W, Estimating Customer Outage Costs due to a Specific Failure Event, 
IEEE Proceedings Generation, Transmission and Distribution, Vol. 150, 668–672, 2003. 
Billinton R, Wangdee W, Predicting Bulk Electricity System Reliability Performance Indices 
using Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, 909-917, 2006 
 Page 180 
 
Billinton R, Wu C, Predictive Reliability Assessment of Distribution Systems Including Extreme 
Adverse Weather, Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering, Vol. 2, 
719-724, Toronto, 2001 
Billinton R, Wu C, Singh G, Extreme Adverse Weather Modelling in Transmission and 
Distribution System Reliability Evaluation, 14th  Power Systems and Computation 
Conference, Sevilla, 2002 
Blake S, Taylor P, Creighton A, Methodologies for the Analysis of both Short-term and Long-
term Network Risks, 20th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Prague, 
No. 24, June 2009 
Bollen M H J, Effects of Adverse Weather and Aging on Power System Reliability, IEEE 
Transactions on Industrial Applications, Vol.37, No.2, 452-457, 2001 
Bollen M H J, Wallin L, Ohnstad T, Bertling L, On Operational Risk Assessment in 
Transmission Systems – Weather Impact and Illustrative Example, 10th International 
Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, Rincon, 2008 
Borgenstam C, Sandstroem A, Why VASA Capsized, AB Grafisk Press, Stockholm, ISBN: 
9185268607, 1995 
Borges C L T, Falcao D M, Mello J C O, Melo A C G, Composite Reliability Evaluation by 
Sequential Monte Carlo Simulation on Parallel and Distributed Processing Environments, 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.16, No. 2, 203-209, May 2001 
Bossi A, Dind J E, Frisson J M, Khoudiakov U, Light HF et al, An International Survey on 
Failures in Large Power Transformers in Service, Cigré Electra, No.88, 21-48, 1983 
Boteler D H, Space Weather Effects on Power Systems, American Geophysical Union, 347-
352, 2001 
Boteler D H, Shier R M, Watanabe T, Horita R E, Effects of Geomagnetically Induced Currents 
in the B. C. Hydro 500 kV System, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
January 1989 
Breslow P B, Sailor D J, Vulnerability of Wind Power Resources to Climate Change in the 
Continental united States, Renewable Energy, Vol.27, 585-598, 2002 
Brostrom E, Ahlberg J, Soder L, Modelling of Ice Storms and their Impact Applied to a Part of 
the Swedish Transmission Network, Power Tech, Laussanne, 1593-1598, 2007  
 Page 181 
 
Brown R E, Gupta S, Christie R D, Venkata S S, Fletcher R, Distribution System Reliability 
Assessment: Momentary Interruptions and Storms, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 
Vol. 12, No. 12, 1569-1575, 1997 
Burnham J T, Bird Streamer Flashovers on FPL Transmission Lines, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, Vol. 10, No. 2, 970-977, 1995 
Carer P, Briend C, Weather Impact on Components Reliability: a Model for MV electrical 
Networks, 10th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power 
Systems, Puerto Rico, 2008 
Carpaneto E, Chicco G, Evaluation of Probability Density Functions of Distribution System 
Reliability Indices with a Characteristic-Functions Approach, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 2, No. 9, 724-734, 2004 
Cha S-T, Jeon D-H, Bae I-S, Lee I-R, Kim J-O, Reliability Evaluation of Distribution System 
Connected Photovoltaic Generation Considering Weather Effects, 8th International 
Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, Iowa, September 2004 
Chen Q, The probability, Identification and Prevention of Rare Events in Power Systems, PhD 
Thesis, Iowa State University, USA, 2004 
Cheng D, Zhu D, Broadwater R P, Lee S, A graph trace based reliability analysis of electric 
power systems with time-varying loads and dependent failures, Electric Power Systems 
Research Vol.79, 1321–1328, 2009 
Chisepo H, Electrical and Magnetic response of Transformers to Geomagnetically Induced 
Currents, MSc. Candidate, University of Cape Town, 2012 
Chowdhury A A, Koval D O, High Voltage Transmission Equipment Forced Outage Statistics 
including Different Fault Types, 10th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods 
Applied to Power Systems, Rincon, 2008 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), Third Benchmarking Report on Quality of 
Electricity Supply, Quality of Supply Task Force Report, December 2005 
Cross N, Herman R, Gaunt C T, Investigating the usefulness of the Beta PDF to describe 
Parameter in Reliability Analyses, International Conference on Probabilistic Methods 
Applied to Power Systems, Stockholm, 2006  
Deaves D M, Lines I G, On the Fitting of Low Mean Wind Speed Data to the Weibull 
Distribution, Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, Vol. 66, No. 3, 
169-178, 1997 
 Page 182 
 
Deshmukh M K, Deshmukh S S, Modelling of Hybrid Renewable Energy Systems, Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews Journal, Vol. 12, 235–249, 2008 
Doble Website, Doble Laboratory Testing-Degree of Polymeriazation, 
http://www.doble.com/services/lab_services_testing.html [viewed on 21/06.2012]   
Dzobo O, Gaunt C T, Herman R, Investigating use of Probability Distribution Functions in 
Reliability-Worth Analysis of Electric Power Systems, International Journal of Electrical 
Power and Energy, Vol.12, 110-116, 2012 
Edimu M, Evaluation of Reliability Indices of a Composite Power System using Probability 
Distributions, MSc Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2009 
Edimu M, Gaunt C T, Herman R (1), Applying Probability Distribution Functions to Model 
System Failures Due to Adverse Weather, 17th Power Systems Computation Conference, 
Stockholm, 2011 
Edimu M, Gaunt C T, Herman R (2), Using Probability Distribution Functions in Reliability 
Analyses, Electric Power Systems Research Journal, Vol. 81, 915-921, 2011 
Endrenyi J, Reliability Modelling in Electric Power Systems, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 
1978 
Esary J D, Marshal A W, Shock Models and Wear Process, The Annals of Probability, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, 627-649, 1973 
Eskom Annual Report 2006, Western Cape Electricity Supply, 
http://www.eskom.co.za/annreport06/pdf/Western%20Cape%20electricity%20supply.
pdf (viewed: 16/08/2009) 
European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), Global Energy Scenario-January 2007, 
http://www.energyblueprint.info/677.0.html (viewed: 27/06/2011) 
Falcao A, Bollen M, Exceptional Events and Force Majeure Events and their use in the 
Electricity Sector, 20th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Prague, 
No. 233, June 2009 
Federal Energy Regulatory Authority, Final Rule: Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic 
Disturbances, Order No.: 779, May 2013 
Fells Associates Report, A Pragmatic Energy Policy for the UK, August 2008 
Filho V X, Couri J J G, Steinberger J M, Salgado E, Pilotto L A S, Martins N, Carvalho A R C, 
Roitman M, Bianco A, Chipp H J, Gomes P, The March 11th 1999 Blackout: Short-Term 
 Page 183 
 
Measures to Improve System Security and Overview of the Reports Prepared by the 
International Experts, CIGRE Large Disturbance Workshop, Paris, 2000 
Fong C C, Grigg C H, Bulk Power System Reliability Performance Assessment, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 46, 25-31, 1994 
Fox News, Brazil Blackout Sparks Concerns about Infrastructure, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009/11/12/brazil-blackout-sparks-concerns-
infrastructure/ (viewed: 18/03/2011) 
Fu W H, James D M, Vittal V, Risk Assessment for Transformer Loading, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, Vol. 16, No. 3, 346-353, 2001 
Gaunt C T, Coetzee G, Transformer Failures in Regions incorrectly considered to have Low 
GIC-risk, IEEE PowerTEch, Lausanne, July 2007 
Gaunt C T, Malengret, Why we use the term non-active power, and how it can be measured 
under non-ideal power supply conditions, presented at IEEE PES PowerAfrica Conference 
and Exposition, Johannesburg, July 2012 
Gençoğlu M T, Cebeci M, The Pollution Flashover on High Voltage Insulators, Electric Power 
Systems Research, Vol. 78, 1914-1921,  2008 
Goel L, Monte Carlo Simulation-based Reliability Studies of a Distribution Test System, 
Electric Power Systems Research, Vol. 54, 55-65, 2000 
González-Fernández R A, Leite da Silva A M, Reliability Assessment of Time-Dependent 
Systems via Sequential Cross-Entropy Monte Carlo Simulation, IEEE Transactions Power 
Systems, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2381-2387, 2011 
Gray H L, Schucany W R, Lower Confidence Limits for Availability Assuming Lognormally 
Distributed Repair Times, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. R-18, No. 4, 157-162, 
1969 
Gu S, Chen J, Tong X, Li X, Zhang R, Evaluation of Lightning Flashover Risk of HV Overhead 
Transmission Lines, Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference, Chengdu, 1-
5, 2010 
Gupta A, Nadarajah S, Handbook of Beta Distribution and its Properties, Florida, CRC Press, 
ISBN: 0824753968, 2004 
Habib S E D, Khalifa M, A New Monitor for Pollution on Power Line Insulators, Part 1: Design 
Construction and Preliminary Tests, IEEE Proceedings, Vol. 133, No. 2, 105-108, 1986 
 Page 184 
 
Haghifam M R, Omidvar M, Wind Farm Modelling in Reliability Assessment of Power System, 
9th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, 
Stockholm, 11-15, 2006 
Haldar A, Mahedavan S, Probability, Reliability and Statistical Methods in Engineering 
Design, New York, John Wiley and Sons, ISBN: 0471331198, 2000 
Haroonabadi H, Haghifam M R, Generation Reliability Evaluation in Power Markets Using 
Monte Carlo Simulation and Neural Networks, 15th International Conference on 
Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems, Curitiba, November, 2009 
He J, Sun Y, Cheng L, Fast and Accurate Online Short-Term Reliability Assessment, 
Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, Singapore, 352-357, 2010 
Heier S, Grid Integration of Wind Energy Conversion Systems, 2nd Edition, John Wiley and 
Sons, Chichester, ISBN: 139780470868997, 2006 
Henderson M, Power System Planning Process and Issues, IEEE Power and Energy Society 
General Meeting, Calgary, 2009 
Herman R, Gaunt C T, A Practical Probabilistic Design Procedure for LV Residential 
Distribution Systems, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2247-2254, 
2008 
Herman R, Gaunt C T, Probabilistic Interpretation of Customer Interruption Costs (CIC) 
Applied to South African Systems, 11th Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems 
Conference, Singapore, 2010   
Herman R, Gaunt C T, Edimu M, Procedure for Investigating the Planned and Operational 
Reliability of Transmission Networks with GICs, IASTED, Greece, 2011 
Herman R, Heunis S W, A General Probabilistic Voltage Drop Calculation Method  for L.V 
Distribution Networks based on a Beta PDF Load Model, Electric Power Systems 
Research, Vol. 46, No. 1, 45-49, 1998 
Historic Model Ships (HMS), The Swedish Vasa of 1628, Available at: 
http://www.modelships.de/Wasa/VASA_eng.htm 
Hutchins T R, Overbye T J, Power flow studies in the presence of geomagnetically induced 
currents, IEEE Power and Energy Conference, 1-4, Illinois, 2012 
Hutchins T R, Overbye T J, The Effect of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Electric Grid and 
Appropriate Mitigation Strategies, North American Power Symposium, 1-5, Boston, 
2011 
 Page 185 
 
IEEE data analysis task force, Working Group on Statistics of Line Outages, An IEEE Survey of 
U.S. and Canadian Overhead Transmission Outages at 230 kV and above, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No. 1, 21-39, 1994 
IEEE/ANSI C57.91-1995, Guide for Loading Mineral-Oil-Immersed Transformers, 1995 
IEEE C57.117-1986, Guide on Reporting Failure Data for Power Transformers and Shunt 
Reactors on Electric Utility Power Systems, 1986 
IEEE 1243-1997, Guide for Improving the Lightning Performance of Transmission Lines, 1997 
IEEE 859-1987, IEEE Standard Terms for Reporting and Analyzing Outage Occurrences and 
Outage States of Electrical Transmission Facilities, 1988 
IEEE Report, Working Group on Geomagnetic Disturbances and Power System Effects, 
Geomagnetic Disturbance Effects on Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Delivery, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1206-1213, 1993 
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) report, October 2010 draft, Available at: http://www.doe-
irp.co.za/archive.html 
International Organization of Standardization (ISO), International Standard: Quality 
Management and Quality Assurance Vocabulary, ISO 8402, 1994 
Jadrijev Z, Majstrovic M, Majstrovic G, The Relationship between Reliability Indices and Daily 
Load Curve, 20th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Prague, No. 909, 
June 2009 
Jagers J N, Khosa J, De Klerk P J, Gaunt C T, Transformer Reliability and Condition Assessment 
in a South African Utility, XVth International Symposium on High Voltage Engineering, 
Ljubljana, 2007 
Jagers J N, Comparing the Reliability of older and newer Transformer Designs, MSc. Thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 2011 
Jakarta Post, Massive Blackout hits Java, Bali, (Available at 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/08/19/massive-blackout-hits-java-
bali.html viewed: 22/03/2011) 
Jandrell I, Blumenthal R, Anderson R, Trengrove E, Recent Lightning Research in South Africa 
with a Special Focus on Kerunopathology, 16th International Symposium on High Voltage 
Engineering, August 2009 
 Page 186 
 
Jian H, Lin C, Yuan-Zhang S, Transformer Real-time, Reliability Model based on Operating 
Conditions, Journal of Zhejiang University, Vol. 8, No. 3, 378-383, 2007   
Kachler A J, Unique Transformer Failure Statistics - An Important Contribution to Economics 
of Transformer Management, SC12 (Transformers), Cigré Colloquium, Dublin, 2001 
Kappenman J G, Albertson V D, Bracing for the Geomagnetic Storms, IEEE Spectrum 
Magazine, 27-33, March 1990 
 Kappenman J G, Radasky W A, Gilbert J L, Erinmez I A, Advanced Geomagnetic Storm 
Forecasting: A Risk Management Tool for Electric Power System Operations, IEEE 
Transactions on Plasma Science, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2114-2122, December 2000 
Kim –O, Singh, Including in Uncertainty in LOLE Calculation using Fuzzy Set Theory, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 17, No. 1, 19-25, February, 2002 
Kinver M, Britain ‘faces power cuts threat’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7618840.stm (viewed: 17/09/2009) 
Kjolle G H, Holen A T, Reliability and Interruption Cost Prediction using Time-dependent 
Failure Rates and Interruption Costs, Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 
Vol. 14, 159-165, 1998 
Koen J, Gaunt C T, Disturbances in the Southern African Power Network due to 
Geomagnetically Induced Currents, CIGRE, August, 2001 
Kolowrocki K, Kwiatuszewska-Sarnecka B, Reliability and risk analysis of large systems with 
ageing components, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 93, 1821– 1829, 
2008 
Koonce A M, Apostolakis G E, Cook B K, Bulk Power Risk Analysis: Ranking Infrastructure 
Elements According to their Risk Significance, Electrical Power and Energy Systems 
Journal, Vol. 30, 169-183, 2008 
KOSTT Press Release-24/07/2007, Kosovo Power System Power Blackout, 
http://www.kostt.com/kosttcms/images/doc/Press_release-
Kosova_Power_System_Blackout.pdf, (viewed: 20/03/2011) 
Koval D O, Bin S, Shen S, Chowdury A, Modelling Severe Weather Related High Voltage 
Transmission Line Forced Outages, Transmission and Distribution Conference and 
Exhibition, 788-793, May 2006 
 Page 187 
 
Krahl S, Ohrem S, Haubrich H-J, probability Distributions of Reliability Indices of Electricity 
Distribution Networks, 20th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Prague, 
No. 373, June 2009 
LaCommare K H, Eto J H, Cost of Power Interruptions to Electricity Consumers in the United 
States (U.S), Environmental Energy Technologies Division, September, 2004, Available 
at: http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/58164.pdf  
Lanoie R, Mercure H, Influence of Forest Fires on Power Line Insulation, 6th International 
Symposium on High Voltage Engineering, New Orleans, USA, 1989  
Lapworth J A, Transformer Reliability Surveys, Cigré Biennial Conference, A2-114, Paris, 2006 
Lecomte E L, Pang A W, Russel J W, Ice Storm ’98, Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, 
December 1998 
Lee M Q, Lu C N, Huang H S, Reliability and Cost Analyses of Electricity Collection Systems of 
a Marine Current Farm-A Taiwanese Case Study, Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, Vol. 13. No. 8, 2012-2021, 2009 
Lee S T, Estimating the Probability of Cascading Outages in a Power Grid, 16th Power 
Systems Computation Conference, Glasgow, 2008 
Lee S T, Probabilistic Reliability Assessment for Transmission Planning and Operation 
Including Cascading Outages, IEEE Power Systems Conference and Exposition, Seattle, 
2009 
Leite da Silva A M, Endreny J, Wang L, Integrated Treatment of Adequacy and Security in 
Bulk Power System Reliability Evaluations, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, 1993 
Leite da Silva A M, Manso L A F, Mello J C O,  Billinton R, Pseudo-Chronological Simulation 
for Composite Reliability Analysis with Time Varying Loads, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 15, No. 1,  73–80,  2000 
Leon-Garcia A, Probability and random Processes for Electrical Engineering, New York, 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, ISBN: 020150037X, 1994 
Li W, Incorporating Aging Failures in Power System Reliability Evaluation, IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Vol. 17, No. 3, 918-923, 2002 
Li W, Operation Reliability of Power Systems, Article in Wiley Encyclopaedia of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering, Wiley Online Library, Available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/047134608X.W8187/abstract, 2013 
 Page 188 
 
Li W, Risk Assessment of Power System. Models, Methods and Applications, New York, IEEE 
Press, ISBN: 0471631682, 2005 
Li W, Xiong X, Zhou J, Incorporating Fuzzy Weather-related Outages in Transmission System 
Reliability Assessment, IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution Journal, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 26-37, January 2009  
Li Y, Bulk System Reliability Evaluation in a Deregulated Power Industry, MSc. Thesis, College 
of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 2003 
Liu Y, Singh C, A Methodology for Evaluation of Hurricane Impact on Composite Power 
System Reliability, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 26, No. 1, 145-152, 
February 2011 
Looms J S T, Insulators for High Voltages, London, Peregrinus limited, ISBN: 0863411169 
1988 
Loredo-Souza A M, Davenport A G, The Effects of High Winds on Transmission Lines, Journal 
of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, Vol. 74-76, 987-994, 1998 
Lun Y F, Lam J C, A Study of Weibull Parameters Using Long-term Wind Observations, 
Renewable Energy, Vol. 20, No.2, 145-153, 2000 
Lundstedt H, The Sun, Space Weather and GIC Effects in Sweden, Advances in Space 
Research, Vol. 37, 1182-1191, 2006  
Makkonen L, Modelling Power Line Icing in Freezing Precipitation, Atmospheric Research 
Journal, Vol. 46, 131-142, 1998 
Marakov Y V, Hardiman R C, Risk, Reliability, Cascading and Restructuring, IEEE PES General 
Meeting, Vol. 3, 1417-1429, 2003  
Marantes S, Pais Da Silva A, Variability Evaluation of Distribution Networks Quality of Supply 
Performance Indices, 20th ICED, pp. 910, June 2009 
Mason J P, Black, Veatch Ltd, Lake Victoria: A Predictably Fluctuating Resource, Hydropower 
and Dams, Issue 3, 1-4, 2006 
Mason J P, Using Short to Medium Term Climate Data to Improve Hydrological 
Understanding and Supplement Stochastic Predictions, 20th African Hydropower 
Symposium, Lusaka, Zambia, September 2008 
Meliopoulos A P, Cokkinides G J, James J R, An online Transformer Diagnostic System, 
TechCon, 23-35, 1998  
 Page 189 
 
Mettas A, Sawa M, System Reliability Analysis: the advantages of using Analytical Methods 
to Analyze Non-repairable Systems, Proceedings of Annual Reliabilioty and 
Maintainability Symposium, Philadelphia, January 2001 
Michener H, Where Engineer and Ornithologist Meet: Transmission Line Troubles caused by 
Birds, The Condor, May-June, 1928 
Minnaar U J, Gant C T, Nicolls F, Characterization of Power System Events on South African 
Power Lines, Electric Power System Research, Vol. 88, 25-32, 2012   
Miranda V, Carvalho L M, Mauro A R, Leite A M S, Singh C, Improving Power System 
Reliability Calculation Efficiency with EPSO Variants, IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1772-1779, 2009 
Mili M, Qiu Q, Risk Assessment of Catastrophic Failures in Electric Power Systems, 
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure, Vol. 1, No. 1, 38-63, 2004 
Molinski T S, Feero W E, Damsky B L, Shielding Grids from Solar Storms, IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 
37, No. 11, 55-60, November 2000 
Molinski T S, Why Utilities Respect Geomagnetically Induced Currents, Journal of 
Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics, Vol. 64, 1765– 1778, 2002 
Nadarajah S, Kotz S, The Beta Exponential Distribution, Reliability Engineering System Safety 
Vol. 91, 689-697, 2006 
Naidoo K, Ijumba N M, Britten, A C, Bird Streamer Initiated Breakdown Characteristics under 
HVDC conditions, International Conference on Power System Technology, Vol. 19, 1-7, 
Chongqing, 2006 
National American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Effects of Geomagnetic 
Disturbances on the Bulk Power System, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim 
Report, Available at: http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf  
Nelson, W, Applied Life Data Analysis, New York, John Wiley & Sons, ISBN: 0471094587 
1982 
Ngwira C M, Geomagnetically Induced Current Characteristics in Southern Africa, MSc. 
thesis, Rhodes University, June, 2008 
Ngwira C M, NASSP Space Weather Course 2011: Geomagnetically Induced Currents, 
University of Cape Town, May 2011 
 Page 190 
 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Special Reliability Assessment 
Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power Systems, 
February 2012 
O’Connor P D T, Practical Reliability Engineering, Sussex, Wiley and Sons, 2002, ISBN: 
978047084463  
Ozgener O, Ozgener L, Exergy and Reliability Analysis of Wind Turbine Systems: A Case 
Study, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 11, 1811-1826, 2007 
Patel M R, Wind and Solar Power Systems, CRC Press, New York, ISBN: 0849316057, 1999 
Pahwa A, Hopkins M, Gaunt C T, Evaluation of Outages in Overhead Distribution Systems of 
South Africa and of Manhattan, Kansas, USA, 7th International Conference on Power 
System Operation and Planning, Cape Town, South Arica, 2007 
Papoulis A, Probability, Random Variables, and Stochastic Processes, 3rd Edition, Singapore, 
McGraw-Hill Inc., ISBN: 0071008705, 1991 
Park J, Liang W, Choi J, El-Keib A A, Shahidehpour M, Billinton R, A Probabilistic Evaluation of 
a Power System including Solar/Photovoltaic Cell Generator, IEEE PES General Meeting, 
1-6, 1999 
Pham T G, Turkkan N, Reliability of a Standby System with Beta-Distributed Component 
Lives, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol. 43, No. 1, 71-75, 1994 
Power System Dynamic Performance Committee (PSDPC), Causes of the 2003 Major Grid 
Blackouts in North America and Europe, and Recommended Means to Improve System 
Dynamic Performance, Proceedings of IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 
Denver, 2004 
Power System Outage Task Force (POSTS) for US and Canada, Final Report on the 14th 
August 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, 
April, 2004 [Available at: https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf] 
Pulkkinen A, Geomagnetic Induction during Highly Disturbed Space Weather Conditions: 
Study of Ground Effects, Ph.D. thesis, University of Helsinki, 2003 
Rei A M, Schilling M T, Reliability Assessment of the Brazilian Power Grid using Enumeration 
and Monte Carlo, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1480-1487, 
August 2008 
 Page 191 
 
Rei A M, Schilling M T, Melo A C G, Monte Carlo Simulation and Contingency Enumeration in 
Bulk Power Systems Reliability Assessment, 9th International Conference on Probabilistic 
Methods Applied to Power Systems, Stockholm, Sweden, 2006 
Réseau de transport d’léctricité (RTE), The French Electricity Report 2009, January 2010, 
Available at: http://www.rte-france.com/uploads/media/pdf_zip/publications-
annuelles/rte-be09-en-02.pdf 
Reuters-US, Factbox: Texas Power Plant, Customer Outages due to Cold, 3rd /02/2011, 
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/us-ercot-rollingblackouts-
idUSTRE7124NA20110203 
Reuters –Africa, Update 5: Risk of Texas Electric Blackout ends, 10th/02/2011, Available at: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFN1026917320110210 
Sahinoĝlu M, Longnecker M T, Ringer L J, Singh C, Ayoub A K, Probability Distribution 
Functions for Generation Reliability Indices-Analytical Approach, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-102, No. 6, 1486-1493, 1983 
Sannino A, Bollen M H J, Effect of Adverse Weather on the Voltage Dip Mitigation Capability 
of a Static Transfer Switch, European Transactions on Electrical Power, Vol. 13, No. 6, 
2003 
SANS 507-1:2007, Electricity distribution-Guidelines for the provision of electricity 
distribution networks in residential areas. Part 1: Planning and design of distribution 
networks, Standards, Pretoria South Africa  
Schlabasch J, Rofalski K-H, Power System Engineering Planning, Design, and Operation of 
Power Systems and Equipment, Weinheim, Wiley-VCH, ISBN-13: 9783527407590, 2008 
Singh C, Lago-Gonzales A, Reliability Modelling of Generation Systems including 
Unconventional Energy Sources, IEEE Power Engineering Review, Vol. PER-5, No.5, 33, 
1985 
Singh C, Mitra J, Composile System Reliability Evaluation based on Monte-Carlo Simulation 
Combined with Outages Screening, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
785-791, 1999 
Sheskins D, Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures, 5th Edition, 
Florida, CRC Press, ISBN: 1439858012, 2011 
  
 Page 192 
 
Smith R L, Extreme Value Theorem and Reliability Applications, Reliability Journal, Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 161-170, 2003 
Sokolov V, Vanin B, Evaluation and Identification of Typical Defects and Failure Modes in 
110 kV-750 kV Bushings, 64th Annual International Conference of Doble Clients, Boston, 
1997 
Solver T, Amelin M, State Duration Based Monte Carlo simulation Model with Independent 
Failures for Distribution System Reliability Analysis, 9th International Conference on 
Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, Stockholm, 2006 
Song Y, He H, Zhang D, Guo J, Probabilistic Security Evaluation of Bulk Power System 
Considering Cascading Outages, IEEE International Conference on Power System 
Technology, Chongqing, October, 2006 
South African Weather Service (SAWS), Western Cape Weather Data, Period: 2000-2010 
Staco Energy Products website: http://www.stacoenergy.com/emergency-lighting-ups.htm 
(viewed: 17/05/2011) 
Stager J C, Ruzmaikin A, Conway D, Verburg P, Mason P J, Sunspots, El Nino and the levels of 
Lake Victoria, East Africa, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 112, d15106, 
doi:10.1029/2006jd008362, 2007 
Streubel H, The Influence of Non-uniform Contamination on the Flashover Voltage of 
Insulators, 4th International Symposium on High Voltage Engineering, Athens, Greece, 
1983 
 Sukhnandan A, A Theoritical and Experimental Investigation into Fire Induced Flashover of 
High Voltage Transmission Lines, MSc. Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, 
2004 
Sukhnandan A, Hoch D A, Fire Induced Flashovers of Transmission Lines: Theoretical Models, 
6th AFRICON Conference, George, South Africa, October 2002 
Sundararajan R, Burnham J, Carlton R, Cherney E A, Couret G, Eldridge K T, Farzaneh M, 
Frazier S D, Gorur R S, Harness R, Schaffner D, Siegel S, Varner J, Preventive Measures to 
Reduce Bird-Related Power Outages-Part II: Streamers and Contamination, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1843-1847, 2004 
Sutanto D, Lachs W R, Control Measure for Improving Power System Reliability, International 
Conference on Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management, Hong 
Kong, 1991 
 Page 193 
 
Suntanto D, Outhred H R, Lee Y B, Probabilistic Power Production Cost and Reliability 
Calculation by the Z-transform Method, IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion, Vol. 4 
No. 4, 559-566,  2002 
Taylor P V, Naidoo P, Hoch D A, Britten A C, An Investigation into Anomalous Flashovers of 
Transmission Lines, 3rd CIGRE South Africa Regional Conference, 1998 
Tyco Electronics website, Porcelain Rigid Red Guano shield (RRGS), Available at: 
http://energy.tycoelectronics.com/index.asp?act=page&pag_id=2&prl_id=5&pls_id=29
&prf_id=59&prr_parent=483 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol: 
Reference Manual on Accounting of Emissions and Assigned Amount, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/items/2625.
php (viewed: 18/09/2009) 
Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE), Final Report of the 
Investigation Committee on the 28th September 2003 Blackout in Italy, April 2004 
(Available at: www.rae.gr/cases/C13/italy/UCTE_rept.pdf ) 
United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO), Meeting Energy demand in the 
21st Century, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, March 
2005 
Van Casteren J F L, Bollen H J M, Reliability Assessment in Electrical Power Systems: The 
Wiebull-Markov Stochastic Model, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 36, 
No. 3, 911-915, 2000 
Van Rooyen C, Vooslo H, Harness R, Watch the Birdie [Overhead Line Faults], IEEE Industry 
Applications, Vol. 9, No. 5, 55-60, 2003 
Van Schijndel A, Wetzer J M, Wouters P A A, Forecasting Reliability of Transformer 
Populations, 19th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Vienna, 2007  
Vancouver Island Powerline website: 
http://www.vancouverislandpowerline.com/quebec_ice_storm.html (viewed: 
17/05/2011) 
Vosloo H F, The Need for and Contents of a Life Cycle Management Plan for Eskom 
Transmission Line Servitudes, MSc. Dissertation, Department of Geography, 
Environmental and Energy Studies, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 2005 
 Page 194 
 
Vosloo H F, Britten A C, Burger A A, Muftic D, The Susceptibility of 400 kV Transmission Lines 
to Bird Streamers and Bush Fires: A Definitive Case Study. 6th CIGRE Southern African 
Regional Conference, Somerset West, Western Cape, August 2009 
Walpole R E, Probability and Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, 8th Edition, Oxford, 
Pearson Education, ISBN: 978-8131715529, 2007 
Wang C, Zheng G, Cheng T C, Reliability Evaluation and Failure Analysis of Power Capacitors, 
Journal of Tsinghua University, Vol. 31, No.4, 107-112, 1991 
 Wang P, Billinton R, Time Sequential Distribution System Reliability Worth Analysis 
Considering Time Varying Load and Cost Models, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 
vol. 14, No. 3, 1046-1051, 1999.   
Wang P, Billinton R, Reliability Cost/Worth Assessment of Distribution Systems Incorporating 
Time-Varying Weather Conditions and Restoration Resources, IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, Vol. 17, No. 1, 260-265, 2002 
Wang Y, Pham H, Dependent Competing-Risk Degradation, Safety and Risk Modelling and Its 
Applications, Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, 197-218, 2011 
Wangdee W, Billinton R, Utilization of Time Varying Event-Based Customer Interruption Cost 
Load Shedding Schemes, 8th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied 
to Power Systems, Iowa, 769-775, September 2004 
Wen J, Zheng Y, Donghan F, A Review on Reliability Assessment for Wind Power, Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Reviews Journal, Vol. 13, 2485–2494, 2009 
William H, Bartley P E, Failure Analysis of Transformers, 36th Annual Conference of the 
International Association of Engineering Insurers, Stockholm, 2003 
Wilkins J D, The Bath-tub Curve and Product Failure Behaviour, Reliability Hotwire, Issue 21, 
November 2002 
Xianhe J, Wang C, Amancio A, Chen C, Cheng T C, Reliability Analyses and Calculation for 
Distribution Transformers, IEEE Transmission and Distribution Conference, Vol. 2, 901-
906, 1999 
Xiao, Y Q, Li Q S, Li Z N, Chow Y W, Li G Q, Probability Distributions of Extreme Wind Speed 
and its Occurrence Interval, Engineering Structures, Vol. 28, 1173-1181, 2006 
Yongji G, Yongjian X, Kai X, Huiyi Y, Composite System Reliability Evaluation based on Monte-
Carlo Simulation with Outages Screening, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol.14, 
No. 2, 785-790, 1999 
 Page 195 
 
Yun S-Y,  Kim J-C, Moon J-F, Park C-H, Park S-M, Lee M-S, Reliability Evaluation of Radial 
Distribution System Considering Momentary Interruptions, IEEE Power and Energy 
Society General Meeting, Vol. 1, 480-485, 2003 
Zapata C J, Silva S C, Burbano O L, Repair Models of Power Distribution Components, IEEE 
PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition, Latin America, 1-6, 2008  
Zhang W, Billinton R, Application of an Adequacy Equivalent Method in Bulk Power System 
Reliability Evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 13, No. 2, 661-666, 
1998  
Zhou J, Reliability Assessment Method for Pressure piping Containing Circumferential Defects 
based on Fuzzy Probability, International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 82, 
669-678, 2005 
Zhou Y, Pahwa A, Yang S-S, Modelling Weather Related Failures of Overhead Distribution 
Lines, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1683-1690, 2006 
Zhou Y X, Xu X, Nie Q, Liang X D, Guan Z C, Cui J F, Li Z Y, Yuan Y C, Chen Y, Yu D M, Bird 
Streamer Caused Flashover in EHV Transmission Line, IEEE Transactions on Dielectrics 
and Electrical Insualtion, Vol. 16, No. 1, 69-76, 2009 
Zhu D, Electric Distribution Reliability Analysis Considering Time-varying Load, Weather 
Conditions and Reconfiguration with Distributed Generation, PhD Thesis, Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2007 




A. SELECTED RELIABILITY INDICES 
Below are some selected indices identified for use in reliability studies [Billinton & Kumar, 
1990; Pereira & Balu, 1992; Billinton & Allan, 1996; Li, 2003]. 
 
A.1 Basic Indices 
 Probability of Load Curtailment 
PLC = ∑ Pi           
Pi = Probability of a state i causing load curtailment  
 
 Expected Loss of Load (LOLE) 
LOLE = ∑ (Pi * Di)  days/period of study    
Pi   = Probability of a given Capacity outage  
Di   = Duration of Capacity outage 
 
 Expected Loss of Energy (LOEE)/Expected Energy not Supplied (EENS) 
LOEE = ∑ (Pi * Ei)  MWh      
Ei = Energy curtailed for a given capacity outage  
 
 Expected Demand not Supplied (EDNS) 
EDNS = ∑ (Ci*Pi) MW       
Ci = Capacity outage due to state i 
 
 Expected Frequency of Load Curtailment (EFLC) 
EFLC = ∑ (Fi - fi ) Occ/yr      
Fi = Frequency of departing state i 
fi = Portion of Fi that corresponds to not going through the boundary wall between 
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 Expected Duration of Load Curtailment (EDLC) 
EDLC = PLC * 8760 hrs/yr      
 Average Duration of Load Curtailment 
ADLC = EDLC/EFLC hrs/disturbance     
 
  Expected Number of Voltage violations (ENVV) 
ENVV = ∑ Fj   
      
A.2 IEEE proposed Indices 
  Bulk Power Interruption Index (BPII) 
BPII = ∑
      
 
 MW/MW-yr      
L = annual system peak load 
 
 Bulk Power-Energy Curtailment Index (BPECI) 
BPECI = 
    
 
 MWh/MW-yr      
 Severity Index (SI) 
SI = (BPECI * 60) system Min/yr     
 
 Bulk Power-Supply Average MW Curtailment Index (BPACI) 
BPACI = 
   
    
 MW/disturbance     
 
 Modified Bulk Energy Curtailment Index (MBECI) 
MBECI = 
    
 
 MW/MW      
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B. SOUTH AFRICAN LIGHTNING FLASH DENSITY MAPS 
 


















The values supplied in the list on the right are representative of the number of lightning flashes 
to ground per square kilometre per year. 
For further Information please contact: 
Hendri Geldenhuys 
Tel (012) 841 4482 
or Bruno Lagesse 
Tol (012) 841 3999 
Fax (012) 841 4038 
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Figure C.0.2: South African Lightning flash density map based on climatic regions [Minnar et al, 
2012] 
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C. PSEUDO NETWORK SPECIFICATIONS 
C.1 Network component specifications 
 Transmission lines 
The transmission lines are rated at 400 kV and 1.7 kA. Table D.1 shows the transmission line 
conductor categories based on the resistance and reactance values. 
Table E.1: Resistance and reactance conductor categories 
Category Resistance Reactance Number of lines 
A 0.36 3.5 5 
B 0.31 3.5 2 
C 0.27 1.0 1 
D 0.34 1.08 4 
E 0.15 0.58 4 
F 0.31 1.2 1 
G 0.32 1.1 11 
H 0.17 0.54 4 
 
Table E.2: Bus-bus line connections and line lengths 




12 12 A 
15 150 B 
















21 123 E 
31 246 F 
41 187 D 
22 123 E 












34 37 250 
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46 47 171 
G 
49 51 163 
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C.2  Pseudo network frequency of failure data sets 
 
Table E.4: Short-term transmission failure statistics for different climatic regions  
Thunderstorm region 
S/P 
00:00-05:59 06:00-11:59 12:00-17:59 18:00-23:59 
mean std max mean std max mean std max mean std max 
January-March 17.8 6.73 58.2 3.6 2.47 15.6 7.9 5.79 36.3 12.6 5.33 44.6 
April-June 13.9 9.39 59.5 8.4 2.99 28.8 7.8 7.69 44.6 9.1 5.17 37.1 
July-September 7.4 4.13 35.8 8.4 4.43 39.6 26.4 12.36 86.4 5.8 2.69 22.2 
October-
December 
10.9 5.12 40.1 3 2.01 17 13.4 4.39 40.2 12.1 5.65 44.1 
January-
December 




00:00-05:59 06:00-11:59 12:00-17:59 18:00-23:59 
mean std max mean std max mean std max mean std max 
January-March 18.10 23.13 131.30 5.00 4.76 35.80 8.70 4.14 40.00 6.80 4.58 39.50 
April-June 11.00 3.83 35.00 6.90 3.68 29.70 2.70 3.39 23.00 6.10 3.69 27.60 
July-September 9.30 3.73 31.30 5.30 1.77 17.30 1.10 1.69 13.70 4.70 3.52 27.30 
October-
December 
11.40 4.62 40.60 2.00 1.84 15.20 4.70 3.34 23.60 4.20 2.30 17.50 
January-
December 
49.80 24.18 238.20 19.20 6.54 98.00 17.20 6.53 100.30 21.80 7.22 111.90 
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Table E. 5: Annual transmission failure statistic for local South African threats  
Frontal region (January-December) 
Threat 
00:00-05:59 06:00-11:59 12:00-17:59 18:00-23:59 
mean std max mean mean std max mean mean std max max 
Birds 36.10 7.13 92.90 13.30 4.50 46.50 5.20 1.73 18.40 14.20 5.48 50.00 
Lightning 4.00 3.06 26.40 2.00 1.66 13.60 4.60 4.89 47.20 2.20 3.27 27.20 
Fire 0.30 0.48 3.90 0.70 0.90 7.50 4.10 2.96 26.10 0.50 0.84 5.30 
Pollution 1.60 2.58 17.60 1.60 2.10 12.80 1.20 2.63 13.20 0.20 0.28 1.80 
 
Thunderstorm region (January-December) 
Threat 
00:00-05:59 06:00-11:59 12:00-17:59 18:00-23:59 
mean std max mean mean std max mean mean std max mean 
Birds 37.80 12.31 129.40 12.50 4.36 46.50 2.00 1.84 16.40 19.10 6.85 70.00 
Lightning 9.20 4.14 38.00 2.00 1.66 13.60 19.40 7.09 67.40 17.70 6.66 60.50 
Fire 1.40 1.16 8.60 7.30 3.54 28.10 34.10 14.52 123.70 2.60 1.71 15.00 
Pollution 9.40 22.90 115.00 3.20 4.35 30.40 1.20 2.63 13.20 2.60 3.29 25.00 
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D. LABORATORY EXPERIMENT SIMULATION TRANSFORMER GIC INJECTION  
D.1 Experiments on single-phase transformers 
The lab set up is shown in Figure F.1. The main purpose of the laboratory experiment was to 
observe the effect dc current (simulated GIC) injection on a transformer’s outputs (voltage 
and current). 
 
Figure F.1: Setup of experiment on single-phase transformers  
 
The set up ensured that only the load transformer (T2) could be pushed into saturation by 
any dc injection. The output voltage and current profiles of the load transformer, before and 
after dc injection, are shown in Figure F.2. The profiles are clearly different. The rms and pk-
pk values also show that the dc injection caused a drop in the magnitude of the load 
transformer’s output voltage and current. The power output of a transformer would thus be 
lower than the rated value. 
 
        
(a)                  (b) 
Figure F.2: Load transformer output voltage and current waveforms (a) before GIC injection (b) 
after GIC injection 
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D.2 Experiments on three-phase transformer 
In order to simulate the effects of GIC on a transformer with an earthed neutral, a bench 
scale laboratory test system was used. A significantly over-rated source transformer 
supplied power to a smaller load transformer an both transformers are a bank of three 
single phase transformers. The load transformer, which is the transformer under test, is 
being operated at its knee voltage as defined by McLyman as the point on the 
magnetization curve that touches a straight line from the origin whose slope is 
characterized by maximum permeability µr. The set up of this experiment is shown in Figure 
F.3.  
 
Figure F.3: Laboratory test system to simulate injection of GIC into the neutral of the load 
transformer. A DC battery is used to inject the direct current [Chisepo, 2012].  
 
A small isolated three phase generator was used as the power supply and care was taken to 
ensure that the applied voltage across the load transformer did not correspond to over-
excitation (approximately 30% below the nameplate rating) and therefore generate 
harmonics. The direct current that was injected was a percentage of the magnetizing 
current of the load transformer, namely 1.6 per unit. The justification for using an arbitrary 
resistive load (70% of VA rating) is that after a series of tests it was shown that non-active 
power absorbed by the load transformer was substantially independent of the load and 
increased more than linearly with the applied voltage, as expected.  
